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SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

AND THE COMMITTEE ON THE GRADUATE DIVISION

OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

James Alden Barber, Jr.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|--|------|
| LIST OF TABLES | vii |
| Chapter | |
| I. THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED | 1 |
| The Problem | |
| Limitations of the Study | |
| Definitions of Social Mobility | |
| Social Status | |
| Subjective and Objective Status | |
| Types of Mobility | |
| Organization of the Study | |
| II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE | 13 |
| Party Preference: Theory | |
| Party Preference: Research | |
| Political Attitudes | |
| Political Interest and Involvement | |
| Extremism and Prejudice | |
| Social Integration | |
| Conclusion | |
| III. THEORETICAL ORIENTATION | 43 |
| Stratification and Political System | |
| The Over-Identification Hypothesis | |
| Political Socialization | |
| Mobility as a Process of Socialization | |
| Statement of Hypotheses | |
| IV. METHODS AND PROCEDURES | 66 |
| Secondary Analysis | |
| Sample Design | |
| Aggregation of Surveys | |
| Measuring Objective Mobility | |
| Occupation as a Measure of Objective Mobility | |
| Ranking of Occupations | |
| An Operational Definition of Objective Mobility | |
| Objective Mobility Sample Size | |
| Measuring Subjective Mobility | |
| Manner of Testing Propositions | |
| Statistical Procedures | |

| Chapter | | Page |
|---|-----|------|
| V. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MOBILE | | 89 |
| Income | | |
| Education | | |
| Religion | | |
| Age | | |
| Race | | |
| Nativity | | |
| Conclusion | | |
| VI. SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE | 112 | |
| Party Preference | | |
| Voting | | |
| Parents and Friends as a Political Influence | | |
| Party Preference and the Passage of Time | | |
| Level of Interest and Party Preference | | |
| Party Loyalty | | |
| Strength of Party Affiliation | | |
| Objective Mobility and Subjective Class | | |
| Summary | | |
| VII. SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES | 171 | |
| Economic Liberalism: Government Economic Activity | | |
| Economic Liberalism: Full Employment Policy | | |
| Economic Liberalism: Medicare | | |
| Noneconomic Liberalism: Isolationism | | |
| Noneconomic Liberalism: Foreign Aid | | |
| Conclusion | | |
| VIII. SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT. . . | 216 | |
| Social Mobility and Political Interest | | |
| Social Mobility and Political Efficacy | | |
| Social Mobility and Voting Turnout | | |
| Conclusion | | |
| IX. SOCIAL MOBILITY, PREJUDICE, AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION. . . | 257 | |
| Fair Treatment of Negroes in Jobs and Housing | | |
| School Desegregation | | |
| Rights of Government Employees | | |
| Group Membership | | |
| Groups Trusted or Distrusted | | |
| Satisfaction--Dissatisfaction | | |
| Conclusion | | |

| Chapter | Page |
|-------------------------------------|------|
| X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION | 321 |
| The Upwardly Mobile | |
| The Downwardly Mobile | |
| The White-Collar Category | |
| Political Extremism | |
| Partisan Change | |
| Status Polarization | |
| Limitations of the Analysis | |
| Conclusion | |
| APPENDIX A | 341 |
| APPENDIX B | 343 |
| APPENDIX C | 345 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 347 |

LIST OF TABLES

| Table | Page |
|--|------|
| 1. Party Choice of German, Finnish, Swedish, and American Middle Class Men Related to Their Social Origin | 22 |
| 2. Social Mobility Related to Choice of Party and Candidate . | 23 |
| 3. Political Preference by Occupational Status and Income . . | 45 |
| 4. Objective Class Identification, Subjective Class Identifi- cation and Party Identification, 1952 and 1956 | 47 |
| 5. Middle and Working Class Expectations of Own Class Vote, 1952 and 1956 . | 51 |
| 6. Parental Politics in Relation to Party Identification and Age of Respondent | 54 |
| 7. Median Scores Obtained in Relating Occupation to Estimated Social Position in 1940 and Present Social Position | 79 |
| 8. Objective Mobility and Annual Family Income | 91 |
| 9. Subjective Mobility and Annual Family Income | 92 |
| 10. Objective Mobility and Educational Level | 94 |
| 11. Subjective Mobility and Educational Level | 95 |
| 12. Objective Mobility and Church Preference. | 98 |
| 13. Subjective Mobility and Church Preference | 99 |
| 14. Objective Mobility and Age. | 101 |
| 15. Subjective Mobility and Age | 103 |
| 16. Objective Mobility and Race | 104 |
| 17. Subjective Mobility and Race | 106 |
| 18. Objective Mobility and Number of Generations in the U.S.. . | 108 |
| 19. Subjective Mobility and Number of Generations in the U.S. . | 109 |

| Table | | Page |
|-------|--|------|
| 20. | Objective Mobility and Party Preference | 114 |
| 21. | Subjective Mobility and Party Preference | 116 |
| 22. | Objective Mobility and Party Preference by Income Groups . . | 118 |
| 23. | Objective Mobility and Party Preference by Educational Level | 121 |
| 24. | Objective Mobility and Party Preference by Religious Groups | 123 |
| 25. | Objective Mobility and Party Preference with Southern Residents Omitted | 126 |
| 26. | Subjective Mobility and Party Preference with Southern Residents Omitted | 127 |
| 27. | Objective Mobility and Reported Vote for President by Election Years | 129 |
| 28. | Subjective Mobility and Reported Vote for President in 1956 and 1960 | 132 |
| 29. | Objective Mobility and Parent's Political Party | 135 |
| 30. | Objective Mobility and Friend's Votes | 137 |
| 31. | Objective Mobility and Party Preference by Age Groups . . . | 140 |
| 32. | Subjective Mobility and Party Preference by Age Groups . . | 144 |
| 33. | Objective Mobility and Party Preference by Level of Political Interest | 148 |
| 34. | Subjective Mobility and Party Preference by Level of Political Interest | 151 |
| 35. | Objective Mobility and Change in Party Affiliation | 154 |
| 36. | Subjective Mobility and Change in Party Affiliation | 155 |
| 37. | Objective Mobility and Party Regularity | 157 |
| 38. | Subjective Mobility and Party Regularity | 158 |
| 39. | Objective Mobility and Strength of Party Preference | 160 |

| Table | | Page |
|-------|--|------|
| 40. | Subjective Mobility and Strength of Party Preference | 161 |
| 41. | Objective Mobility and Subjective Class | 163 |
| 42. | Objective Mobility and Party Preference by Subjective Class . | 165 |
| 43. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Economic Activity . | 175 |
| 44. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Economic Activity . | 176 |
| 45. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Economic Activity, by Income Groups | 178 |
| 46. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Economic Activity, by Educational Level | 180 |
| 47. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Insuring Full Employment . | 183 |
| 48. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Insuring Full Employment . | 184 |
| 49. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Insuring Full Employment, by Income Groups | 187 |
| 50. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Insuring Full Employment, by Educational Level | 189 |
| 51. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Medicare | 192 |
| 52. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Medicare | 194 |
| 53. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Medicare, by Income . | 195 |
| 54. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Isolationism | 199 |
| 55. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Isolationism | 200 |
| 56. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Isolationism, by Educational Level . | 202 |
| 57. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Isolationism, by Educational Level . | 204 |

| Table | | Page |
|-------|---|------|
| 76. | Objective Mobility and Feeling of Political Understanding | 247 |
| 77. | Objective Mobility and Feeling of Political Understanding, by Education | 248 |
| 78. | Subjective Mobility and Feeling of Political Understanding | 251 |
| 79. | Objective Mobility and Voting Turnout | 253 |
| 80. | Subjective Mobility and Voting Turnout | 255 |
| 81. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Insuring Fair Treatment of Negroes in Jobs and Housing | 261 |
| 82. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Insuring Fair Treatment of Negroes in Jobs and Housing | 262 |
| 83. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Insuring Fair Treatment of Negroes in Jobs and Housing, by Region | 264 |
| 84. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Insuring Fair Treatment of Negroes in Jobs and Housing, by Region | 266 |
| 85. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Insuring Fair Treatment of Negroes in Jobs and Housing, by Race . | 268 |
| 86. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Insuring Fair Treatment of Negroes in Jobs and Housing, by Race . | 270 |
| 87. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Insuring Fair Treatment of Negroes in Jobs and Housing, by Education | 273 |
| 88. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Insuring Fair Treatment of Negroes in Jobs and Housing, by Education | 275 |
| 89. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government Insuring Fair Treatment of Negroes in Jobs and Housing, by Subjective Class | 278 |
| 90. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government's Role in School Desegregation | 282 |

| Table | | Page |
|-------|---|------|
| 91. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government's Role in School Desegregation | 283 |
| 92. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government's Role in School Desegregation, by Education | 284 |
| 93. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Government's Role in School Desegregation, by Education | 286 |
| 94. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Rights of Government Employees | 290 |
| 95. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Rights of Government Employees | 291 |
| 96. | Objective Mobility and Attitude Toward Rights of Government Employees, by Education | 293 |
| 97. | Subjective Mobility and Attitude Toward Rights of Government Employees, by Education | 295 |
| 98. | Objective Mobility and Membership in Groups or Organizations | 299 |
| 99. | Objective Mobility and Union Membership, Males Only . . . | 301 |
| 100. | Subjective Mobility and Union Membership, Males Only . . | 302 |
| 101. | Objective Mobility and Number of Groups Trusted | 305 |
| 102. | Subjective Mobility and Number of Groups Trusted | 306 |
| 103. | Objective Mobility and Number of Groups Distrusted | 307 |
| 104. | Subjective Mobility and Number of Groups Distrusted | 308 |
| 105. | Objective Mobility and Feeling of Being Lucky | 310 |
| 106. | Subjective Mobility and Feeling of Being Lucky | 311 |
| 107. | Objective Mobility and Feeling of Being Pushed Around . . | 313 |
| 108. | Subjective Mobility and Feeling of Being Pushed Around . | 314 |
| 109. | Objective Mobility and Belief in Opportunity in America . | 315 |

| Table | | Page |
|-------|--|------|
| 110. | Objective Mobility and Satisfaction with Financial Situation | 317 |
| 111. | Subjective Mobility and Satisfaction with Financial Situation | 318 |
| 112. | Respondent's Vote Intention by Intentions of Friends and Co-workers | 334 |

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

This is a study of social mobility and political behavior. It is related at two levels to a subject that has long interested political scientists. At the macro level is the relationship between social classes and the functioning of a political system. At the micro level is the relationship between social status and individual political behavior. Knowledge of the association between social mobility and political behavior can contribute to understanding at both levels.

Although the behavior of the mobile has been the subject of much unsubstantiated generalization, empirical evidence has been lacking. Considerable data have been accumulated about the relationship between social status and political behavior, but relatively little effort has been expended on accumulating evidence about the effect of changes in social status on political behavior. Because such changes are an important feature of the American social system, it is important to understand how they affect the way the political system works.

The Problem

It is my purpose (1) to outline a theory of social mobility and political behavior, (2) to state a number of hypotheses drawn

from the theory, (3) to subject these hypotheses to empirical test using data from national surveys, and (4) to suggest some of the implications of the relationship between social mobility and political behavior for the functioning of a democratic political system.

Political analysts have long been interested in the relationship between an individual's place in the social structure and his political behavior. The thread runs from Aristotle to Karl Marx to the frequently quoted passage in The People's Choice which declared flatly that "a person thinks politically, as he is socially. Social characteristics determine political preference."¹ Yet in spite of the long ancestry of the idea, the relationship between status and politics is not yet adequately explored. Warren Miller has written:

Socio-economic variables . . . exert a major influence on political attitudes and behaviors. Thanks to the swiftly changing character of our society, we stand in danger of mistaking this influence unless we turn to a diligent re-examination of old concepts and search out the applicability of new ones. The task of understanding the mechanisms whereby social and economic factors influence political behavior is one of the major tasks facing the student of political analysis today.²

It is to a portion of the task of understanding the mechanisms whereby social and economic factors influence political behavior that this study is devoted.

¹Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 27.

²Warren E. Miller, "The Socio-Economic Analysis of Political Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, II, No. 3 (August, 1958), 255.

Estimates of the amount of social mobility within the American social system vary with the definition of mobility used, but all studies concur that a substantial amount does take place. Lipset and Bendix, in a study conducted in Oakland, California, found that 47 per cent of the sons whose fathers had been in manual work had moved into nonmanual work, while 32 per cent whose fathers had been in nonmanual work were now in manual work.³

Because social mobility is so widespread, and because to understand the functioning of the political system it is necessary to understand the relationship between social characteristics and political behavior, social mobility is an important subject for political research.

Limitations of the Study

Because of the scanty empirical evidence on the relationship of mobility to political behavior, and because of the conflicting results of such evidence as has been published, an exploratory approach to the subject is necessary. This results in less precision of focus and depth of analysis than can be obtained when more reliance can be placed upon prior work.

Both the theory and the data are limited to the United States. The findings may be subject to wider generalization, but no specific

³ Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, "Social Mobility and Occupational Career Patterns: I. Stability of Jobholding; II. Social Mobility," American Journal of Sociology, LVII (1952), 366-74, 494-504.

attempt is made to do so. As in any scientific work measurement problems exist. I will postpone discussion of these to Chapter IV.

A potentially serious limitation concerns the use of secondary analysis of survey data. Because existing survey data are used rather than a survey designed de novo, information is not always available for testing theoretically interesting propositions. Beyond this, however, there is a limitation in how far any conventional survey can penetrate into the ways in which social mobility affects individual behavior. A recent paper suggests that the motivations which affect the behavior of the mobile "often operate on a subconscious or only partially conscious level," and are thus hard to diagnose in a conventional survey interview.⁴ Although this objection may be legitimate from the standpoint of an inquiry into the sources of individual behavior, it is less serious from the standpoint of an inquiry into the relationship between a social phenomenon and the operation of the political system. If the political behavior of the mobile is different from that of the non-mobile, inference can be made to the effect of mobility upon the political system. That the survey technique does not permit complete understanding of the psychological processes involved in social mobility may be a serious limitation, but from the standpoint of political science it is not a fatal one.

⁴Bo Anderson and Morris Zelditch, Jr., "Rank Equilibration and Political Behavior" (Stanford University, 1965), pp. 17-18 (Ditto).

Definitions of Social Mobility

As with any term which has been widely used, "social mobility" has been subjected to many definitions, not all of which are compatible. Since the concept is basic to this study it is necessary that a precise definition be adopted and used in a consistent way.

Pitirim Sorokin, in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, defines social mobility as "the movement of individuals or groups from one social position to another and the circulation of cultural objects, values and traits among individuals and groups."⁵

C. Wright Mills is more specific in specifying the changes involved, defining the rate of upward mobility as "the proportion of people who rise from one occupation level to another."⁶ In Chapter IV the role of occupation in social mobility is discussed, but it is sufficient here to note that while a majority of studies of social mobility utilize occupation as an index of mobility, Mills is in a minority in treating it as the sole variable.

Social mobility is usually tied to the concepts of social class or social status. Joseph A. Kahl, for example, characterizes mobility as "movement from one class level to another between generations."⁷ Similarly, Milton M. Gordon refers to "movement from

⁵P. A. Sorokin, "Mobility, Social," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1933), X, 554.

⁶C. Wright Mills, White Collar (New York: Oxford, 1953), p. 272.

⁷Joseph A. Kahl, The American Class Structure (New York: Rinehart, 1953), p. 252. Social mobility may occur within generations as well as between generations. The distinction is discussed infra, p. 10.

one class to another," and elsewhere as "movement up or down the various stratification dimensions."⁸ A more elaborate definition is offered by Bernard Barber:

We have been using the term social mobility to mean movement, either upward or downward, between higher and lower social classes; or more precisely, movement between one relatively full-time, functionally significant social role and another that is evaluated as either higher or lower.⁹

The thread which unites these several definitions of social mobility is that all view it as a movement of individuals or groups from one place, position, or class in society to another. Starting with this rather vague notion the following sections attempt to lend precision to the concept.

Social Status

It is proper to speak of movement from one place within society to another only if places within society can in some sense be located relative to each other. Further, it is appropriate to speak of vertical mobility, or of movement upward or downward, only if there is some means by which positions can be ordered in terms of higher or lower. To do this it is necessary to devote some attention to the theory of social status.

⁸ Milton M. Gordon, Social Class in American Sociology (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1958), pp. 3, 19-20.

⁹ Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1957), p. 356.

A society is a means for the distribution of scarce goods.

While societies may differ on the value placed on any particular good, most seem to value the same things highly. Harold Lasswell has listed eight terms which he asserts may be "employed to classify all the value outcomes of any society."¹⁰ These universal social goods are power, wealth, respect, well-being, rectitude, skill, enlightenment, and affection.¹¹ Within the limits of any known society, most of these goods tend to be both relative (in the sense that the amount an individual has is evaluated not against any absolute standard, but against how much other people have), and in limited supply. Because of the relativity and the scarcity of social goods, members of society compete for preferential access. Some are more successful in the competition than others because of luck, ability, or parental advantage. As a result, all complex societies are stratified in the sense that some people have more of what there is to get than do others.

The differential distribution of social goods is common knowledge. An individual is evaluated by his fellows on the basis of his possession of or access to these goods. Such evaluations, made in terms of higher or lower, constitute for the evaluator the

¹⁰ Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958), p. 201.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 202. See also Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) pp. 83-102.

social status of the person evaluated. The social status of the individual within the society is a composite of the status evaluations accorded him by the other members of the society, and the treatment he receives reflects this status.

Subjective and Objective Status

An individual's own view of his social status is not necessarily identical to the way others evaluate him. Thus, though different terms will be used here, it is useful to make a distinction similar to that made by Richard Centers between social class and social status. For Centers, "social class" refers to groupings of people who feel a sense of social identification and shared interest, usually as a result of membership in a common stratum. Whether or not a class exists depends upon the psychological criteria of social rank. An individual's "social stratum," on the other hand, is completely dependent upon external criteria. Centers writes:

Much confusion can be avoided and great simplicity of conception gained if one always distinguishes clearly between stratum and class. Stratification is something objective; it derives, as has been indicated before, primarily from the economic system that happens to prevail in a given culture. The process of getting a living imposes upon people certain functions, statuses, and roles. . . . But these strata, as some have seen, are not necessarily classes.¹²

¹²Richard Centers, The Psychology of Social Classes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 27.

Similarly, while avoiding the term social class, a distinction will be made between the evaluation of a person's social status by others (objective status) and his own evaluation of his position in society (subjective status).¹³ In the same vein, if a person has changed social position as evaluated by others, he is objectively mobile. If he thinks he has changed social position he is subjectively mobile.

In The American Voter it is reported that occupational status and subjective class are better predictors of political attitudes and voting than any of the other status measures, but that they are not as closely related to each other as are other objective measures to occupation.¹⁴ They may thus be considered as two equally important but distinct measures that it is useful to treat separately.

Types of Mobility

A distinction having been made between objective social mobility and subjective mobility, it is now necessary to distinguish types of mobility. Changes within a given stratum level, such as changes from one occupation to another of the same relative prestige, are sometimes treated as a form of social mobility. These changes

¹³For convenience in expression and to conform to the phrasing of questions in the survey data, the term subjective class will be used interchangeably with subjective status, though there is no intention of implying the existence of class consciousness in a Marxian sense.

¹⁴Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 344-345.

are horizontal mobility. Social mobility, as understood here, refers only to vertical mobility--movement from a higher status to a lower, or vice versa.

The concept of mobility implies measurement at more than one point in time. Two types of movement are generally distinguished: intra-generation mobility and inter-generation mobility. Intra-generation mobility involves the analysis of status at two or more points in an individual's lifetime. Inter-generation mobility involves the determination of the relationship between the social status of successive generations. The two are usually related, for an individual normally begins life in the social status of his father. The measures used here are of inter-generation mobility alone.

To summarize. A person has undergone social mobility if his social status is higher or lower than that of his parents. Objective social status is determined by the evaluation of a person by other members of society. This evaluation is based upon his possession of or access to the things valued by the society. Subjective social status depends upon a person's own evaluation of his place in society. An individual is objectively mobile if his objective social status is higher or lower than that of his parents, as measured at comparable points in the life cycle. A person is subjectively mobile if he evaluates his own place in society as higher or lower than he evaluates that of his parents.

Organization of the Study

The remainder of the study is organized as follows.

Chapter II reviews the findings of previous research into social mobility and political behavior, together with certain related material on political behavior. Chapter III sets forth a theory of social mobility and states some hypotheses drawn from the theory. Chapter IV describes the methods and procedures used in the study and adopts operational definitions for both objective and subjective mobility.

The heart of the thesis is contained in Chapters V through IX, which report the empirical findings of the study. Chapter V provides a demographic profile of the mobile. Chapter VI investigates the relationship between mobility and various forms of political allegiance. Chapter VII examines the relationship of mobility to attitudes on economic issues and on issues of foreign affairs. Chapter VIII treats three aspects of political orientation and their relationship to social mobility. These are (1) political interest and activity, (2) feeling of political understanding and efficacy, and (3) voting turnout. The final empirical chapter, Chapter IX, is concerned with the degree to which the mobile are integrated into their social environment, satisfied with their place in society, and whether they are more inclined to be prejudiced or mistrustful than are non-mobile individuals.

The concluding chapter, Chapter X, contains a brief review of the more important empirical findings, and a tentative assessment of the meaning these have for the operation of the political system.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

There is extensive literature on the twin subjects of social class and social mobility. In 1953 Donald MacRae published a bibliography of 616 items on stratification and mobility.¹ Six years later he noted he had since become aware of nearly 500 additional items, most of them new.² The literature has continued to grow rapidly since that time. Because a number of excellent bibliographical articles already exist no attempt at a comprehensive review of the literature will be undertaken here.

¹ Donald G. MacRae, "Social Stratification: A Trend Report and Bibliography," Current Sociology, II, No. 1 (1953-54), 3-74.

² Donald G. MacRae, review of Kipset and Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, in American Sociological Review, XXIV (August, 1959), 582 (hereafter referred to as ASR).

³ Extensive reviews and bibliographies may be found in: Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1957); Milton M. Gordon, Social Class in American Sociology (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1958); S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959); D. G. MacRae, "Social Stratification: A Trend Report and Bibliography," Current Sociology, II, No. 1 (1953-54), 3-74; Raymond W. Mack, Linton Freeman, and Seymour Yellin, Social Mobility: Thirty Years of Research and Theory (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1957); S. M. Miller, "Comparative Social Mobility: A Trend Report and Bibliography," Current Sociology, IX, No. 1 (1960), 1-89; Harold W. Pfautz, "The Current Literature on Social Stratification: A Critique and Bibliography," American Journal of Sociology, XLIII (January, 1953), 391-418 (hereafter referred to as AJS).

Most studies of social mobility have been concerned with either (1) measuring the amount of mobility that takes place within a given society; or (2) examining the process by which mobility is achieved. Less attention has been paid to the equally important questions of the consequences of mobility for the individual and his society. Accordingly, an attempt has been made to select from the extensive literature on social mobility those items which seemed most relevant to a study of political behavior.⁴

The review of the literature in this chapter commences with a discussion of some of the theories that relate social mobility to party preference and to the operation of the political system. This is followed by a review of research findings on the association between mobility and party preference. The following sections review studies on the relationship of mobility to political attitudes and to political interest and involvement. The chapter concludes with a discussion of mobility and extremism, prejudice, and social integration.

⁴Two omissions should perhaps be explained. Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto both offer theories of politics emphasizing the role of social mobility into an "elite" or "ruling class." Their work has been deliberately omitted here. Unless one adopts the dubious assumption that the effects of mobility upon entrants into the ruling class are identical to the effects of mobility upon individuals in the society at large, the two subjects must be studied separately. Further, the ruling class is likely to be so small relative to the population as a whole that national sample surveys as used here will leave it essentially untapped. Thus neither the theoretical nor the empirical portions of this study are directly applicable to ruling elite theories. (Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (Elementi di Scienza Politica), H. D. Kahn, trans., edited and revised by Arthur Livingston (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939); Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, edited and translated by A. Livingston (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935), 4 vol.)

Party Preference: Theory

It was Marx who amplified the ancient observation that every society is divided into the rich and poor into a comprehensive political theory, but he was neither the first nor the last to emphasize the importance of the linkage between social class and politics. It is not necessary to believe in a Marxian version of class struggle to accept the importance of the relationship between class and party. Every study of voting behavior has reported an association between social position and political partisanship. As Robert MacIver has phrased it, "the party-system is the democratic translation of the class struggle."⁵ In the United States the association between class and party is reflected in the consistent finding that those of low status are more often Democrats and those of high status more often Republicans.

It would not be correct, however, to conclude that the link between class and party in the United States is an indication of self-conscious class politics. For one thing, correlations between status and partisanship, while consistent, are relatively low.⁶ For another, evidence indicates that few American citizens are "class conscious" in any activist sense. Finally, there is no indication that many individuals make political decisions in terms of anything which could be called a coherent ideology.⁷

⁵ Robert M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947), p. 217.

⁶ Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 351-352.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 188-215.

The combination of class-linked political behavior with the absence of any strong class consciousness or ideology is not necessarily paradoxical. The voting studies have contributed information on the roots of political preference that can explain class-linked behavior in the absence of any explicit class consciousness. Most individuals early in their lives acquire a political party preference that tends to be self-reinforcing throughout life. The choice of a party appears to find its source mainly in the family and early social environment. A typical finding is that of Campbell, et al., who report that 79 per cent of individuals from families where both parents were Democrats and at least one parent was politically active are themselves Democrats. Even where neither parent was politically active 76 per cent of those from Democratic families are themselves Democrats.⁸

The influence of social environment is not confined to the family's role in determining initial political preference. An individual's political preference usually agrees with that of friends and coworkers, and the more homogeneous the view of these associates the stronger the individual's political convictions.⁹ If an individual's inherited familial political preference is in harmony with the social milieu in which he finds himself as an adult, the chances of his deviating are slight.¹⁰

⁸ Ibid., p. 147.

⁹ Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 335.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Thus status-linked political behavior need not result from class consciousness on the part of any particular individual. Political preferences may be inherited from a class conscious ancestor, retained from some past event of sufficient magnitude to make an individual temporarily class conscious (such as a major depression), or influenced by contact with friends and co-workers with status-linked political preferences. These friends and co-workers need not themselves think consciously in class terms, but may have formed their own political preferences in similarly indirect ways. Although the association between status and party is rooted ultimately in the economic relationship, there is no need of much conscious awareness of the fact to maintain the linkage.

The nature of the link between status and party is important for a theory of social mobility and political behavior. If all political preferences were based on a calculation of present economic advantage uninfluenced by an individual's previous history or present social contacts, social mobility would be of little political relevance. Rich men would vote for policies that favored the rich, poor men for policies that favored the poor, uninfluenced by whether they had always been in their present economic circumstances. But political preferences are not often based on rational calculation, but are strongly influenced by an individual's social experiences, past and present. Thus it is that a mobile individual, who has been subject to different socializing experiences than a non-mobile individual, may be expected to behave in politically different ways.

Almost all theorists who have discussed the relationship of social mobility to politics have focussed upon the effect of mobility on status polarization and the intensity of class conflict. Lipset and Bendix, in Social Mobility in Industrial Society, state that "the process of social interchange through which some men rise in status and others fall weakens the solidarity and the political and economic strength of the working class."¹¹ A similar but broader view is expressed in The American Voter: "An open-class society, in which social mobility across culturally-defined boundaries between classes is frequent, has less potential for polarization than a society in which avenues to such mobility are blocked."¹²

Some of the mechanisms by which social mobility is supposed to reduce status polarization and moderate the intensity of class conflict are spelled out by Ralf Dahrendorf. He sees knowledge of the possibility of mobility as reducing individual involvement in class struggles: "If the individual sees for his son, or even for himself, the chance of rising into the dominant or falling into the subjected class, he is not as likely to engage his whole personality in class conflicts."¹³ In addition, the possibility of mobility

¹¹ Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., p. 70.

¹² Campbell et al., op. cit., p. 377.

¹³ Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 222-223.

directs energy away from the class struggle. "As mobility increases, group solidarity is increasingly replaced by competition between individuals, and the energies invested by individuals in class conflict decrease."¹⁴ Thus Dahrendorf sees an inverse relation between the degree of openness of classes and the intensity of class conflict. He states this as a formal hypothesis: "The intensity of class conflict decreases to the extent that classes are open (and not closed)."¹⁵ It might be added that mobility dilutes the solidity of experience and perspectives among members of any class.

Marx himself recognized the role that mobility might play in reducing class conflict. Regarding the relative mildness of the class struggle he saw in the United States, he comments: "in the United States of America, where, though classes, indeed, already exist, they have not yet become fixed, but continually change and interchange their elements in a constant state of flux."¹⁶ But in spite of this recognition that any considerable amount of social mobility can interfere with class cohesion, Marx does not assign an important role to social mobility in his class theory. This is because implicit in Marx's work is the assumption that the position an individual occupies in society--his class--is fixed at birth. While recognizing that some mobility does take place, he considers

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 222.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 239.

¹⁶ Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marxist Library, Works of Marxism-Leninism, Vol. XXXV (New York: International Publishers, no date), 22.

this a rare occurrence in capitalist society, and views the relatively high rate of mobility he sees in the United States as an indication of an early stage of capitalism. Because he views mobility as an infrequent exception to a prevailing situation of class rigidity, Marx does not develop further his insight into the effect of social mobility on the class struggle.

Marx was wrong in viewing social mobility as characteristic only of an early stage of capitalism. The available evidence shows no tendency for the amount of mobility to decline as industrial societies mature.¹⁷ Marx's failure to include social mobility as an essential element of his theory may account in large part for the failure of his prediction that class conflict in industrial societies must become more and more intense. If a class theory is to adequately explain the functioning of the political system of a modern industrial society it must incorporate a theory of social mobility as an integral element. Unfortunately, however, the present state of knowledge of the political correlates of social mobility is inadequate to support such a theory.

Party Preference: Research

Some information is available on the relationship between social mobility and party preference. Lipset and Bendix compare data on political affiliation of mobile individuals in a number of countries. The downwardly mobile behave similarly in all countries, being more

¹⁷ See, for example, Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., pp. 11-38, 76-113.

apt to prefer a conservative party than are other members of their new class. In comparing the political affiliation of upwardly mobile individuals, however, they find a difference between the results of a number of European studies and data for the U.S. Their data are reproduced in Table 1. The difference between the United States and European countries they explain as a result of greater differences in class living styles in Europe than in the U.S. This is said to make it more difficult for mobile Europeans to adopt a new style of life, including appropriate political preferences. As a result, mobile Europeans "are more likely than comparably successful Americans to retain links to their class of origin."¹⁸ On the other hand, Lipset and Bendix report that "in America the successfully mobile members of the middle class are more conservative (that is, more often Republican) than those class members who are in a social position comparable to that of their parents."¹⁹ In support they cite the study by Eleanor E. Maccoby et al. "Youth and Political Change."²⁰ The pertinent data from Maccoby's study are reproduced in Table 2. Maccoby's data however do not offer unequivocal support to Lipset and Bendix's conclusion. Although the upwardly mobile more often prefer Eisenhower than do the non-mobile of the same class, they also more often give their political

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 66.

²⁰ Eleanor E. Maccoby, Richard E. Matthews, and Anton S. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVIII, No. 1 (Spring, 1954), 23-39.

TABLE 1.--Party choice of German, Finnish, Swedish, and American middle class men related to their social origin^a

| Country and Party Choice | <u>Father's Occupation</u> | | | | | |
|---|----------------------------|-----|------------|-----|------|-----|
| | Manual | | Non-manual | | Farm | |
| | % | # | % | # | % | # |
| Germany: 1953 Social Democratic | 32 | 200 | 20 | 142 | 22 | 58 |
| Finland: 1945 Social Democratic & Communist | 23 | 357 | 6 | 356 | 10 | 183 |
| Sweden: 1950 Social Democratic | 47 | 135 | 20 | 315 | -- | -- |
| Norway: 1957 Labor & Communist | 49 | 61 | 29 | 73 | 24 | 46 |
| United States: 1952 Democratic | 22 | 67 | 30 | 79 | 34 | 59 |

^aS. M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), Table 2.7, p. 67.

TABLE 2.--Social mobility related to choice of party and candidate^a

| Choice | Upwardly Mobile % | Non-mobile in Class Where Upward Mobiles Originated ^b | Non-mobile in Class Where Upward Mobiles Moved ^b |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|---|--|
| <u>Party Preference</u> | | | |
| Republican definitely | 18% | 8% | 21% |
| Republican leanings | 5 | -- | -- |
| Independent | 9 | 18 | 28 |
| Democratic leanings | 12 | 1 | 8 |
| Democratic definitely | 56 | 73 | 43 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| Number of cases | 82 | 73 | 73 |
| <u>Candidate Choice</u> | | | |
| Eisenhower | 48% | 28% | 37% |
| Stevenson | 52% | 72% | 63% |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| Number of cases | 82 | 72 | 72 |

^aAdapted from Eleanor E. Maccoby, Richard E. Matthews, and Anton S. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVIII, No. 1 (Spring, 1954), Table 6, 35.

^bFor purposes of comparison, the non-mobile cases have been weighted to cancel out differences between them and the mobiles in SES. That is, for the first comparison, the non-mobiles have been weighted so as to have the same SES distribution as the mobile people at their point of origin. For the second comparison, the non-mobiles have been weighted so as to have the same SES distribution as the mobiles have in their destination class.

preference as Democratic. If party choice is taken as an indicator, the Maccoby results are closer to the European data reported by Lipset and Bendix than to those they report for the U.S.

A study by Patricia Salter West also fails to support Lipset and Bendix's conclusion that the upwardly mobile are more often Republicans than are their non-mobile peers. She reports that among college graduates "self-made men [are] less likely to be Republican; their greater tendency is to remain withdrawn from formal party alignments altogether."²¹

West goes on to report that the difference between the self-made and initially more privileged groups declines with age.²² This is consistent with an interpretation that the effects of later socialization are becoming stronger than the effects of earlier socialization. A contrary finding is reported by Maccoby et al., who find that "the mobile young people seldom consider themselves Independents: they seem to make a definite party choice more often than non-mobile people."²³ Though there are substantial differences in the sample base of the two studies, West's being confined to college graduates and Maccoby's including only those in the age bracket 21-24, this is not an adequate explanation of the opposed findings. It may

²¹ Patricia S. West, "Social Mobility among College Graduates," in Bendix and Lipset (eds.), op. cit., p. 478.

²² Ibid.

²³ Maccoby et al., loc. cit., p. 34.

be that Maccoby's sample, being drawn from the 1952 election, revealed that Eisenhower's political personality and middle-of-the-road political stance were particularly attractive to the upwardly mobile in her sample. Data bearing on this possibility are reported in Chapter VI.

The American Voter examines the relationship between mobility and change in party affiliation, reporting that "even among the people who report both a change in partisanship and a change in their own occupational status there is no suggestion of a relationship between the two kinds of change."²⁴ Further, the same work reports that there is little evidence of association between inter-generational mobility and changes in political preference, though "upward mobile people are slightly more likely to have shifted from Democratic to Republican identification" than are the downward mobile.²⁵

Similar to the hypothesis that change in political preference may accompany change in social status is the hypothesis that changes in political preference are associated with moves from the city to the suburbs. The underlying assumption is that movement from the city to the suburbs is part of a process of upward mobility, and that those who have made such moves are likely to change political allegiance

²⁴ Campbell et al., op. cit., p. 458. This finding is difficult to interpret, however, depending as it does on recollection by the respondent both of changes in occupational status and changes in partisanship. Retrospective data of this sort are notoriously weak.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 459. The measure of mobility used is similar to that operationally defined as "subjective mobility" in the following chapter and is not necessarily the best measure of studying political behavior. A revised analysis of these same data is presented in Chapter VI.

from the Democratic to the Republican party.²⁶ The findings of several studies afford some support to the hypothesis that moves to the suburbs are associated with conversion to the Republican party, but only as part of a relatively slow process rather than any wholesale change on the part of new suburban residents.²⁷

Political Attitudes

Evidence on the effect of social mobility on attitudes toward political issues is even scarcer than evidence on party preference. Political issues are often treated as though they can be placed along a unidimensional liberal-conservative continuum, with those of low status more often liberal and those of high status more often conservative. This is an inadequate conceptualization. Attitudes on political issues are associated with social status, but not all in the same way. The authors of Voting, for example, report that "There is no correlation between 'liberalism' on domestic-economic (Position) issues and 'liberalism' on international-ethnic (Style) issues."²⁸ It is necessary to investigate attitudes toward a variety

²⁶ But note that The American Voter found that there was no higher incidence of upward mobility among those who moved to the suburbs than among those who remained in the city, and an only slightly higher incidence of Republican converts among the new suburban residents. Campbell et al., op. cit., pp. 455-459.

²⁷ Fred I. Greenstein and Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Suburbs and Shifting Party Loyalties," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXII, 4 (Winter, 1958), 473-482; J. G. Manis and L. C. Stine, "Suburban Residence and Political Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXII, 4 (Winter, 1958), 483-489; B. Lazerwitz, "Suburban Voting Trends: 1948 to 1956," Social Forces, XXXIX, 1 (October, 1960), 29-36.

²⁸ Berelson et al., op. cit., p. 342.

of issues before generalizing about the attitude structure of a group. Such a variety of data are not available for the mobile, but some findings on related matters are pertinent.

Marvin Olsen, investigating the degree to which individual's attitudes are consistently liberal or consistently conservative, reports that the more, and the more intense, social cross-pressure a person encounters the less consistent are his attitudes.²⁹ If it can be assumed that the socially mobile are more often subject to social cross-pressure, Olsen's finding should be applicable to the mobile.

Another study of attitudes toward political issues that is potentially applicable to mobility is that by Gerhard Lenski on status crystallization.³⁰ Lenski divided respondents into groups of high crystallization (consistently high or consistently low on several measures of status) and low crystallization (high on some measures of status, low on others). After controlling for status differences, Lenski found that low crystallization was associated with preference for the Democratic party and liberal responses to a series of

²⁹ Marvin E. Olsen, "Liberal-Conservative Attitude Crystallization," Sociological Quarterly, III, 1 (January, 1962), 17-26.

³⁰ Gerhard E. Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," American Sociological Review, XIX, No. 4 (August, 1954), 405-413.

economic-political questions.³¹ If the mobile are more often uncrystallized, as a result of not having moved equal distances on all indicators of status, they should resemble Lenski's uncristal-lized individuals. But unless both the upwardly and downwardly mobile have the same type of attitude distributions, the crystal-lization approach would not seem very useful in explaining attitudes of the mobile toward political issues. Both the upwardly and down-wardly mobile are likely to be uncristallized, but as noted above, the evidence on party preference indicates that the downwardly mobile more often prefer conservative political parties than do those of stable low status---a finding contrary to that expected from the crystallization hypothesis. An explanation of the attitude of the mobile toward political issues in terms of a socialization hypothesis is offered in Chapter VII.

Political Interest and Involvement

Several studies have suggested that mobile individuals are more often subject to social "cross-pressures" and that this is reflected in their political behavior. The cross-pressure hypothesis,

³¹In spite of subsequent work along the same lines the re-lationship of status crystallization to political attitudes is by no means clear. See: Gerhard E. Lenski and William F. Kenkel, "The Relationship between Status Consistency and Politico-Economic Attitudes," *ASR*, XXI, No. 3 (June, 1956), 365-369; Gerhard E. Lenski, "Social Participation and Status Crystallization," *ASR*, XXI, No. 4 (August, 1956), 458-464; Irwin W. Goffman, "Status Consistency and Preference for Change in Power Distribution," *ASR*, XXII, No. 3 (June, 1957), 275-281; Werner S. Landecker, "Class Crystallization and Class Consciousness," *ASR*, XXVIII, No. 2 (April, 1963), 219-229.

first set forth in The People's Choice, states that voters exposed to conflicting political influences react by political withdrawal and indecision.³² As a result the cross-pressured individuals change political preference more often, vote less frequently, and are less active politically compared to those exposed to homogeneous political influences.³³

Lipset and Bendix provide one example of the application of the cross-pressure hypothesis to social mobility. They conclude, on the basis of the limited evidence available, that both upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals "are more likely to be apathetic, to abstain from voting and to show low levels of political interest than are the immobile."³⁴ This is explained as a special case of cross-pressure: "The mobile individual, who is in many ways a marginal man, retaining old ties and experiences, is more likely to be subjected to cross-pressure than the non-mobile person."³⁵

Lipset has elsewhere offered a similar hypothesis concerning the political behavior of the mobile:

Occupational mobility, upward or downward, and the hope of improving one's class position would be expected to create an ambiguity of class position and interest for

³²P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. R. Berelson, and Helen Gaudet, The People's Choice (2d. ed.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).

³³e.g. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, op. cit., pp. 19-20, 27, 128-132, 333-347; Campbell et al., op. cit., pp. 80-88.

³⁴Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., p. 69.

³⁵Ibid.

the individual which would lead to cross pressures and withdrawal from political choice. The greater expectation of mobility in the United States might therefore be another factor making for lower voting rates here as compared with Europe.³⁶

A reformulated version of the cross-pressure hypothesis is used in The American Voter to explain the fact that class voting is blurred among people who are in different objective and subjective classes. The authors state:

In this case, the cross-pressures as operationally defined consist of a sociological variable (occupation) on the one hand and a psychological variable (perception of class location) on the other. The individual has reason to identify with one class, but the occupational milieu in which he operates from day to day consists primarily of members of the 'opposing' class. The class with which he sympathizes has one set of political norms, but his active social group, to the degree it is class-oriented, has opposing norms. Under these cross-pressures, the aggregate of such marginal individuals behaves in a manner that does not clearly fit either set of norms.³⁷

This formulation is of particular interest, because as reported below in Chapter VI, the mobile are considerably more often class misidentifiers than are the status stable. The question of whether this results in a withdrawal from political involvement is examined in Chapter VIII.

³⁶S. M. Lipset et al., "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, II (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), 1134.

³⁷Campbell et al., op. cit., p. 372.

Extremism and Prejudice

There are many suggestions in the literature of a link between social mobility and extremism, authoritarianism, or prejudice. A study by Morris Janowitz on social stratification and mobility in West Germany, for example, contains the implicit assumption that the downwardly mobile are political extremists.³⁸ That no one of the major parties has a predominant concentration of downwardly mobile persons he considers to be highly beneficial for the stability of German political behavior.³⁹

In a similar vein, a frequently repeated explanation of the radical right movement in the United States is that it is at least partially a result of status inconsistencies and insecurity about social class position.⁴⁰ Stanley Rothman utilizes a similar hypothesis in explaining the widespread affiliation of Catholics with the radical right in terms of the desire of Catholics to assimilate U.S. culture and remove the taint of being "un-American."⁴¹ Little data is offered in support of these explanations, however, and a recent study that

³⁸ Morris Janowitz, "Social Stratification and Mobility in West Germany," AJS, LXIV, No. 1 (July, 1958), 6-24.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 22-23.

⁴⁰ Daniel Bell (ed.), The New American Right (New York: Criterion Books, 1955); Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955); Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Right (New York: Doubleday, 1963).

⁴¹ Stanley Rothman, "American Catholics and the Radical Right," Social Order, XIII, No. 4 (April, 1963), 5-8.

examined the hypothesis in the case of one rightist organization found it unsupported.⁴²

Lipset finds extremist and intolerant views characteristic of low status as such. After reviewing a considerable quantity of evidence from several countries he concludes that "low status and low education predispose individuals to favor extremist, intolerant, and transvaluational forms of political and religious behavior."⁴³ MacKinnon and Centers, and Christie and Cook report similar findings, MacKinnon and Centers noting that authoritarianism increases with the intensity of class identification.⁴⁴

A study by H. J. Eysenck distinguishes between two dimensions of social attitudes: a conservative-radical dimension and a tough-minded-tender-minded dimension.⁴⁵ He finds that within all four British political parties (Conservative, Labor, Liberal, Communist) there is a consistent difference on both dimensions between working class and middle class party members. All working class groups are

⁴² Raymond E. Wolfinger *et al.*, "America's Radical Right, Politics and Ideology," in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 262-293.

⁴³ Seymour Martin Lipset "Democracy and Working-Class Authoritarianism," ASR, XXIV, No. 4 (August, 1959), 482.

⁴⁴ W. J. MacKinnon and Richard Centers, "Authoritarianism and Urban Stratification," AJS, LXI, No. 6 (May, 1956), 610-620; Richard Christie and Peggy Cook, "A Guide to Published Literature Relating to the Authoritarian Personality," Journal of Psychology, XLV (April, 1958), 171-199.

⁴⁵ H. J. Eysenck, "Primary Social Attitudes as Related to Social Class and Political Party," British Journal of Sociology, II, No. 3 (October, 1951), 198-209.

less radical than the corresponding middle class groups within the same party, and all working class groups are more tough minded, in the sense of favoring compulsory sterilization, favoring harsher treatment of criminals, believing that Jews are too powerful, etc.⁴⁶ Although Eysenck is not using quite the same concepts, the combination of conservatism-tough-mindedness he finds for the working class adherents of all parties is strikingly similar to the views which characterize the American radical right, not normally considered a working class movement.

Several studies examine a hypothesized association between mobility and prejudice directly, but the findings are not entirely harmonious. Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz find greater prejudice among the downwardly mobile than among the stationary, but somewhat less prejudice among the upwardly mobile.⁴⁷ Joseph Greenblum and Leonard Pearlin find that both upward and downward mobility are associated with prejudice, but that prejudice is linked with subjective class identification as well.⁴⁸ The upwardly mobile individual who claims middle class membership and is presumably less secure about his status tends to be more prejudiced than the upwardly mobile individual who claims working class status.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 204-205.

⁴⁷ Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, The Dynamics of Prejudice (New York: Harpers, 1950).

⁴⁸ Joseph Greenblum and Leonard I. Pearlin, "Vertical Mobility and Prejudice: A Socio-Psychological Analysis," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, Class, Status and Power (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953) pp. 480-491.

Fred Silberstein and Melvin Seeman find that mobility as such is not related to prejudice except through the individual's attitude toward mobility.⁴⁹ Those who are highly mobility-minded tended to be prejudiced, and whether or not mobility affects ethnic prejudice depends upon the individual's concern with mobility. A similar hypothesis is put forth by W. C. Kaufman, who suggests that the specific attitude toward status offers one explanation of anti-semitism.⁵⁰

A study by Melvin Tumin and Ray Collins finds an entirely different pattern.⁵¹ In studying the effect of mobility upon attitudes toward desegregation they find status is a much better index of prejudice than is mobility. The upwardly mobile, though less ready for desegregation than those born to high status, are more ready than those of their class of origin. The downwardly mobile as well are less prejudiced than others of low status, though more so than either the upwardly mobile or those of a stable high status.

Social Integration

A recurrent theme of writings on social mobility is the disruption of social ties which can accompany mobility and the effect on the individual of this disruption. Morris Janowitz has pointed out

⁴⁹ Fred B. Silberstein and Melvin Seeman, "Social Mobility and Prejudice," AJS, LXV, No. 3 (November, 1959), 258-264.

⁵⁰ W. C. Kaufman, "Status, Authoritarianism, and Anti-Semitism," AJS, LXII, No. 4 (January, 1957), 379-382.

⁵¹ Melvin M. Tumin and Ray C. Collins, Jr., "Status, Mobility and Anomie: A Study in Readiness for Desegregation," British Journal of Sociology, X, No. 3 (September, 1959), 253-267.

that the consequences of mobility for social integration may vary depending on whether the focus is upon primary or secondary groups. He finds that while upward mobility has disruptive implications for primary group relations, the upwardly mobile seem to join and participate in secondary structures with relative effectiveness.⁵² For the downwardly mobile, Janowitz sees more difficulty. Primary group relations tend to be disrupted, with no compensating involvement in secondary groups. Janowitz notes that while results are not clear, "if anything, downward mobility does not produce effective involvement in secondary group structures in pursuit of self-interest."⁵³ Thus for the downwardly mobile both primary and secondary ties are disrupted.

The Janowitz hypothesis on the relationship of social mobility to membership in secondary groups has been examined in several studies by Richard Curtis. In one study he compares the membership rates of mobile and non-mobile persons in several types of formal voluntary associations. He finds that, "In so far as non-membership in such [formal voluntary] associations represents social isolation, these data do not support the contention that mobile persons are any more or less isolated than their stable peers."⁵⁴

⁵² Morris Janowitz, "Consequences of Social Mobility in the United States," Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, III (1956), 193.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Richard F. Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Membership in Formal Voluntary Associations: A Note on Research," ASR, XXIV, No. 6 (August, 1959), 847.

In a second article, Curtis examines the finding of Seymour Lipset and Joan Gordon that downwardly mobile workers are less likely to be trade-union members than are non-mobile workers.⁵⁵ Curtis' findings reinforce those of Lipset and Gordon: the downwardly mobile are slightly less likely to be union members than non-mobile manual workers, and upwardly mobile non-manual workers are more likely to belong to a union than the non-mobile. Curtis concludes, however, that the differences between mobile and non-mobile are relatively minor.⁵⁶

In examining church membership, Curtis finds no difference between the mobile and the non-mobile in frequency of membership. When they are church members, however, both the upwardly and downwardly mobile tend to attend church more frequently than do the non-mobile church members.⁵⁷

In evaluating his findings on the effect of social mobility on membership in formal voluntary associations, Curtis concludes that in most cases it produces no measureable effect. He notes that this finding is consistent with the view that the socially isolating effects of mobility "are limited to, first, rapid or extreme mobility, and

⁵⁵ Seymour Martin Lipset and Joan Gordon, "Mobility and Trade Union Membership," in Bendix and Lipset, op. cit., pp. 491-500.

⁵⁶ Richard F. Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Union Membership in Detroit: A Replication," Social Forces, XXXVIII, No. 1 (October, 1959), 69-71.

⁵⁷ Richard F. Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Church Participation," Social Forces, XXXVIII, No. 4 (May, 1960), 315-319.

second, isolation (if any) in primary rather than secondary relationships."⁵⁸

The hypothesis that dilemmas faced by the mobile inhibit social integration has been examined by Peter Blau. He finds the mobile evidence insecurity by a greater preoccupation with their health and by hostility toward minority groups.⁵⁹ Blau describes the socially mobile:

Without extensive and intimate social contacts, they do not have sufficient opportunity for complete acculturation to the values and style of life of the one group, nor do they continue to experience the full impact of the social constraints of the other.⁶⁰

Evidence bearing on the hypothesis that social mobility inhibits social integration is offered in several other studies. In a study by Evelyn Ellis, twenty-seven successful unmarried career women who had been socially mobile were compared with a control group of thirty-three equally successful unmarried career women who had not been mobile. The finding was that the socially mobile career women tended to be emotionally maladjusted, with superficial, impermanent

⁵⁸Richard F. Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Membership in Formal Voluntary Associations: A Note on Research," ASR, XXIV, No. 6 (December, 1959), 848.

⁵⁹Peter M. Blau, "Social Mobility and Interpersonal Relations," ASR, XXI, No. 3 (June, 1956), 290-295. A much more extensive catalog of the detrimental effects of mobility is set forth by Melvin Tumin, although it is unsupported by convincing evidence. (Melvin M. Tumin, "Some Unapplauded Consequences of Social Mobility in a Mass Society," Social Forces, XXXVI, No. 1 (October, 1957), 21-37.)

⁶⁰Blau, op. cit., p. 291. For a similar view see Everett V. Stonequist, The Marginal Man (New York: Scribners, 1937).

primary group relations.⁶¹ Another study, by E. E. Lemasters, was designed specifically to examine the relationship between social mobility and family integration. Using participant observation reports on seventy-eight families, Lemasters found excellent family integration, communication, and adjustment in non-mobile families, whereas in upward mobile families integration tended to be good within the nuclear family, but sometimes strained and disrupted within the extended family. The strains existed between the mobile members of the family and those who had been left behind in the mobility process.⁶²

A recent study by Robert Stuckert examined the relationship of mobility to four dimensions of extended family cohesion, using 266 white married females as subjects. The four dimensions examined were frequency of family visiting, family identification, use of the family as reference group, and concern for maintaining family unity. In each case Stuckert found that the mobile women had fewer ties with their extended family and were less likely to be oriented toward them than were the stable wives. Stuckert concluded that the mobile women were characterized by a general pattern of non-involvement outside of

⁶¹ Evelyn Ellis, "Social Psychological Correlates of Upward Social Mobility among Unmarried Career Women," ASR, XVII (October, 1952), 558-563.

⁶² E. E. Lemasters, "Social Class Mobility and Family Integration," Marriage and Family Living, XVI, No. 3 (August, 1954), 226-232.

the nuclear family, including participation in fewer voluntary associations than non-mobile wives.⁶³

Most studies have indicated that the problem of social integration is more serious for the downwardly mobile than it is for those who have risen in status. One reason for this seems to be that the conflict between their acquired norms and their actual life situation is more serious. Harold Wilensky and Hugh Edwards found that the downwardly mobile, socialized in early life toward the middle class norms of success, tend to retain these norms.⁶⁴ However, those non-mobile who inherit a lower class position insulate themselves from frustration in various ways. For example, Ely Chinoy found that automobile workers tended to limit their goals and to redefine their aspirations toward ambitions for their children rather than to be personally ambitious.⁶⁵ In a similar vein, Herbert Hyman found "reduced striving for success among the lower classes, an awareness of lack of opportunity, and a lack of valuation of education, normally the major avenue to achievement of high status."⁶⁶ The

⁶³ Robert P. Stuckert, "Occupational Mobility and Family Relationships," Social Forces, XLI, No. 3 (March, 1963), 301-307.

⁶⁴ Harold L. Wilensky and Hugh Edwards, "The Skidder: Ideological Adjustments of Downward Mobile Workers," ASR, XXIV, No. 2 (April, 1959), 215-231.

⁶⁵ Ely Chinoy, "The Tradition of Opportunity and the Aspirations of Automobile Workers," AJS, LVII (March, 1952), 453-459.

⁶⁶ Herbert H. Hyman, "The Value Systems of Different Classes," in Bendix and Lipset, op. cit., p. 438.

downwardly mobile, on the other hand, seem to be denied this psychological insulation. Wilensky and Edwards found the "skidders" more conservative in values and beliefs, more apt to reject identification with the working class, more apt to attach importance to promotion, and more apt to believe firmly in the free mobility ideology than were those of stable working class status.⁶⁷

In Suicide Emile Durkheim suggested that individuals who are socially mobile are more likely to find themselves in an anomic situation, disoriented and thus more likely to resort to suicide.⁶⁸ Direct evidence on this hypothesis is offered by Warren Breed. Breed examined data on 103 white males who committed suicide between 1954 and 1959. Comparing these with a control group, he found an extraordinary amount of downward mobility among the suicides, both inter-generational and during the individual's own worklife. Breed reports, on the other hand, no evidence of a correlation between suicide and upward mobility.⁶⁹

It is to be expected that poor social integration of mobile individuals would be reflected in a higher than normal incidence of psychiatric disturbance. However, the evidence on this is mixed.

⁶⁷ Wilensky and Edwards, loc. cit.

⁶⁸ Emile Durkheim, Suicide (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 246-254.

⁶⁹ Warren Breed, "Occupational Mobility and Suicide among White Males," ASR, XXVIII, No. 2 (April, 1963), 179-188.

Hollingshead, Ellis, and Kirby found some indication of correlation between upward mobility and certain types of mental disturbance, though the evidence is not unequivocal.⁷⁰ Mary Lystad found that schizophrenics were significantly more likely to be downwardly mobile but less likely to be geographically mobile than controls.⁷¹

When the evidence on social mobility and social integration is assessed, it is fairly well established that a link exists between downward mobility and poor integration. The link is more tenuous in the case of upward mobility. A tutored guess is that upward mobility seriously affects the social integration of individuals only where the process of mobility has been abrupt, or where the social distance between the individuals status of origin and status of destination is unusually large.

Conclusion

The literature on social mobility and political behavior is richer in hypotheses than in verified findings. Although numerous theorists have suggested that social mobility reduces class polarization and the violence of class conflict in the political arena, there is a shortage of hard empirical evidence on the mechanisms

⁷⁰A. B. Hollingshead, R. Ellis, and E. Kirby, "Social Mobility and Mental Illness," ASR, XVII, No. 5 (October, 1954), 577-584.

⁷¹Mary H. Lystad, "Social Mobility among Selected Groups of Schizophrenic Patients," ASR, XXII, No. 3 (June, 1957), 288-292.

through which this is assumed to take place. This chapter has reported on a number of studies that shed some light on the relationship of social mobility to political behavior, but unfortunately the evidence is neither as comprehensive nor as unequivocal as would be necessary to support a theory of social mobility and politics.

The study that most directly examined the relationship of mobility to political behavior, Lipset and Bendix's Social Mobility in Industrial Society, reported that in the United States the downwardly mobile retain the political loyalties of their class of origin, but that the upwardly mobile abandon their earlier beliefs and become even more conservative than others in their new class. Some reasons for doubting their assessment of the behavior of the upwardly mobile were set forth in this chapter. In the following chapter a theory of mobility is developed that results in hypotheses at variance with some of the findings reported by Lipset and Bendix.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

Although a number of suggestions that social mobility affects political behavior were reviewed in Chapter II, the available empirical evidence could not convincingly establish the nature of the relationship. It is the task of the present chapter to set forth a theory accounting for the relationship between social mobility and political behavior, and to state in testable form some hypotheses derived from the theory.

In any study that focuses upon the effect of a single variable there is danger of an impression that it is offered as a total explanation. Quite obviously, social mobility is but one of many factors that affect political behavior. Accordingly, in all subsequent theoretical statements "other things being equal" should be assumed.

Stratification and the Political System

As was noted in the previous chapter, a persistent finding of all studies has been that those of high status tend to hold conservative viewpoints on economic matters and to vote Republican, while those of low status tend to hold more radical views on economics and vote Democratic. This makes sense in terms of economic self-interest. Those who are presently well-off naturally wish to leave things as they are, while those not so well off want to change things in their

own favor. Thus the political preferences of an individual are influenced by his place in the stratification system.

The association between status and party preference is far from perfect. As Table 3 indicates, the highest proportion of Republicans is found in the high income Business and Professional category, coupled with the lowest proportion of Democrats. The lowest status group, low income blue-collar workers, report the highest proportion of Democrats and the lowest proportion of Republicans. Thus even among groups of the highest or of the lowest status there are substantial numbers of supporters of both major parties.

Other types of political misidentification than just belonging to the "wrong" party are also important. The notion of subjective status and objective status was introduced earlier. Using two measures of status, there are many individuals who assign themselves to one social level, but who would be assigned by an analyst to another. Heinz Eulau, using objective and subjective class identifications taken from the 1956 SRC survey, reports that of those who are objectively middle class 30 per cent assign themselves to the working class. Of those who are objectively working class 22 per cent assign themselves to the middle class.¹ Eulau examines the relationship between objective and subjective identifications and political behavior. He reports that subjective identification is most important

¹Heinz Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 54.

TABLE 3.--Political preference by occupational status and income

| Annual Income ^a | Political Preference ^b | Occupational Status ^c | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| | | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
| \$7,500 up | Democratic | 30% | 39% | 43% |
| | Republican | 42 | 36 | 25 |
| | Independent or other | 28 | 25 | 31 |
| | | 100% | 100% | 99% |
| | N | 296 | 59 | 114 |
| \$3,500-\$7,499 | Democratic | 41% | 43% | 49% |
| | Republican | 31 | 32 | 22 |
| | Independent or other | 28 | 25 | 28 |
| | | 100% | 100% | 99% |
| | N | 392 | 173 | 670 |
| \$0-\$3,499 | Democratic | 49% | 44% | 50% |
| | Republican | 28 | 30 | 22 |
| | Independent or other | 24 | 26 | 28 |
| | | 101% | 100% | 100% |
| | N | 195 | 122 | 701 |

^a"About what do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family?"

^b"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or what?"

^cOccupation of head of household.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

for attitudes where direct action is unnecessary, but that "capacity for role performance seems to be more immediately grounded in objective class position."² The data reported by Eulau show a consistent tendency for the class misidentifiers--those objectively in one class, but subjectively in another--to display distributions of partisan preference and attitudes intermediate between the groups of consistent high and consistent low class identification. As Table 4 indicates, class misidentifiers are, for example, less often Democrats than those who are both objectively and subjectively working class, but more often Democrats than those who are consistently middle class. In this way the class misidentifiers serve to weaken the closeness between class and party.

Social mobility has also often been thought to affect the closeness of the association between class and party. One version of this theory has been stated by Eulau:

If the party system operates with considerable indifference to class stratification, the social situation is presumably one of high mobility and relatively weak 'class awareness.' The parties are hardly distinguishable from one another with respect to principles or objectives. The party struggle is one between the 'ins' and the 'outs.' On the other hand, if the social situation is one of low mobility and high 'class awareness,' the parties are likely to divide on issues, notably economic issues--with voters higher in the class scale preferring one party or group of parties.³

²Ibid., p. 85.

³Heinz Eulau, "Perceptions of Class and Party in Voting Behavior: 1952," American Political Science Review, XLIX, No. 2 (June, 1955), 366.

TABLE 4.--Objective class identification, subjective class identification and party identification, 1952 and 1956^a

| Party Identification | Objectively Working Class Self-identified as: | | | | Objectively Middle Class Self-identified as: | | | |
|-------------------------|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| | <u>Working Class</u> | | <u>Middle Class</u> | | <u>Working Class</u> | | <u>Middle Class</u> | |
| | 1952 | 1956 | 1952 | 1956 | 1952 | 1956 | 1952 | 1956 |
| Democratic | 59% | 50% | 39% | 41% | 49% | 48% | 32% | 36% |
| Independent | 22 | 24 | 22 | 29 | 28 | 33 | 27 | 26 |
| Republican | <u>19</u> <u>100%</u> | <u>26</u> <u>100%</u> | <u>39</u> <u>100%</u> | <u>30</u> <u>100%</u> | <u>23</u> <u>100%</u> | <u>19</u> <u>100%</u> | <u>41</u> <u>100%</u> | <u>38</u> <u>100%</u> |
| N | 557 | 625 | 185 | 187 | 130 | 118 | 235 | 279 |

^aAdapted from Heinz Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), Table 3, p. 62.

Data Source: Michigan Survey Research Center, 1952, 1956.

Implicit in the theory that social mobility reduces class polarization in politics is an assumption about the effect of mobility on individual political behavior. If social mobility is to reduce political polarization, the mobile individual's political behavior must be less closely linked to his new status than is the non-mobile individual, or his presence in a new social position must somehow reduce the class-linkage of those around him, or both. It will be argued subsequently that under certain circumstances both are true, but first it is necessary to examine alternative hypotheses about the effect of mobility upon political behavior.

The Over-Identification Hypothesis

The classic folk speculation about the behavior of upwardly mobile individuals is that the parvenu is meticulous in his adoption of the values and symbols of his new group in the attempt to convince himself or others that he really does belong. The picture is painted by Dostoevsky:

Already the merchant grows more and more eager for rank, and strives to show himself cultured though he has not a trace of culture, and to this end meanly despises his old traditions, and is even ashamed of the faith of his fathers.⁴

This view would suggest that, to the extent that political affiliation is a visible indicator of status, at any given social level upwardly

⁴Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Constance Garnett (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. [Great Books of the Western World, No. 52], 1952), p. 165.

mobile people are even more likely to be Republicans than those at the same level whose status has been stable. This view is adopted by Lipset and Bendix, who state that in America persons who move up into the middle class are more often Republican than those born to the middle class.⁵ They contrast this with the situation in most of Europe, where the upwardly mobile tend to be less conservative than those born to the middle class. The difference is explained as the result of differences in class living style between Europe and America.⁶ In the case of downwardly mobile persons, Lipset and Bendix find political behavior the same in Europe as in America: "they vote more conservatively than the stationary members of the class into which they have fallen."⁷

Some of the difficulties of the over-identification hypothesis were noted in the previous chapter, but there are other problems as well. Even if the parvenu over-identifies with the norms of his new status, his over-identification involves only those traits which he recognizes as characteristic of the status. In the United States,

⁵ Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), p. 66. Their evidence for this conclusion is discussed in Chapter II.

⁶ Lipset and Bendix's reasoning is that the upwardly mobile Europeans, finding it difficult to adjust to the life style of higher levels, retains his working class party identification along with other working class elements in his style of life. In the United States, where the upwardly mobile individual can more easily fulfill the requirements of his new social position he presumably adopts a Republican party identification along with a middle class style of life. This does not explain, however, the finding that the mobile are "even more conservative politically than those who are non-mobile in high status positions." Ibid., p. 67.

⁷ Ibid.

party preference does not have this kind of a clear status coloration. This is demonstrated in Table 5. At most, only a small majority of those who identify themselves as members of the middle class or working class are able to say definitely whether their own class will vote Democratic or Republican. In 1956 only 36 per cent of the middle class thought that their class would vote mostly Republican, compared with 48 per cent who thought it would split evenly or vote mostly Democratic and 16 per cent who did not know. In the working class 37 per cent thought the working class would vote mostly Democratic, while 41 per cent thought it would be evenly split or vote Republican, and 22 per cent did not know.⁸ This ambiguity of party preference as a status symbol, coupled with the previously reported finding that politics is of only minor importance for most people, makes it unlikely that political affiliation serves as a means of status reassurance for very many people.

Nor does Lipset and Bendix's explanation of the difference between findings in Europe and the United States in terms of differences in class living style between the two continents suit their finding. If class living styles differ more in Europe than they do in the U.S., one would expect the parvenu reaction to be more prevalent there. Where upward mobility is accompanied by a radical change in

⁸On the basis of these data Eulau concludes: "In 1952 . . . only small majorities in either class could definitely say whether their own class would vote Democratic or Republican. In 1956 only minorities in either class were definite in their perceptions of the voting behavior of their own class, while majorities were either ambiguous in their perceptions or had no perceptions at all." Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years, p. 95.

TABLE 5.--Middle and working class expectations of own class vote,
1952 and 1956^a

| Own Class Will Vote: | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
|----------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | 1952 ^b (N = 389) | 1956 ^c (N = 414) | 1952 ^b (N = 811) | 1956 ^c (N = 848) |
| Democratic | 15% | 12% | 52% | 37% |
| Republican | 40 | 36 | 7 | 11 |
| Split | 32 | 36 | 25 | 30 |
| Do not know | <u>13</u> | <u>16</u> | <u>16</u> | <u>22</u> |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

^aAdapted from Heinz Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 96, Table 14.

^b"Now I'd like to ask some questions about how you think other people will vote in this election--How about working class (middle class) people--do you think they will vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or do you think they will be about evenly split?"

^c"Now how about working class (middle class) people--do you think more working class (middle class) people will vote Republican, more will vote Democratic, or do you think they will be about evenly split?"

Data Source: Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, 1952-1956.

style of life, insecurity is more likely. The less secure an individual is in his new status, the greater is his need to adopt reassuring symbols to convince himself and others that he really has arrived. Thus the upwardly mobile European, faced with a radically different social situation, should feel more in need of status reassurance than the mobile American.⁹ Finally, party affiliation seems a more likely status indicator for Europeans than for Americans. Although evidence is lacking, I suspect that European political parties are seen as more clearly class-colored than are U.S. parties.¹⁰ If this is true, the European parvenu is more likely to view party affiliation as a status symbol than is his counterpart in the U.S. If, even so, upwardly mobile Europeans do not "over-identify" with middle class parties, it seems unlikely that the upwardly mobile American will behave differently.

One of the hypotheses of this study is that persons who move up into the middle class are less often Republicans and less often economic conservatives than those born into the middle class. Before formalizing the hypothesis, however, it is necessary to examine the view of political socialization upon which it is based.

⁹It might be argued that it is the very vagueness of status symbols in the U.S. that creates a need for status reassurance, but this argument is incompatible with that of Lipset and Bendix, who argue that it is the European mobile individual who has more trouble gaining status acceptance.

¹⁰There is abundant evidence (a) that political analysts see European parties as more class-colored than they see American parties, and (b) that there actually is higher class polarization in voting in Europe than in the U.S., but neither of these facts bears directly on whether the citizens at large view parties as class-affiliated. I suspect that they do, but I have no evidence.

Political Socialization

Bernard Barber has stated: "It is an essential feature of human behavior that social norms, ideas, and emotions are not innate but have to be learned by participation in society."¹¹ Evidence that this is the case for political behavior has been summarized by Herbert Hyman.¹² Although socialization is a life-long process, the attitudes learned in the family are reflected throughout an individual's life. This seems to be as true of political behavior as of other behavior, one study reporting that

most citizens tend to locate themselves in a political party at an early point in their adult life, and . . . this identification typically gains strength throughout life. The party that wins favor appears to depend predominantly upon social transmission from the family or early reference groups.¹³

One way in which attitudes learned in the family are reflected is in the high correlation between the party preferences of respondents and their parents. The influence of parental party preference and its persistence are shown in Table 6. Where both parents were Democrats, more than 70 per cent of respondents are also Democrats at any age level. Where both parents were Republicans, the percentage of respondents with the same identification range from 60 per cent to 71 per cent, with the oldest respondents the most apt to agree with

¹¹ Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1957), p. 264.

¹² Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).

¹³ Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), p. 212.

TABLE 6.--Parental politics in relation to party identification and age of respondent^a

| Age and Party Identification of Respondent | Parental Politics ^b | | | Shifted, Do Not Know, Neither Voted |
|---|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|---|
| | Both Parents Democrats | Both Parents Republicans | 100% | |
| <u>Under 35</u> | | | | |
| Democratic | 72% | 15% | 37% | |
| Independent ^c | 22 | 25 | 40 | |
| Republican | 6 | 60 | 23 | |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | |
| N | 231 | 220 | 88 | |
| <u>35-55</u> | | | | |
| Democratic | 74% | 18% | 43% | |
| Independent | 14 | 23 | 37 | |
| Republican | 12 | 59 | 20 | |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | |
| N | 276 | 163 | 119 | |
| <u>55 and over</u> | | | | |
| Democratic | 71% | 15% | 44% | |
| Independent | 10 | 14 | 40 | |
| Republican | 19 | 71 | 16 | |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | |
| N | 139 | 118 | 50 | |

^aAdapted from V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 300, Table 12.2.

^b"Do you remember when you were growing up whether your parents thought of themselves mostly as Democrats or Republicans or did they shift around from one party to another?"

^cIndependents include those who, when pressed, confessed that they felt closer to one or the other of the parties.

Data Source: Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, 1952.

their parents. Thus roughly two-thirds of all voters follow their parent's party preference.

It could be argued that the high degree of association between an individual's party preference and that of his parents is not a reflection of early socialization, but of the fact that most individuals remain in the status of their fathers and that the similarity of preference reflects only the similarity of adult social environment. Evidence that this is not the case is reported in Voting. Differences in the proportion of sons agreeing with their father's party preference between those who have risen above their father's status and those who have not range from 8 to 21 per cent. But with change in status controlled, differences assignable to father's party preference range from 32 to 45 per cent, making it clear that the inheritance of party preference is not simply a matter of sons being in the same status as their fathers.¹⁴

Political socialization by the family is important for a theory of social mobility because socialization patterns are different at different status levels. The low status child undergoes substantially different socializing experiences than does the higher status child, in school as well as in the family and neighborhood.¹⁵ An individual's

¹⁴ Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954) Chart XXXIX, p. 91.

¹⁵ Allison Davis, Social-Class Influences upon Learning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961); Allison Davis, "American Status Systems and the Socialization of the Child," American Sociological Review, VI, No. 3 (June, 1941), 345-54; E. Litt, "Civic Education, Community Norms, and Political Indoctrination," American Sociological Review, XXVIII,

political habits and his political attitudes are strongly influenced by the social ambience of his childhood. Because at any given status level mobile individuals will have been subject to socializing experiences that differ systematically from those to which non-mobile individuals are exposed, they should have different political habits and attitudes.

Yet socialization is not a process that ends with childhood. Voting studies have emphasized repeatedly the importance of an individual's current social milieu to his political behavior. Vote decisions are strongly influenced by relatives, friends, and co-workers, and the more homogenous these personal associates, the more certain the agreement.¹⁶ It is reported in Voting that where a respondent's three closest friends intended to vote for the Republican candidate he was in agreement 88 per cent of the time, and where all three intended to vote for the Democratic candidate he was in agreement 85 per cent of the time.¹⁷ Agreement is almost as high in the case of voting preferences of co-workers.¹⁸ The importance of personal influence is further reflected in the finding that disagreements among

No. 1 (February, 1963), 69-75; Genevieve Knupfer, "Portrait of the Underdog," in Bendix and Lipset, Class, Status and Power, pp. 255-263; Herbert Hyman, "The Values Systems of Different Classes: A Social Psychological Contribution to the Analysis of Stratification," in Bendix and Lipset, op. cit., pp. 426-442.

¹⁶ Berelson et al., op. cit., p. 335.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 98.

¹⁸ Ibid.

the primary groups to which an individual belongs constitute one of the most important sources of party irregularity and defection.¹⁹

Given the importance of socialization and social contact to political behavior, what effect can social mobility be expected to exert? People who are socially mobile differ from those of stable status in politically important ways. First, for the mobile the influence of early socialization in family, school, and neighborhood is likely to be incongruent with that exerted by the friends, neighbors, and co-workers who inhabit their new social milieu. Second, the mobile are more likely to have social contacts across status lines. Family and old friends serve as links to their former status, whereas new friends and co-workers are likely to be peers of their new status. Because, as has been noted, contact with people is of paramount importance as an influence on political behavior, it is to be expected that the difference in patterns of social contact will be reflected politically.

Mobility as a Process of Socialization

There are two alternative hypotheses about the effect of social mobility on political behavior. The one advanced by Lipset and Bendix has already been discussed. An alternative view is that the effects of mobility are principally the result of a process of socialization, a view that has been expressed by Peter Blau:

¹⁹H. McClosky and H. E. Dahlgren, "Primary Group Influence on Party Loyalty," American Political Science Review, LIII, No. 3 (September, 1959), 757-776.

This pattern, which may be called the pattern of acculturation, can be explained in terms of the hypothesis that mobile persons are not well integrated in either social class. Without extensive and intimate social contacts, they do not have sufficient opportunity for complete acculturation to the values and style of life of the one group, nor do they continue to experience the full impact of the social constraints of the other. But both groups exert some influence over mobile individuals, since they have, or have had, social contacts with members of both, being placed by economic circumstances amidst the one while having been socialized among the other. Hence their behavior is expected to be intermediate between that of the two non-mobile classes.²⁰

To the extent that the adoption of political norms is a result of the social interactions taking place in the new environment--being exposed to new friends, changing habits to meet changed circumstances, accepting new norms--the process is one of gradual socialization into the new status. This should result in a relatively smooth change in attitudes and behavior from what was appropriate to the old station in life to what is appropriate to the new station.

If, on the other hand, the adoption of political attitudes is a form of symbolic justification--attempting to prove to oneself and others that one really does belong--the process may involve a more radical change in attitudes and behavior. The mobile person may even "over-identify" with new norms, presenting us with an example of parvenu behavior. Such behavior can be expected only when both of two conditions are present. First, there must be psychic insecurity sufficient to create the need for symbolic justification.

²⁰Peter M. Blau, "Social Mobility and Interpersonal Relations," American Sociological Review, XXI, No. 3 (June, 1956), 291.

Second, such behavior can occur only with regard to those norms of attitude or behavior which are status-linked in the mind of the mobile individual, since one proves nothing about one's status by adopting norms which are not perceived as related to status.

I incline to the alternative view that political behavior tends to be affected more often by processes of gradual socialization than by needs for symbolic justification. Politics is of such peripheral concern for most people, and of sufficiently ambiguous status coloration, that the mechanisms of symbolic justification are not likely to be called into play. Further, in a society like the United States, where there is a substantial amount of mobility, where there is a widespread belief in relative social equality, and where there is not a vast gap in the styles of life of people in adjacent social strata, there is unlikely to be much psychic insecurity generated by moderate social mobility.²¹ My argument is similar to that stated by Everett Stonequist:

What is true of the parvenu is equally true of the declassé. He is forced through a period of acute maladjustment, from which he may never recover his peace of mind. But in a society of relatively open classes, where ancestors count less heavily in the balance sheet of the individual's present status, the parvenu is the rule instead of the exception. Instead of being regarded with suspicion, as in an old country like England, in America he becomes glorified in the epic 'from log-cabin to White House.' In such a situation there are strictly speaking no parvenus.²²

²¹ It has been suggested that the absence of unambiguous status symbols can make for status anxiety, but even if this is so I see no reason for believing that the mobile are more susceptible to this type of anxiety than the non-mobile. If no one can prove or be sure of his status all are likely to be equally anxious.

²² Everett V. Stonequist, The Marginal Man (New York: Scribners, 1937), p. 6.

Under these circumstances symbolic justification or "over-identification" would be expected to occur only where the gulf between original status and new status is unusually large. For cases of more moderate mobility the individual should encounter no serious problems in adjusting to his new environment.

Statement of Hypotheses

A number of hypotheses have been drawn from the preceding theory of social mobility and the review of the social mobility literature in the previous chapter. The first group of hypotheses are based on the view that social mobility is accompanied by a continuous process of socialization into a new environment, with attitudes and beliefs undergoing gradual change to conform to those prevalent in the new status environment.

1.0--For both the upwardly and downwardly mobile, political loyalties and attitudes tend to change in the direction appropriate to their new status, resulting in political behavior intermediate between that typical of their old and their new status.

When this basic hypothesis is translated into terms of the political party loyalties characteristic of high and low strata in the United States, the following two hypotheses result:

1.1--The upwardly mobile more often prefer the Democratic Party than do non-mobile members of their new stratum, but they less often prefer the Democratic Party than do non-mobile members of their original stratum.

1.2--The downwardly mobile less often prefer the Democratic Party than do non-mobile members of their new stratum, but they more often prefer the Democratic Party than do non-mobile members of their original stratum.

With the passage of time the influence of a mobile individual's new stratum should increase relative to that of his original status. Occupational status is normally determined during young adulthood, and therefore older persons generally will have spent a higher proportion of their lives in their new status than have younger persons. As a result, political attitudes of the older mobiles should more closely resemble those characteristic of the new stratum because of their longer exposure to the new norms. Thus:

1.3--Political preferences of older mobile individuals are closer to those typical of their new stratum, whereas those of young mobile individuals are closer to those typical of their original stratum.

Hypothesis 1.0 predicts an association between social mobility and changes in political preference. Thus the mobile are more likely to have changed party allegiance.

1.4--Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile have more often changed political party allegiance at some point in their lives than have the non-mobile.

The mobile, who are exposed to conflicting political influences, should be less wholehearted in their party allegiance than are non-mobile individuals:

1.5--Both the upwardly and the downwardly mobile more often view themselves as "independents" or as "weak" party members than do the non-mobile at the same status level. Accompanying an individual's actual change in status a change in subjective status is likely. The class label an individual assigns himself--his subjective class--is of considerable consequence to his political behavior.²³ Although subjective class, because more clearly a means of status reassurance, is more likely to be distorted by the need for symbolic justification than is party affiliation, it should also be subject to the same pulls of early socialization and personal contact as other political attitudes. Thus:

1.6--Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile are more often class misidentifiers than are non-mobile individuals.

Because of the American norm of success, an individual should find it psychologically easier to transfer his self-assigned class position upward to conform to upward mobility than downward to conform to downward mobility. As a result:

1.7--The downwardly mobile are more often class misidentifiers than are the upwardly mobile.

The second group of hypotheses is based upon the assumption that mobile individuals are more likely to be subject to politically

²³ Angus Campbell et al., op. cit., pp. 333-380; Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years, passim.

incongruent personal influences and socialization experiences than are the non-mobile. As noted in the previous chapter, there have been several suggestions that as a result the mobile behave as cross-pressed individuals. If this is true, then they should evidence the lack of interest and involvement in politics that have been reported as characteristic of those subject to conflicting political pressures. Specifically:

2.1--Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more often show low levels of political interest than do the non-mobile at the same status level.

2.2--Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more often feel politically ineffectual than do the non-mobile at the same status level.

2.3--Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more often abstain from voting than do the non-mobile at the same status level.

A recurrent theme of much of the literature on social mobility is that the mobile are more isolated from their social environment than are the non-mobile. A number of consequences of this presumed isolation have been suggested by various authors. The mobile have been reported to be more often prejudiced or intolerant, to have lower rates of membership in unions and voluntary organizations, and to be more withdrawn, suspicious, and dissatisfied than the non-mobile. In some cases these traits have been reported as characteristic

of the downwardly mobile only, sometimes as characteristic of both upwardly and downwardly mobile. To examine these aspects of the social integration of the mobile and its effects, the following hypotheses will be tested:²⁴

3.1--Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more often hold prejudiced or intolerant attitudes than do the non-mobile at the same status level.

3.2--Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile less often belong to voluntary organizations than do the non-mobile at the same status level.

3.3--The downwardly mobile less often belong to trade unions than do the non-mobile at the same status level.

3.4--Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile less often trust other groups in the society than do the non-mobile at the same status level.

3.5--Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile are less often satisfied with their social circumstances than are the non-mobile at the same status level.

²⁴ It had been my original intention to compare not only the social integration of the mobile with the non-mobile, but that of the extremely mobile with the moderately mobile. Unfortunately, the index of extreme mobility adopted--movement from the highest occupational category to the lowest, or vice-versa, classified a substantial majority of mobile respondents as extremely mobile, and only a small number as moderately mobile. Using this index no significant differences were found between the moderately and extremely mobile, but I attribute the lack of difference primarily to the inadequacy of the index used. I would expect that if an adequate index to extreme mobility were devised that it would show the extremely mobile less well integrated in their social environment than the moderately mobile.

These hypotheses are tested against the data in subsequent chapters. Hypotheses 1.0-1.7 are examined in Chapters VI and VII; hypotheses 2.1-2.3 in Chapter VIII; and hypotheses 3.1-3.5 in Chapter IX.

CHAPTER IV

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

The empirical data on which this study is based were obtained through preelection and postelection interviews of survey samples designed to represent the non-institutional adult population of the United States. The material, originally gathered for other purposes, is subjected here to secondary analysis.

This chapter discusses secondary analysis as a research technique, describes the sample design, adopts and justifies operational definitions for both objective and subjective mobility, describes the manner of testing propositions, and discusses the statistical procedures used.

Secondary Analysis

This study uses the method of secondary analysis, the fresh use of accumulated data. This method allows the researcher, faced with the inevitable limitations of time and funds, to undertake research projects considerably more ambitious than would otherwise be practical.

There are two varieties of secondary analysis. One makes use of published findings, making its contribution in the form of synthesis and interpretation. An excellent example of this kind of secondary

analysis is Herbert Hyman's Political Socialization.¹ The second makes use of accumulated data in less finished form--interview sheets or IBM cards--and uses them to test hypotheses other than those for which it was originally collected. It is the latter variety of secondary analysis which is used here.²

The potential of this kind of secondary analysis is exemplified in recent works by Robert E. Lane, Heinz Eulau, Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marwick, and V. O. Key, all of which use data obtained from the Michigan SRC archives.³

The gains thus achieved are not unflawed. As Heinz Eulau points out, "Secondary analysis of social science data collected for other purposes always runs the risk of doing violence to the data and their original interpretation."⁴ This danger is reduced, however,

¹Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).

²The data used here were obtained through the facilities of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, which was created by a group of cooperating universities and the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan to provide easier access to the data repository created at the SRC through its research program in political behavior, together with other data that has been deposited at the Center. For information on the IUCPR see: Warren Miller, "Inter-University Consortium for Political Research," Institute for Social Research Newsletter (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, October, 1962).

³Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959); Heinz Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marwick, Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent (Ann Arbor: Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1956); V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).

⁴Heinz Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years, p. ix.

when the reanalysis is based upon the data as originally coded rather than a reanalysis of published data. A potentially more serious problem is that the area of inquiry which interests us may have been only touched upon in the original surveys. Consequently data to test propositions of great theoretical importance may be scanty or absent altogether. Thus data from the 1958 and 1962 election surveys could not be used here, because despite desirability on other grounds, they did not include questions necessary to the measurement of mobility. For similar reasons it has at times been necessary to compromise on indicators less appropriate to a particular use than might have been available had a survey been designed de novo. But there seems little doubt that what is sacrificed is more than compensated for by the increase in scope and generality obtainable through secondary analysis.

Sample Design

The data upon which this study is based are those collected by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center for the national elections of 1952, 1956, and 1960. Analysis cards containing the required data were obtained through the facilities of the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research.

The samples (about 1700 respondents each year) were representative cross-sections of adults living in private households in the United States, excluding those living on military reservations and on some institutional properties. Also excluded were places such as large rooming houses, hotel rooms, dormitories for students or

workers, barracks, and living quarters for inmates of institutions, where persons lived outside the usual family household.

The samples were selected by the probability method known as area sampling.⁵ By this method every member of the population sampled has a known chance of being selected. To insure a close fit between the sample and the parent population on certain characteristics, the population was stratified by population density, geographic location, and several other variables.

For these surveys, sixty-six strata were formed from all the counties in the United States. The twelve largest metropolitan areas and their suburbs account for twelve of the strata and contain about 30 per cent of the population. From each of the remaining fifty-four strata, one county-unit (sometimes consisting of several counties) was chosen by a controlled selection procedure to represent the stratum.⁶ In the twelve largest metropolitan areas, each of the twelve central cities was included in the sample. A sample was also drawn from a list of the cities, towns, and suburban areas surrounding these central cities.

Within each of the fifty-four primary sampling units outside of the large metropolitan areas a rather general urban-rural sub-stratification was established.⁷ The urban areas were further classified

⁵The information in the following four paragraphs is obtained from the IUCPR Analysis Book for the elections involved.

⁶For a description of the procedure see Roe Goodman and Leslie Kish, "Controlled Selection--A Technique in Probability Sampling," Journal of the American Statistical Association, XLV (1950), 350-372.

⁷Briefly, places of 2,500 or more population at the time of the 1950 Census are classified as urban.

by size before a probability selection was made to obtain representation of each population subgroup. Similarly, from the rural parts of the primary sampling units, two classifications were formed according to the density of the population: (1) rural congested areas, and (2) open country areas. Probability selections were then made from each type of rural area.

Only one respondent was interviewed within each selected sample dwelling. The respondent to be interviewed was selected by an objective procedure, and no substitutions were allowed.⁸ From three to ten call-backs were made in an attempt to interview respondents not at home on the first call. Even so, a small proportion were never reached--4 per cent in 1952 and 5 per cent in 1956. In addition, 6 per cent of the sample in 1952 and 8 per cent in 1956 refused to be interviewed, and another 4 per cent in 1952 and 2 per cent in 1956 could not be interviewed because of illness, senility, or language problems. In the 1960 survey the figures are similar, but not precisely comparable because of the inclusion of a panel design in the basic cross-section study.⁹

⁸ Leslie Kish, "A Procedure for Objective Respondent Selection Within the Household," Journal of the American Statistical Association, XLIV (1949), 380-387..

⁹ Of the respondents who had been interviewed in 1956, 838 were reinterviewed in 1960. These reinterviewed respondents constitute a survey "panel."

Aggregation of Surveys

Wherever possible, data from the three elections are aggregated. For theoretical reasons the mobile are expected to have distributions on political variables intermediate between those of stable high and stable low status, and thus observed differences should be of relatively small magnitude. A large number of cases is therefore desirable to help avoid the interpretation of chance differences as real differences. Further, many of the analyses involve breaking the sample down into large numbers of cells, and if cell frequencies are not to fall so low that they are unusable, large numbers of cases are required.

In order to aggregate data from the three study years certain procedures are necessary. First, in the original SRC codings the occupational classifications are not coded identically for each of the three study years. It was therefore necessary to recode occupation uniformly. Since the occupation code used in 1952 is nearest to a common denominator, occupation of both father and son in the 1956 and 1960 surveys were re-coded to conform to the 1952 code.¹⁰

Second, in the 1960 survey a number of respondents were weighted by a factor of two or four in order to maintain a representative national sample. Because this weighting procedure makes the use of standard statistical techniques inappropriate, and because

¹⁰The 1952 occupation code is reproduced in Appendix A.

a perfectly representative national sample was not considered important in studying social mobility, the 1960 sample was used in unweighted form. This reduces the 1960 sample by 773, making it about two-thirds the size of the 1952 and 1956 samples.

Finally, the use of a panel design involving reinterviews of respondents in the later study years made the aggregation of study years more complex. If the 1956 and 1960 studies were simply added together, this would result in counting twice those respondents who had been interviewed both in 1956 and 1960. To avoid double counting, reinterviewed respondents were dropped from the 1960 sample prior to aggregation. Wherever the 1960 survey is reported separately both new and reinterviewed respondents are included, but wherever it is combined with the 1956 survey only those respondents interviewed for the first time in 1960 are included.

Measuring Objective Mobility

In order to measure social mobility status ranks must be obtained for father and son, together with a measure of the difference between them. In the interest of practicality it is desirable to use a single measure that is simple, a valid measure of social status; one which is stable over time and place and which can be provided reliably by the son for both himself and his parents.

The most commonly used measures of social status are income, education, occupation, and status as estimated by the interviewer.

or ranking by a panel of experts who personally know the respondent.¹¹ The latter two measures, although useful in studies of social class, are of little utility in the study of social mobility because it is difficult to establish parental status reliably and because the use of panels of experts is obviously impractical in a national sample survey. Of the remaining measures, neither parental income nor education is ascertainable with as high reliability as is desirable. A more serious defect is their instability as measures of status. The social meaning of a given level of income or education changes with the average level of education or income in the society. Forty years ago twelve years of education and an income of \$3,000 a year had an entirely different meaning in terms of social status than they do now. A son who has no more income or education than his father had several decades earlier would occupy a lower relative position in society than did his father. While this difficulty could be overcome to some extent by developing an index that would provide multiplication factors compensating for shifts over time, such an index would be cumbersome and would be subject to inevitable inaccuracies and regional variations. Because of the deficiencies of alternative measures, and because occupation correlates highly with most other measures of status, almost all research on social mobility has used occupation to measure social status.

¹¹ For a comprehensive discussion of possible indices to social status see Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1957), pp. 96-185.

Occupation as a Measure of Objective
Mobility

Occupation has several advantages over alternative measures as a basis for measuring inter-generational mobility. Matthews states that "While an individual's occupation is by no means a certain index to his social standing, it is the closest approach to an infallible guide."¹² The reasons occupation and social standing are so closely related have been set forth succinctly by Joseph Kahl:

In the first place, a man's occupation is the source of his income, which in turn provides the style of life that serves as one of the major clues used by his neighbors in making their evaluations. But occupation stands for more than merely a certain level of income. It indicates a man's education: it suggests the type of associates he comes in contact with on the job; it tells something of the contribution he makes to community welfare; it hints at the degree of his authority over other people.¹³

As a result, occupation tends to correlate highly with other measures of social status.¹⁴

Perhaps the greatest advantage of an occupational index is stability over time and place. Deeg and Paterson compared a prestige rating of twenty-five occupations made in 1925 with a similar rating

¹² Donald R. Matthews, "United States Senators and the Class Structure," in Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (eds.), Political Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), p. 185.

¹³ Joseph A. Kahl, The American Class Structure (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1957), p. 53.

¹⁴ W. Lloyd Warner reports a correlation of .87 between income and occupation and a correlation of .77 between education and income (W. Lloyd Warner et al., Social Class in America (Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc., 1949), Table 13, p. 172), but these high correlations have not been duplicated in broader studies. Reiss found correlations in the ranges .4 to .6 utilizing a much wider sample. (Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Occupations and Social Status (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 140ff.)

made in 1947 and obtained a correlation of .97.¹⁵ Inkeles and Rossi found a relatively standard hierarchy of occupational prestige in the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, Germany, Soviet Russia, and Japan despite cultural differences.¹⁶ Kaare Svalastoga, after examining the findings of twenty-nine studies on occupational prestige, concludes:

Empirical research on occupational prestige in various countries and ranging in time from 1925 till today has revealed one basic finding confirmed by all studies. This finding is the high degree of consensus on the occupational prestige hierarchy of any given nation. . . . Moreover recent international comparisons in general reveal a high level of international prestige consensus.¹⁷

After completing his measurements of occupational prestige in Denmark and comparing his findings with those of other studies, he concludes "it is no great exaggeration to say that there exists within Western civilization a nearly invariant rank-order of occupational prestige."¹⁸

Occupational indices have proved useful in social theory because, as Bernard Barber has pointed out, "practically all of the relatively full time, functionally significant social roles that are the criteria of social evaluation are defined as 'jobs,' that is, as

¹⁵ Martha E. Deeg and Donald G. Paterson, "Changes in the Social Status of Occupations," Occupations, XXV (1947), 205-208.

¹⁶ Alex Inkeles and Peter Rossi, "Cross National Comparisons of Occupational Ratings," American Journal of Sociology, LXI, No. 4 (January, 1956), 329-339..

¹⁷ Kaare Svalastoga, Prestige, Class and Mobility (Denmark: Scandinavian University Books, 1959), p. 60.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 129.

positions in a single occupational sphere.¹⁹ Similar considerations led Chinoy to observe that the use of occupations in the study of mobility was useful for all important contemporary theories of stratification.²⁰

Ranking of Occupations

Most studies have used occupational groupings similar to those developed by Dr. Alba M. Edwards of the U. S. Bureau of the Census.²¹ The occupational groupings devised by Edwards were intended to provide a rough scale of occupations in terms of increasing prestige, education and income.

Evidence from a number of sources indicates that an Edwards type scale does provide an effective ordering of the social status of occupational groups. The ordering of occupational groups tends to be the same whether they are ranked by education, income, prestige as evaluated by others, or self-evaluated prestige.

Joseph A. Kahl reports that professional and technical workers have the highest median educations.²² Next highest median educations are found in the occupational groups of managers and officials and clerical and sales. At a lower education level are found blue-collar,

¹⁹ Bernard Barber, op. cit., p. 171.

²⁰ E. Chinoy, "Social Mobility Trends in the United States," American Sociological Review, XX (1955), 180-186.

²¹ A. M. Edwards, Alphabetical Index of Occupations by Industries and Socio-Economic Groups (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1937, Bureau of the Census).

²² Joseph A. Kahl, The American Class Structure (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1957), p. 66.

service and farm workers. The ordering of income groups reported by Kahl is similar. The professional and managerial groups have the highest median incomes, the clerical and sales and the skilled laborers intermediate incomes, and other blue-collar workers, service workers, and farm laborers the lowest median incomes.²³

The ordering of occupational groups by evaluated prestige is similar to the order of rank by education or income. Of the studies which have evaluated occupational prestige, perhaps the best known is the National Opinion Research Center study by North and Hatt.²⁴ Using the occupational prestige scores obtained in this study, Albert J. Reiss, Jr., computed average prestige scores for major occupational groups.²⁵ He found the following prestige order of occupations:

(1) Professional and technical; (2) Managers, officials, and proprietors; (3) Craftsmen and foremen; (4) Sales and Clerical; (5) Operatives and kindred workers; (6) Protective-service workers; (7) Service workers; and (8) Laborers. The notable inversion of the usual order is to be found in the rating of craftsmen and foremen above sales and clerical workers. With this single exception the usual white-collar to blue-collar status order is followed.

²³ Ibid. See also Herman P. Miller, Income of the American People (New York: Wiley, 1955), p. 54.

²⁴ National Opinion Research Center, National Opinion on Occupations: Final Report of a Special Opinion Survey among Americans 14 and Over (University of Denver: National Opinion Research Center, March, 1947). This study has recently been replicated with virtually identical results. See Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel, and Peter H. Rossi, "Occupational Prestige in the United States: 1925-1963" (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 1964). (Mimeo graphed.)

²⁵ Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Occupations and Social Status (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 68.

As important as prestige ranks assigned by others are self-ratings of occupational prestige. Many studies have examined the subjective class identifications of people in different occupational groups.²⁶ The finding has consistently been that individuals in occupations which rate high on other indicators of status are more likely to identify themselves as members of higher social classes than are individuals in lower rated occupations and vice versa.

A study by Stanley Hetzler uses a technique that permits a much finer breakdown of self-evaluated prestige than does the technique of choosing between social class "boxes."²⁷ Hetzler presented his subjects with a scale one foot in length, containing no markings other than an indication of the high and low ends of the scale. He then asked them to estimate their social position in 1940 and at the present time by placing a mark at the appropriate point on the scale. The results are shown in Table 7. Using the "median score on present scale," and omitting farmers, the order of self-evaluated social status is: (1) Professionals; (2) the single Big Business Owner; (3) Executives; (4) Employee-Supervisors; (5) White-collar; (6) Proprietors; (7) Skilled; (8) Unskilled; (9) Semiskilled. The notable inversions here are between unskilled and semiskilled, and in the low ranking of proprietors, who are usually included with managers

²⁶ e.g., Richard Centers, The Psychology of Social Classes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949); Eulau, op. cit.

²⁷ Stanley A. Hetzler, "Social Mobility and Radicalism-Conservatism," Social Forces, XXXIII, No. 2 (December, 1954), 161-166.

TABLE 7.--Median scores obtained in relating occupation to estimated social position in 1940 and present social position^a

| Occupational Category | Median Score on 1940 Scale | Median Score Present Scale | Net Loss or Gain Since 1940 | Number (N = 300) |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|
| Unskilled | 5.7 | 5.8 | +.1 | 43 |
| Semi-skilled | 5.1 | 5.3 | +.2 | 31 |
| Skilled | 6.4 | 6.6 | +.2 | 67 |
| White-collar | 7.2 | 7.5 | +.3 | 73 |
| Farmers | 9.0 | 7.0 | -2.0 | 13 |
| Employee-Supervisors | 6.7 | 8.0 | +1.3 | 25 |
| Proprietors | 7.3 | 7.1 | -.2 | 32 |
| Professionals | 10.0 | 9.6 | -.4 | 9 |
| Executives | 9.0 | 9.0 | .0 | 6 |
| Big Business Owners | 9.5 | 9.5 | .0 | 1 |

^aAdapted from Stanley A. Hetzler, "Social Mobility and Radicalism-Conservatism," Social Forces, XXXIII, No. 2 (December, 1954), Table 2, p. 162.

and officials, but by and large the ranking follows the by now familiar pattern.

Sufficient evidence has been presented to indicate that the Edwards type of occupational grouping does form at least a rough scale of social status. Inconsistencies are present, but any regrouping would involve other inconsistencies, for the measures of social status do not correlate perfectly with each other. As a result little is gained by any wholesale attempt at regrouping, and comparability with the dozens of other studies that have used occupational scales of the Edwards type would be lost.

Two further problems of measurement involve the instability of job-holding and the unreliability of occupational data obtained in the interview situation. The problem of the instability of job-holding is raised by Lipset and Bendix in a pair of articles in the American Journal of Sociology.²⁸ Basing their conclusions on a study of the job histories of 935 respondents in Oakland, California, Lipset and Bendix indicate that most of the respondents had unstable occupational careers. While this may cast some doubt on the use of occupation as a stable measure of social position, it does not seem to interfere seriously with the use of occupation as a measure of mobility for several reasons. First, change of social status and change of job are often an integral part of the process of social

²⁸ Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, "Social Mobility and Occupational Career Patterns, I. Stability of Jobholding; II. Social Mobility," American Journal of Sociology, LVII (January, March, 1952), 366-374, and 494-504.

mobility which we are studying. Second, the time and location of the study--not long after World War II and in a region characterized by high geographic mobility--would tend to overstate the amount of occupational instability to be found in the country as a whole.

Finally, as Lipset and Bendix point out elsewhere:

It is important to note . . . that there are major areas of stability; there are certain limits to the variety of occupational experience of the respondents. In the first place, their mobility is largely confined to mobility on either side of the dividing line between manual work and the nonmanual occupations. There is little permanent occupational movement across this basic line. This means that although many persons have experience in a wide variety of occupations, most of it will be homogenous to the extent that it will be either manual or nonmanual.²⁹

One further problem involves the reliability of the method of determining the occupations of father and son. If, as in the data used in this study, the respondent is asked what his occupation is and what his father's occupation is, the father's occupation will usually be obtained at the high point of his occupational career, while the son's occupation will be reported at a stage below the peak of his career.³⁰ The effect of any error thus introduced would be to overstate downward mobility and to underestimate upward mobility. The problem is avoided in the data used here, however, by asking for the father's occupation during the time the respondent was growing up.

²⁹ Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), p. 180.

³⁰ In the majority of cases, however, this would not involve a shift from one major occupational category to another.

An Operational Definition of Objective
Mobility

This study uses occupation as coded in the 1952 SRC election survey, with the 1956 and 1960 data recoded to conform to the 1952 code as explained above. Occupations are grouped in the following manner for purposes of analysis. The professional and business category includes managers and officials, self-employed businessmen and artisans, and those in professional and semi-professional occupations. Clerical, sales, buyers, agents, and brokers form the white-collar category. Skilled, semiskilled, unskilled, service workers, farm laborers, and protective service form the blue-collar category. Dropped from the sample prior to analysis are instances where either the head of the respondent's household or the head of his parental household (while the respondent was growing up) are coded as unemployed, retired, or a housewife or student. Cases where the head of the respondent's household is a farm operator are also dropped, though where the head of the parental household was a farm operator the respondent is retained and classified in the ex-farm category.

The three occupational categories form a status scale, with the professional and business category highest, the white-collar category in the middle, and the blue-collar category at the lower end of the status scale. Respondents are assigned to occupational categories on the basis of their occupation, or where respondents are not themselves the family head, the occupation of the head of the

household is used, since the family normally constitutes a status unit with the social attributes of the family head being the chief determinant of status for dependent relatives in the household.³¹ Within occupational categories a respondent is classified into one of four objective mobility categories. The four categories are status stable, upwardly mobile, downwardly mobile, and ex-farm. Respondents are assigned to objective mobility categories on the basis of a comparison of their occupation with that of their father.³² A respondent is status stable if in the same broad occupational category as his father, upwardly mobile if in a higher occupational category, and downwardly mobile if in a lower occupational category. Where the father was a farm operator the respondent is assigned to the ex-farm category.

Objective Mobility Sample Size

Of the original total of 5,516 respondents included in the SRC samples for 1952, 1956 and 1960, 2,738 cases had to be dropped prior to aggregating study years for three reasons: (1) 1,129 cases

³¹ Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," American Sociological Review, XIX, No. 4 (August, 1954), 407; Talcott Parsons, "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," in Reinhard Bendix and S. M. Lipset (eds.), Class, Status and Power (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 116-117; Kingsley Davis, Human Society (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949), p. 364.

³² The question asked to determine father's occupation was: "What kind of work did your father do for a living while you were growing up?" Wherever someone other than the respondent's father was head of the parental household his occupation is used instead of the father's.

were dropped because either the respondent or the respondent's father was in an unclassified occupational category; (2) 838 of the respondents in the 1960 survey were dropped because they had been interviewed in the 1956 survey; (3) 771 cases from the 1960 survey were dropped because they were not actually additional interviews, but were "weighted" cases added to the sample by duplication of data on respondents already in the sample.³³

The classification procedure assigns 837 respondents in the aggregate sample to the professional and business category, of whom 309 are status stable, 338 are upwardly mobile, and 190 are ex-farm. The white-collar category has 360 respondents, of whom 87 are downwardly mobile, 35 are status stable, 152 are upwardly mobile, and 86 are ex-farm.³⁴

Measuring Subjective Mobility

Subjective mobility, as defined here, is dependent upon whether an individual thinks that he has moved up or down the social ladder relative to his parents, or that he occupies about the same position. The most straightforward way of finding out this information is simply to ask, and fortunately for our purposes the Michigan SRC has asked useful questions in two of the surveys used here: those

³³ As noted above, this is a legitimate technique for balancing a sample to obtain a correct national profile, but prevents the use of standard statistical techniques, and offers no compensating benefits for a study of the present type. Therefore weighted cases were removed from the sample prior to aggregation.

³⁴ A complete breakdown may be found in Appendix B.

for the 1956 and 1960 elections. The question evolved by the SRC to identify self-perception of class is:

There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or to the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as being in one of these classes? Which one?³⁵

An individual's answer to this question may be taken as an indication of his perception of his own place in society.³⁶ Of the same respondents the Michigan SRC asked "What would you say your family was when you were growing up, middle class or working class?"³⁷ Persons who place themselves in the same class as they place their parental family are subjectively status stable. Those who place themselves in the middle class while placing their parents in the working class are subjectively upwardly mobile; those who place themselves in the working class and their parents in the middle class are subjectively downwardly mobile.

Applying these criteria to the samples from the 1956 and 1960 election surveys gives a subjectively middle class group of 730 and

³⁵ For a fuller description of techniques see Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), p. 340ff.

³⁶ For many purposes it would be desirable to have finer gradations than simply middle or working class. In the 1956 survey the Michigan SRC is able to supply this in terms of perception of location in the "upper" or "average" part of the class. Unfortunately this was not done in the 1960 survey, and in aggregating data all that can be salvaged is middle or working class identification.

If designing a study de novo, it would be worthwhile to consider the use of a more direct question as an index to subjective mobility, e.g. "Would you consider your place in society to be higher, about the same, or lower than that of your parents?"

³⁷ Campbell et al., loc. cit.

a subjectively working class group of 1,253.³⁸ In the middle class sample, 222 are subjectively upwardly mobile and 508 are subjectively status stable. For the working class, 1,155 are subjectively status stable and 98 subjectively downwardly mobile.³⁹

Manner of Testing Propositions

The propositions developed in Chapter III are tested against the data in the following chapters. The technique used consists of comparing the distributions of the mobile and the status stable on a number of politically relevant characteristics. The independent variable is social mobility throughout, but separate tests are conducted for objective mobility and subjective mobility using the operational definitions adopted above. An extensive series of politically relevant dependent variables are used, including a standard array of demographic traits, party preference, voting choice, changes in party preference, strength of party preference, subjective class, a series of issue attitudes, political interest and activity, feeling of political understanding and efficacy, voting turnout, feelings of personal satisfaction, and rates of membership in unions and voluntary organizations. The results are displayed in contingency tables, and a standard format has been followed to permit easier interpretation of the tables.

³⁸ As with objective mobility, weighted cases and reinterviews with the same respondents are removed prior to aggregation.

³⁹ A complete breakdown is contained in Appendix C.

Wherever there is a likelihood that a relationship is affected by a third or contaminating variable, the third variable is introduced as a control. This is done by dividing the sample into subgroups based on the control variable (as for instance, into Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish subgroups) and then comparing the relationship of the independent and dependent variable within subgroups. Operational definitions for both dependent and control variables are reported in footnotes to each table.

Statistical Procedures

The statistical test used as a measure of statistical significance is chi square. Chi square is a particularly useful measure for analyses of the type employed in the following chapters because of its additive properties.⁴⁰ In many of the tables in the following chapters a statistical test which tested the entire table at once would give a false indication, because differences due to social status would be combined indiscriminately with differences due to mobility. Because chi square values may be summed, it is possible to test for statistical significance between mobility categories within status groups, and then sum chi square values to determine the statistical significance for the table as a whole. This procedure has the effect of factoring out the influence of social status upon the variable in question so far as the statistical test is concerned.

⁴⁰Quinn McNemar, Psychological Statistics (3d ed. rev.) (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 222-223.

The level of probability adopted as a criterion of statistical significance is .05. Wherever a difference would occur more often than five times out of 100 by chance, it is reported as not significant (NS). Wherever the probability of the difference occurring by chance is less than .05 the actual probability level reached is reported.

Although when using chi square it is desirable to use a correction for continuity whenever predicted cell frequencies are low, this correction cannot be easily made in the case of a general contingency table.⁴¹ Thus, although in a few instances predicted cell frequencies are sufficiently low that a correction for continuity would be desirable, none has been used.

⁴¹ Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 221.

CHAPTER V

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MOBILE

Before turning to an examination of the relationship between social mobility and political behavior it is well to determine whether the mobile differ from the stable in any systematic way. High and low social strata differ with regard to characteristics such as income, education and religion, and these are related to political behavior. If differences in social characteristics exist between the socially mobile and the status stable at a given status level, caution must be exercised to avoid attributing to social mobility behavior which is really a reflection of other factors.

This chapter examines differences between the mobile and the stable with regard to six important demographic characteristics, using the data described in the previous chapter. The six characteristics examined are income, education, religion, age, race, and nativity.

Income

Although income is an important indicator of status, its relations to other indicators is imperfect. This is particularly likely to be the case for the socially mobile. Even though the son of a poor family succeeds in moving into an occupational category of higher status, he remains at a competitive disadvantage with the son

of a higher status family. The child of a high status family is likely to have a better education, better clothes, more polished manners, and better contacts. These social advantages can be turned to economic advantage, and as a result, within any occupational group those born to high status tend to make more money than those born to low status.¹

Evidence that this is the case for both objective and subjective mobility is presented in Tables 8 and 9. Where the family is headed by a professional or businessman almost half of the status stable have annual incomes exceeding \$7,500, while less than a third of the upwardly mobile have an income this large. Among blue-collar workers the downwardly mobile also evidence the advantage of their higher status origin by substantially higher income levels than are enjoyed by the status stable blue-collar families. The exception to the rule is in the white-collar category, where the stable have higher incomes than either the upwardly mobile, which is expected, or the downwardly mobile, which is not expected. Unfortunately, it is in this category that the fewest cases are available, and the result is not statistically significant. It may be noted that the white-collar category will prove deviant in several of the analyses in the next few chapters.

¹ Although the data are not reported here, it is interesting to note that this competitive advantage is greater in the case of business than for the professions. Status stable businessmen, on the average, have substantially higher incomes than do upwardly mobile businessmen, but the advantage of status stable professionals over upwardly mobile professionals is relatively small.

TABLE 8.--Objective mobility and annual family income^a

| Annual Family Income (\$) | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|----------------|------|------|----------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| 0-3,999 | 10% | 23% | 39% | 33% | 26% | 37% | 34% | 20% | 42% | 60% | | |
| 4,000-7,499 | 41 | 48 | 43 | 45 | 49 | 50 | 52 | 64 | 49 | 36 | | |
| 7,500 up | 49 | 29 | 19 | 22 | 26 | 13 | 14 | 16 | 9 | 4 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 301 | 397 | 183 | 85 | 35 | 148 | 85 | 143 | 769 | 568 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 38.999 (df: 2) | | | 5.789 (df: 4) | | | 26.275 (df: 2) | | | | | |
| Probability | .001 | | | NS | | | .001 | | | | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | 71.063 (df: 8) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | .001 | | | | | | | | |

^a"About what do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 9.--Subjective mobility and annual family income^a

| Annual Family Income | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---|---|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| \$0-\$3,999 | 23% | 24% | 32% | 46% |
| \$4,000-\$7,499 | 40 | 40 | 54 | 43 |
| \$7,500 up | 37 100% | 36 100% | 14 100% | 10 99% |
| N | 493 | 215 | 96 | 1121 |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | |
| X ² | | 0.165 (df: 2) | | 7.028 (df: 2) |
| Probability | | NS | | .05 |
| X ² for entire table | | | 7.193 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | | NS | |

^a"About what do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family?"

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

For subjective mobility the difference is apparent only for the working class, where the downwardly mobile are more prosperous than are the status stable. Among those who identify themselves as middle class, however, the upwardly mobile evidence about the same income distribution as do the status stable.

Education

In spite of the relatively equalitarian system of public education in the United States, the son of a high status family is much more likely to receive a good education than is the son of a low status family. At any given status level, therefore, the downwardly mobile individual is likely to have more years of formal education than the status stable individual, while the upwardly mobile individual is likely to have fewer years of education.² Evidence that this is the case is presented in Tables 10 and 11.

In the professional and business category more than two-thirds of the status stable have education beyond the high school level, while less than half of the upwardly mobile or those from farm families have reached this level.³ In the blue-collar category

²This is true in spite of the fact that education is a principal route to social mobility. An examination of the accompanying tables reveals that the upwardly mobile tend to be better educated than the non-mobile of low status, but less well educated than the non-mobile of high status.

³It should be recalled that status categories are assigned on the basis of the occupation of the head of the family, while educational level is reported for the respondent, who may or may not be the head. Thus the educational levels reported are not necessarily representative of those actually employed at particular occupational levels.

TABLE 10.--Objective mobility and educational level

| Respondent's Education (Years) | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|----------------|------|-----|----------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Low (0-8) | 4% | 15% | 26% | 14% | 6% | 13% | 25% | 21% | 34% | 57% | | |
| Med (9-12) | 25 | 38 | 37 | 32 | 37 | 47 | 38 | 49 | 52 | 35 | | |
| High (12+) | 71 | 47 | 37 | 54 | 57 | 39 | 38 | 30 | 14 | 9 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 101% | | |
| N | 309 | 404 | 190 | 87 | 35 | 152 | 85 | 147 | 784 | 577 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^a</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 46.788 (df: 2) | | | 8.259 (df: 4) | | | 24.673 (df: 2) | | | | | |
| Probability | .001 | | | NS | | | .001 | | | | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | 79.720 (df: 8) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | .001 | | | | | | | | |

^aIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 11.--Subjective mobility and educational level

| Respondent's Education | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Low (0-8 yrs.) | 11% | 21% | 29% | 41% |
| Med. (9-12 yrs.) | 31 | 38 | 38 | 44 |
| High (12+ yrs.) | 58 <u>100%</u> | 42 <u>101%</u> | 34 <u>101%</u> | 14 <u>99%</u> |
| N | 505 | 221 | 98 | 1152 |

| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| χ^2 | 21.782 (df: 2) | 25.569 (df: 2) |
| Probability | .001 | .001 |
| χ^2 for entire table | | 47.351 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | .001 |

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

the downwardly mobile are twice as likely to have been educated beyond high school as are the status stable. The white-collar category is again somewhat deviant, with the status stable being slightly better educated than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile. Even here, however, the downwardly mobile are better educated than the upwardly mobile.

The educational pattern of the subjectively mobile is similar to that of the objectively mobile. In the middle class category 58 per cent of the status stable have some education beyond high school, while but 42 per cent of the upwardly mobile reach this level. This is particularly noteworthy because of the fact that there is no difference in income distribution between these two groups. The liability of lower status parents is apparently reflected much more strongly in the educational attainments of the subjectively upwardly mobile than in their pocketbooks. Among the working class 34 per cent of the downwardly mobile have some education beyond high school, but only 14 per cent of the status stable members of the working class have this much education. The difference between groups is again stronger with regard to education than for income.

Religion

The earliest settlers of the United States were primarily Protestant, while later waves of immigration were largely Catholic. As a result Protestants have often enjoyed economic and social advantages over Catholics. That this situation still exists in some

measure may be seen from Table 12, where it is clear that Protestants are somewhat over-represented in the professional and business category while Catholics are over-represented among blue-collar workers. This suggests that the upwardly mobile would more often be Catholics than would the status stable at the same level, while the downwardly mobile would less often be Catholics than those of stable low status.

As Table 12 indicates, this is indeed the case. While in the professional and business category only 16 per cent of the status stable are of the Catholic faith, 28 per cent of the upwardly mobile are Catholics. In the white-collar category, though the differences are small, the downwardly mobile are least often Catholics, the status stable next, and the upwardly mobile most apt to be of the Catholic faith. Among blue-collar workers the status stable are more often Catholics than are the downwardly mobile. In each case the difference is statistically significant, and in each case the difference is in the anticipated direction. In all three occupational categories those born to farm families are least likely to be Catholics.

For subjective mobility the pattern is similar. Table 13 shows that in the middle class category there are 27 per cent Catholics among the upwardly mobile, but only 12 per cent Catholics among the status stable. In the working class the difference is negligible, with 23 per cent of both the downwardly mobile and the status stable of the Catholic faith. The difference is statistically significant for the middle class category and for the table as a whole, but not for the working class.

TABLE 12.--Objective mobility and church preference^a

| Church Preference | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----|------|-----------------|------|-----|----------------|------|------|------|----|------|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | SS | UM | ex-F |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | | | |
| Protestant | 70% | 63% | 84% | 69% | 74% | 58% | 86% | 65% | 60% | 82% | | |
| Catholic | 16 | 28 | 13 | 22 | 26 | 28 | 12 | 27 | 36 | 13 | | |
| Jewish | 10 | 6 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 0 | | |
| Other | 4 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 5 | | |
| | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 305 | 403 | 187 | 87 | 35 | 151 | 85 | 147 | 777 | 576 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 16.653 (df: 3) | | | 12.982 (df: 6) | | | 12.233 (df: 3) | | | | | |
| Probability | .001 | | | .05 | | | .01 | | | | | |
| X ² for entire table | | | | 41.868 (df: 12) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | .001 | | | | | | | | |

^a"Is your church preference Protestant, Catholic or Jewish?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 13.--Subjective mobility and church preference^a

| Church Preference | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|----------------------|---|--------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Working Class Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Protestant | 80% | 65% | 74% | 72% |
| Catholic | 12 | 27 | 23 | 23 |
| Jewish | 5 | 6 | 2 | 2 |
| Other | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>99%</u> | <u>99%</u> |
| N | 505 | 219 | 94 | 1141 |

Statistical Measures

| | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| X ² | 24.869 (df: 3) | 2.468 (df: 3) |
| Probability | .001 | NS |
| X ² for entire table | | 27.336 (df: 6) |
| Probability | | .001 |

^a"Is your church preference Protestant, Catholic or Jewish?"

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

As a final observation on religion it may be noted that those of the Jewish faith are conspicuous by their rarity in the working class category. Whether by subjective or objective measure, they are predominantly middle class.

Age

In Chapter IV it was noted that a possible distortion involved in the use of occupation as a measure of mobility was that it might compare respondent and father at different points in the life-cycle, with the respondent reporting his present occupation, but reporting his father's occupation at the peak of his career. If this were the case young persons would be more likely to be reported as downward mobile, not having had time to reach the high point of their careers. In order to guard against this possibility it is necessary to examine the age distribution of our sample.

As may be seen in Table 14, the objectively downwardly mobile have an age distribution very similar to that of the status stable in both the white-collar and blue-collar categories. If any difference does exist it is in the direction of the downwardly mobile being slightly older than the status stable. In the professional and business category the upwardly mobile individual is likely to be younger than the status stable individual. For objective mobility, then, there seems to be no tendency to exaggerate downward mobility through measuring status at different points in the life cycle.

TABLE 14.--Objective mobility and age

| Respondent's Age Group ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | |
| Young | 20% | 30% | 19% | 30% | 34% | 26% | 14% | 36% | 35% | 23% |
| Medium | 57 | 49 | 47 | 48 | 43 | 56 | 46 | 49 | 49 | 51 |
| Older | 22 <u>99%</u> | 21 <u>100%</u> | 34 <u>100%</u> | 22 <u>100%</u> | 23 <u>100%</u> | 18 <u>100%</u> | 39 <u>99%</u> | 16 <u>101%</u> | 15 <u>99%</u> | 26 <u>100%</u> |
| N | 305 | 406 | 189 | 87 | 35 | 150 | 84 | 148 | 783 | 575 |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 8.920 (df: 2) | | | 2.651 (df: 4) | | | 0.022 (df: 2) | | | |
| Probability | .02 | | | NS | | | NS | | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | 11.593 (df: 8) | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | |

^aBecause of differences in coding, age groups are not homogeneous. Age groups are as follows: 1952 and 1960 Young: 18-29, Med: 30-49, Older: 50 up; 1956 Young: 18-34, Med: 35-54, Older: 55 up.

^bIn each case chi square computation omit the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

For the case of subjective mobility the problem is somewhat different. In determining parental social class the respondent is asked the class of his family when he was growing up--thus presumably permitting less variation of the point in the life cycle at which status is determined. That no serious distortions are introduced thereby may be seen from Table 15, where there is little difference in age distributions for the mobile and the stable either in the middle class or working class category.

Race

In America Negroes have tended to be confined to the lower end of the social scale. In Table 16 Negroes constitute but 2 per cent of the status stable members of the professional and business category, while at the other end of the scale they constitute 12 per cent of the status stable blue-collar workers and 18 per cent of the blue-collar workers from farm families. If no outside factors were operating, this over-representation at low status levels and under-representation at high status levels would lead to an expectation that Negroes would also be over-represented among the upwardly mobile and under-represented among the downwardly mobile.

While Table 16 shows some slight differences in the anticipated direction, it is also apparent that other factors are operating. In the white-collar category 7 per cent of the upwardly mobile are Negroes as compared with 3 per cent of the status stable, but this is only about half the number of upwardly mobile Negroes to be expected

TABLE 15.--Subjective mobility and age

| Respondent's Age Group | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---------------------------|---|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable | |
| Young | 28% | 27% | 30% | 30% |
| Med. | 46 | 48 | 48 | 43 |
| Older | 26 <u>100%</u> | 24 <u>99%</u> | 22 <u>100%</u> | 28 <u>101%</u> |
| N | 508 | 222 | 98 | 1151 |

Statistical Measures

| | | |
|---------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| χ^2 | 0.478 (df: 2) | 1.486 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for entire table | | 1.965 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |

^aBecause of differences in coding age groups are not homogeneous. Age groups are as follows: 1956 Young: 18-34, Med: 35-54, Older: 55 up; 1960 Young: 18-29, Med.: 30-49, Older: 50 up.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 16.--Objective mobility and race

| Race | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|----------------|------|--------------|---------|------|-------------|---------|----------------|----------------|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F |
| White | 98% | 97% | 97% | 95% | 97% | 93% | 95% | 95% | 88% | 82% |
| Negro | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 12 | 18 |
| Other | 0 | - ^a | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | - ^a | - ^a |
| | 100% | 99% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 308 | 406 | 190 | 87 | 35 | 152 | 86 | 148 | 785 | 579 |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | .789 | (df: 2) | | 3.661 | (df: 4) | | 5.826 | (df: 2) | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | NS | | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | 10.275 | (df: 8) | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | |

^aLess than 1 per cent.

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

on the basis of their proportion of the blue-collar category.⁴ Again, 5 per cent of the downwardly mobile blue-collar workers are Negroes as against 12 per cent of the status stable--but this is about twice the percentage to be expected on the basis of the small number of Negroes in higher status occupations.

The same pattern is apparent in Table 17 for subjective mobility. Negroes are again over-represented in the working class, their representation among the upwardly mobile is less than their proportion of the working class would indicate, and there is somewhat more downward mobility than the sparse representation of Negroes in the middle class would lead us to expect.

While in neither subjective nor objective mobility is statistical significance reached, the tendencies are in each case in agreement with common knowledge. Negroes are over-represented in lower status positions, under-represented in higher positions. They are relatively less often upwardly mobile, relatively more often downwardly mobile.⁵ In brief, it appears harder for a Negro to improve his social status than it is for a white man, and harder to maintain the improved status once it is achieved.⁶

⁴ Negroes constitute about 12 per cent of the blue-collar category. If sons of Negro families were upwardly mobile with the same frequency as for whites, the upwardly mobile professional and business and white-collar groups should contain this same proportion of Negroes instead of the 2 to 7 per cent that they do contain.

⁵ That is, as compared with the very small proportion of Negroes in the higher status categories.

⁶ It should be remembered that these conclusions are based upon data collected between 1952 and 1960. It may be that some improvement in the Negro's competitive position has been achieved since that time, though there is as yet no reason to believe that the basic situation has changed.

TABLE 17.--Subjective mobility and race

| Race | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|-------|---|--------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Working Class Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| White | 98% | 97% | 95% | 87% |
| Negro | 2 | 2 | 5 | 13 |
| Other | 0 | 1 | 0 | - ^a |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 508 | 222 | 98 | 1155 |

| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|--|
| X ² | 4.591 (df: 2) | | 5.667 (df: 2) | |
| Probability | NS | | NS | |
| X ² for entire table | | 10.258 (df: 4) | | |
| Probability | | .05 | | |

^aLess than 1 per cent.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

Nativity

At one time in the United States a heavy over-representation of immigrants would be expected among lower status groups. Restrictions on immigration have reduced the relative numbers of immigrants, however, and it may be that immigrants now tend to bring higher skill levels with them than was once the case. In any event, as Table 18 indicates, there now seems to be little difference in the proportions of native to foreign born at different status levels. To the extent that any difference does exist, it is in the direction of some over-representation of recent arrivals at the lower levels, but the difference is slight.

When objective mobility is used as a measure the difference in nativity between the mobile and stable is in no case statistically significant, but two things are worth mention. First, in each occupational category those born into farm families are most likely to be natives. Second, and of interest because as has been noted previously the white-collar category most often deviates from anticipated patterns, the status stable white-collar workers are substantially more often natives than are any other group.

When subjective mobility is the measure, however, as in Table 19, the upwardly mobile more often are immigrants or from immigrant families than are the status stable. The difference between objective and subjective mobility in this regard may perhaps be explained in terms of a subjective downgrading of status levels

TABLE 18.--Objective mobility and number of generations in the U.S.

| Number of Generations ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|----------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Native | 68% | 65% | 77% | 63% | 84% | 63% | 79% | 65% | 60% | 74% | | |
| 2nd Gen. | 25 | 29 | 21 | 29 | 13 | 34 | 16 | 27 | 33 | 19 | | |
| 1st Gen. | 7 | 6 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 7 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 272 | 370 | 180 | 79 | 32 | 136 | 76 | 128 | 721 | 535 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 1.369 (df: 2) | | | 8.452 (df: 4) | | | 2.293 (df: 2) | | | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | NS | | | | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | 12.114 (df: 8) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | | | |

^aDefinitions: Native--respondent and parents native born;
2nd generation--respondent native born, one or both parents foreign born;
1st generation--respondent foreign born.

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956.

TABLE 19.--Subjective mobility and number of generations in the U.S.

| Number of Generations ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|------------------------------------|---|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Native | 77% | 62% | 72% | 70% |
| 2nd Gen. | 18 | 28 | 21 | 24 |
| 1st Gen. | 5 100% | 10 100% | 7 100% | 6 100% |
| N | 436 | 185 | 81 | 968 |

| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| X ² | 14.241 (df: 2) | 0.444 (df: 2) |
| Probability | .001 | NS |
| X ² for entire table | | 14.685 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | .01 |

^aDefinitions: Native-Respondent and parents native born; 2nd generation-Respondent native born, one or both parents foreign born; 1st generation-Respondent foreign born.

Data Source: 1956.

in the "old country."⁷ Such an explanation would be consistent with the fact that there is virtually no difference between the mobile and the status stable in the working class category.

Conclusion

When compared with the status stable the upwardly mobile are more often members of the Catholic faith, and on average have lower incomes and less education. Conversely, when compared with the status stable the downwardly mobile have higher incomes, more education, and are less often Catholics. These relationships hold whether objective or subjective measures of mobility are used, except that the subjectively upwardly mobile are under no income liability, and the subjectively downwardly mobile are as often Catholics as are their status peers.

When objective mobility is used as a measure the upwardly mobile are somewhat younger than their status stable counterparts, but when subjective mobility is used as a measure the relationship is not apparent. For the downwardly mobile no significant pattern exists, though perhaps the subjectively downwardly mobile are a little younger than subjectively status stable members of the working class.

Primarily because of the rarity of Negroes in the upper strata the relationship between race and mobility in the data

⁷That is, the immigrant feels that things are "better here" than in the old country, and feels that his status is improved, whether or not this is objectively the case.

presented here is not statistically significant. It seems clear, however, that upward mobility is more difficult for Negroes, and compared with their small representation in higher strata downward mobility occurs more often.

With objective mobility used as a measure there is little difference between the mobile and the status stable in regard to nativity, with the possible exception of the high proportion of status stable individuals in the white-collar category who come from native families. When subjective mobility is the measure there is little difference among working class members, but in the middle class those who are subjectively upwardly mobile more often are immigrants or from immigrant families.

Perhaps the simplest description of the differences here reported between the mobile and the status stable is that on most characteristics the mobile have a distribution of the trait which falls between that of their status of origin and their present status. Because this pattern is similar to that hypothesized for the mobile with regard to political variables the distribution of these social characteristics will be taken into account when political variables are examined in the following chapters.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE

In most democratic political systems political alignments take the form of political parties, and individuals "choose sides" by adopting a party loyalty. In the United States an individual's party loyalty is usually to the Democratic or the Republican party, and as we have seen, which he adopts is affected by whether he is of high or low status. This chapter investigates a further relationship: that between social mobility and party allegiance.

In the following sections the relationship of both objective and subjective mobility to various forms of political allegiance is investigated. The forms of allegiance examined are party preference, voting choice in presidential elections, changes in party preference, party regularity, and the strength of party preference. In addition, the party preferences of parents and friends, the relation of age to party preference, the relation of interest level to party preference, and the effect of mobility upon subjective class are examined.

Party Preference

In the United States the person who moves from a position of low social status to a position of high status moves from a social environment where most people consider themselves Democrats to one where preference for the Republican Party is more prevalent. For the

person who is downwardly mobile the opposite is true. The hypotheses to be tested here are based on the assumption that a mobile individual's party preference may undergo a change from that appropriate to his original environment to that typical of his new social environment.

Two hypotheses have been stated formally: 1.1--The upwardly mobile more often prefer the Democratic Party than do non-mobile members of their new stratum, but they less often prefer the Democratic Party than do non-mobile members of their original stratum; and 1.2--The downwardly mobile less often prefer the Democratic Party than do non-mobile members of their new stratum, but they more often prefer the Democratic Party than do non-mobile members of their original stratum.

Table 20 illustrates the relationship between objective mobility and preference for a political party. In the highest status group, the professional and business category, of those status stable who usually think of themselves as belonging to a political party 54 per cent are Republicans. Among the upwardly mobile only 44 per cent consider themselves Republicans. The result is statistically significant, and is in the direction predicted by hypothesis 1.1.

In the blue-collar category 70 per cent of the status stable blue-collar workers who express a party preference consider themselves Democrats, compared with 60 per cent of the downwardly mobile workers. The result is again statistically significant, and as predicted by hypothesis 1.2.

TABLE 20.--Objective mobility and party preference

| Party Preference ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|----------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Democrat | 46% | 56% | 62% | 58% | 28% | 63% | 61% | 60% | 70% | 68% | | |
| Republican | 54 | 44 | 38 | 42 | 72 | 37 | 39 | 40 | 30 | 32 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 219 | 292 | 145 | 66 | 29 | 103 | 70 | 103 | 556 | 418 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 4.684 (df: 1) | | | 11.816 (df: 2) | | | 4.148 (df: 1) | | | | | |
| Probability | .05 | | | .01 | | | .05 | | | | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | 20.648 (df: 4) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | .001 | | | | | | | | |

^a"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (if Rep or Dem) Would you call yourself a strong (R)(D) or not a very strong (R)(D)? (If Independent or Other) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?" Table includes only those who identified themselves as Republicans or Democrats in response to the first question.

^bIn each case the ex-Farm category is omitted from the χ^2 computation.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

In the white-collar category the picture is not so clear. The upwardly mobile are, as predicted, much more likely to choose the Democratic Party than are the status stable, 63 per cent of the upwardly mobile as opposed to but 28 per cent of the status stable. But the downwardly mobile, who according to hypothesis 1.2 should less often prefer the Democrats than do the status stable, actually more often consider themselves Democrats. The deviant group in this case would seem to be the status stable white-collar workers, who are substantially more often Republicans than even the status stable business and professional workers. This same group will prove deviant in a number of subsequent analyses.

With the exception of the status stable white-collar workers, the rest of the white-collar group fits the anticipated pattern rather well. The downwardly mobile white-collar workers are less often Democrats than are the upwardly mobile, but more often Democrats than are the higher status business and professional group. The upwardly mobile white-collar workers are less often Democrats than the status stable blue-collar workers, but more often Democrats than any group of equal or higher status. This is in line with both hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2. It is unfortunate that the one deviant category, the status stable members of the white-collar group, is also the category having the fewest cases.

Turning to the relationship between subjective mobility and political preference, Table 21 provides additional evidence in support of hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2. In the middle class group there is little

TABLE 21.--Subjective mobility and party preference

| Party Preference ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Democrat | 49% | 51% | 50% | 68% |
| Republican | 51 | 49 | 50 | 32 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 387 | 153 | 64 | 837 |

| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| χ^2 | 0.249 (df: 1) | 8.139 (df: 1) |
| Probability | NS | .01 |
| χ^2 for entire table | | 8.388 (df: 2) |
| Probability | | .02 |

^a"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (If Rep or Dem) Would you call yourself a strong (R)(D) or not a very strong (R)(D)? (If Independent or Other) Do you think of yourself as close to the Republican or Democratic party?" Table includes only those who identified themselves as Republicans or Democrats in response to the first question.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

difference between the upwardly mobile and the status stable.¹ In the working class sample 50 per cent of the downwardly mobile who make a party choice are Democrats compared with 68 per cent of the status stable, a statistically significant difference in the predicted direction.

In Chapter V it was noted that the mobile differed from the status stable in several ways, notably in income, education, and religion. Thus it is necessary before accepting hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 to determine whether or not the relationship of mobility to party preference persists when these characteristics are held constant. This may be done by dividing respondents into groups based on the characteristic in question, and seeing if the relationship holds within each group.

In Table 22 the relationship between objective mobility and party preference is controlled by income. As the table indicates, in the professional and business category the upwardly mobile are Democrats more often than are the status stable at each income level, although the difference is most marked in the low income group and almost vanishes in the middle group. In the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile are at each income level less often Democrats than are the status stable. In the white-collar category the pattern is again deviant, with the status stable consistently more often Republicans than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile. In the highest and lowest occupational status groups in every case differences are in the

¹When southern residents are omitted, as in Table 26, a statistically significant difference in the hypothesized direction does appear.

TABLE 22.--Objective mobility and party preference by income groups

| Income Group ^a and Party Preference ^b | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|----|----|
| | Professional and Business | | | DM | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | DM | SS |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| <u>\$0-3,999</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 28% | 51% | 56% | 36% | 44% | 45% | 52% | 38% | 50% | 50% | | |
| Republican | 45 | 29 | 21 | 39 | 56 | 25 | 21 | 34 | 22 | 22 | | |
| Ind., Other | 28 | 21 | 23 | 25 | 0 | 29 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | | |
| | 101% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 29 | 91 | 70 | 28 | 9 | 55 | 29 | 29 | 325 | 338 | | |
| <u>\$4,000-7,499</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 39% | 41% | 45% | 50% | 12% | 43% | 48% | 45% | 51% | 49% | | |
| Republican | 32 | 32 | 27 | 26 | 65 | 23 | 39 | 24 | 20 | 25 | | |
| Ind., Other | 29 | 27 | 28 | 24 | 24 | 34 | 14 | 31 | 29 | 26 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 123 | 191 | 78 | 38 | 17 | 74 | 44 | 91 | 374 | 205 | | |
| <u>\$7,500 up</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 28% | 30% | 41% | 42% | 22% | 32% | 58% | 30% | 46% | 45% | | |
| Republican | 43 | 36 | 53 | 32 | 56 | 37 | 25 | 30 | 23 | 27 | | |
| Ind., Other | 29 | 34 | 6 | 26 | 22 | 32 | 17 | 39 | 30 | 27 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 99% | 99% | 99% | | |
| N | 148 | 114 | 34 | 19 | 9 | 19 | 12 | 23 | 69 | 22 | | |

TABLE 22.--Continued

| Income Group | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|---|---------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^c</u> | | | |
| <u>\$0-3,999</u> | | | |
| X ² | 4.805 (df: 2) | 5.743 (df: 4) | 2.704 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 13.251 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>\$4,000-7,499</u> | | | |
| X ² | .280 (df: 2) | 13.833 (df: 4) | 1.026 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | .01 | NS |
| X ² for table | | 15.139 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>\$7,500 up</u> | | | |
| X ² | 1.500 (df: 2) | 1.915 (df: 4) | 1.797 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 5.211 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of X ² for Income Groups | 6.585 (df: 6) | 21.491 (df: 12) | 5.527 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | .05 | NS |
| Sum of X ² for entire table | | 33.603 (df: 24) | |
| Probability | | NS | |

^a"About what do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family?"

^b"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

^cIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

hypothesized direction, though no longer statistically significant.

Party preference is controlled for education in Table 23. In the professional and business category the upwardly mobile are more often Democrats than are the status stable in both the highest and lowest educational groups, though in the low education group they are also somewhat more often Republicans as well because of the large numbers of Independents among the status stable. At the intermediate level differences wash out completely. In the blue-collar group the downwardly mobile, when compared with the status stable, are more often Republicans and less often Democrats at each educational level, though again the difference is greatly reduced at the intermediate level. In the white-collar group the status stable are at every level more often Republican, less often Democrats than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile. For the table as a whole differences remain statistically significant.

Table 24 illustrates the relationship between objective mobility, party preference, and religion. In the professional and business category the upwardly mobile are more often Democrats than are the status stable in all three religious groups. Among blue-collar workers the downwardly mobile are less often Democrats than are the status stable within each group. The white-collar category is again deviant, with the status stable more often Republicans than either of the mobile groups for Protestants and Catholics. None of the white-collar Jews are Republicans so mobility within that group

TABLE 23.--Objective mobility and party preference by educational level

| Years of Education and Party Preference ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|------|------|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 25% | 50% | 44% | 42% | 0% | 45% | 45% | 34% | 46% | 51% | | |
| Republican | 17 | 28 | 30 | 25 | 100 | 35 | 23 | 31 | 24 | 20 | | |
| Ind., Other | 58 | 22 | 26 | 33 | 0 | 20 | 32 | 34 | 30 | 29 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 12 | 60 | 50 | 12 | 2 | 20 | 22 | 32 | 266 | 326 | | |
| <u>Med (9-12)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 46% | 44% | 46% | 32% | 31% | 44% | 47% | 51% | 52% | 50% | | |
| Republican | 28 | 28 | 25 | 39 | 54 | 21 | 34 | 21 | 20 | 26 | | |
| Ind., Other | 26 | 28 | 29 | 29 | 15 | 35 | 19 | 28 | 28 | 25 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | | |
| N | 78 | 155 | 69 | 28 | 13 | 72 | 32 | 72 | 405 | 200 | | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 28% | 34% | 51% | 51% | 20% | 40% | 56% | 32% | 52% | 37% | | |
| Republican | 43 | 36 | 33 | 30 | 60 | 27 | 34 | 36 | 19 | 33 | | |
| Ind., Other | 28 | 29 | 16 | 19 | 20 | 33 | 9 | 32 | 29 | 29 | | |
| | 99% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 99% | | |
| N | 218 | 190 | 70 | 47 | 20 | 60 | 32 | 44 | 112 | 51 | | |



TABLE 23.--Continued

| Years of Education | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|--|---------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 6.719 (df: 2) | 4.695 (df: 4) | 1.735 (df: 2) |
| Probability | .05 | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 13.149 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>Med (9-12)</u> | | | |
| X ² | .207 (df: 2) | 7.872 (df: 4) | .027 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 8.106 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 2.300 (df: 2) | 10.982 (df: 4) | 6.919 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | .05 | .05 |
| X ² for table | | 20.201 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | .02 | |
| Sum of X ² for educational groups | 9.226 (df: 6) | 23.549 (df: 12) | 8.681 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | .05 | NS |
| Sum of X ² for table | | 41.456 (df: 24) | |
| Probability | | .02 | |

^a"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 24.--Objective mobility and party preference by religious groups

| Religion ^a and Party Preference ^b | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|------|--------------|------|------|------|-------------|------|
| | Professional and Business | | | DM | White-Collar | | | DM | Blue-Collar | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | ex-F |
| <u>Protestant</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 32% | 35% | 47% | 42% | 23% | 38% | 49% | 38% | 44% | 46% |
| Republican | 46 | 39 | 31 | 37 | 62 | 35 | 32 | 34 | 26 | 25 |
| Ind., Other | 23 | 26 | 23 | 22 | 15 | 27 | 19 | 28 | 30 | 29 |
| | 101% | 100% | 101% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 212 | 255 | 157 | 60 | 26 | 88 | 73 | 95 | 469 | 473 |
| <u>Catholic</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 39% | 48% | 54% | 42% | 22% | 51% | 50% | 49% | 58% | 70% |
| Republican | 29 | 20 | 25 | 32 | 56 | 16 | 40 | 23 | 14 | 12 |
| Ind., Other | 33 | 32 | 21 | 26 | 22 | 33 | 10 | 28 | 27 | 18 |
| | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% |
| N | 49 | 112 | 24 | 19 | 9 | 43 | 10 | 39 | 277 | 74 |
| <u>Jewish</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 43% | 68% | 50% | 63% | 0% | 55% | 0% | 75% | 85% | 100% |
| Republican | 10 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ind., Other | 47 | 24 | 50 | 38 | 0 | 45 | 0 | 25 | 15 | 0 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 30 | 25 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 8 | 13 | 1 |

TABLE 24.--Continued

| Religion | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|--|------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^c</u> | | | |
| <u>Protestant</u> | | | |
| X ² | 2.048 (df: 2) | 6.783 (df: 4) | 2.596 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 11.428 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>Catholic</u> | | | |
| X ² | 1.888 (df: 2) | 6.721 (df: 4) | 2.230 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 10.839 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>Jewish</u> | | | |
| X ² | 3.508 (df: 2) | .120 (df: 4) | .297 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 3.925 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of X ² for Protestants and Catholics ^d | | 22.267 (df: 16) | |
| Probability | | NS | |

^a"Is your church preference Protestant, Catholic or Jewish?"

^b"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

^cIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

^dJewish table omitted because of low cell frequencies.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

is immaterial. As before, the hypothesized relationship between mobility and party preference holds for the highest and lowest occupational groups, but not for the white-collar status stable category.

One further control is worth reporting: that for geographical region. The southern part of the United States has been traditionally a Democratic stronghold, and generally speaking, the association between status and party is lower in the South than for other regions of the country.² As a result the hypothesized relationships between mobility and political preference should be sharper when southerners are eliminated from the sample than when they are included.

Data on party preference with southern residents omitted are reported in Tables 25 and 26. For both objective and subjective mobility differences remain in the same directions as before the control for region was introduced, but are of increased magnitude and statistical significance.

The evidence for both objective and subjective mobility offers strong support for hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2. With the exception of the consistently deviant status stable white-collar group, relationships are as predicted by the hypotheses, and do not wash out when controls for income, education and religion are introduced. When southern residents are omitted from the analyses the strength of the relationship is increased.

²Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 367-368.

TABLE 25.--Objective mobility and party preference with Southern residents omitted

| Party Preference ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|----------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Democrat | 24% | 36% | 34% | 38% | 17% | 33% | 36% | 37% | 49% | 42% | | |
| Republican | 46 | 35 | 40 | 39 | 67 | 30 | 44 | 31 | 22 | 31 | | |
| Ind., Other | 30 | 30 | 26 | 23 | 17 | 37 | 20 | 32 | 29 | 28 | | |
| | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | | |
| N | 225 | 321 | 119 | 64 | 30 | 119 | 50 | 117 | 632 | 347 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 10.743 (df: 2) | | | 15.837 (df: 4) | | | 6.619 (df: 2) | | | | | |
| Probability | .01 | | | .01 | | | .05 | | | | | |
| χ^2 for table | | | | 33.199 (df: 8) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | .001 | | | | | | | | |

^a"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 26.--Subjective mobility and party preference with Southern residents omitted

| Party Preference ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|----------------------|------------------|-------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| Status | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable | |
| Democrat | 25% | 31% | 30% | 44% |
| Republican | 50 | 35 | 31 | 27 |
| Ind., Other | 26 | 33 | 39 | 29 |
| | <u>101%</u> | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 322 | 159 | 74 | 791 |

Statistical Measures

| | | |
|---------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| χ^2 | 9.007 (df: 2) | 5.888 (df: 2) |
| Probability | .02 | NS |
| χ^2 for entire table | | 14.895 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | .01 |

^a"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

Thus the data for upward mobility support West's finding that the upwardly mobile are less likely to be Republicans, rather than the finding of Lipset and Bendix that they are more likely to prefer the conservative party.³ The upwardly mobile in the United States exhibit behavior similar to that reported by Lipset and Bendix for upwardly mobile Europeans: both retain political links to their status of origin. The same is true for the downwardly mobile. The data reported here confirm the finding of studies in many countries that the downwardly mobile more often prefer a conservative party than do other members of their new status.⁴

Voting

An individual's declared party preference by no means insures that in any particular case he will vote for the candidate of that party. This may be seen in Table 27, where in all three election years a higher proportion of respondents report voting for the Republican candidate than would be expected on the basis of the proportion of individuals in each group who consider themselves Republicans.

Even so, the relationship of mobility to voting is similar to its relationship to party preference. Table 27 records the relationship of objective mobility to presidential votes in 1952, 1956, and 1960.

³Patricia Salter West, "Social Mobility among College Graduates," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset (eds.), Class, Status and Power (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), p. 478; Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), p. 66.

⁴Lipset and Bendix, loc. cit.

TABLE 27.--Objective mobility and reported vote for president by election years

| Reported Vote ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| <u>1952</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Voted Demo- cratic | 25% | 34% | 29% | 33% | 14% | 26% | 33% | 43% | 41% | 38% | | |
| Voted Repub- lican | 64 | 52 | 57 | 50 | 71 | 58 | 45 | 36 | 32 | 30 | | |
| Didn't Vote | 11 | 14 | 14 | 17 | 14 | 16 | 21 | 21 | 27 | 32 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 106 | 182 | 87 | 40 | 14 | 50 | 33 | 28 | 304 | 212 | | |
| <u>1956</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Voted Demo- cratic | 23% | 27% | 27% | 35% | 7% | 34% | 32% | 28% | 36% | 26% | | |
| Voted Repub- lican | 68 | 52 | 54 | 50 | 73 | 47 | 42 | 45 | 37 | 36 | | |
| Didn't Vote | 9 | 22 | 19 | 15 | 20 | 19 | 26 | 28 | 27 | 38 | | |
| | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 147 | 162 | 85 | 34 | 15 | 73 | 38 | 94 | 366 | 273 | | |
| <u>1960</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Voted Demo- cratic | 38% | 48% | 36% | 41% | 44% | 47% | 48% | 50% | 55% | 40% | | |
| Voted Repub- lican | 55 | 44 | 53 | 50 | 56 | 43 | 32 | 33 | 32 | 35 | | |
| Didn't Vote | 7 | 8 | 11 | 9 | 0 | 10 | 19 | 17 | 13 | 24 | | |
| | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 99% | | |
| N | 99 | 101 | 47 | 22 | 9 | 49 | 31 | 46 | 185 | 139 | | |

TABLE 27.--Continued

| Election Year | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|---|---------------------------|----------------|---------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | |
| <u>1952</u> | | | |
| X ² | 3.941 (df: 2) | 2.279 (df: 4) | .473 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 6.693 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>1956</u> | | | |
| X ² | 11.781 (df: 2) | 5.402 (df: 4) | 2.807 (df: 2) |
| Probability | .01 | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 19.990 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | .02 | |
| <u>1960</u> | | | |
| X ² | 2.475 (df: 2) | 1.172 (df: 4) | .654 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 4.301 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |

^a"In talking to people about the election we find that a lot of people weren't able to vote because they weren't registered or they were sick or they just didn't have time. How about you, did you vote this time? (IF YES) Who did you vote for for President?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

In the professional and business category the upwardly mobile in each election more often voted for the Democratic candidate for President than did the status stable. In the blue-collar group the status stable more often voted for the Democratic candidate in 1956 and 1960 than did the downwardly mobile, though not in 1952. The downwardly mobile members of the blue-collar group did, however, vote more often for the Republican candidate in 1952 as well as for the Democratic candidate. The apparent paradox is explained by the fact that the status stable blue-collar workers were more likely not to have voted in that election.

The white-collar category is again deviant. The status stable white-collar workers more often voted for the Republican candidate in each of the elections than did either the upwardly or downwardly mobile workers.

Data on voting patterns in relation to subjective mobility in the 1956 and 1960 elections are presented in Table 28. The patterns are not identical in the two years. In 1956 the middle class upwardly mobile voted for Eisenhower in as high proportion as did the status stable members of the middle class, and almost equal proportions of both the status stable and the upwardly mobile voted for Stevenson. In discussing Maccoby's findings in Chapter II it was suggested that a possible explanation of her findings might be that Eisenhower was particularly appealing to the upwardly mobile. While the data on objective mobility show no such tendency, it is possible to interpret the data of Table 28 that way, particularly since in the 1960 election the more normal pattern of the upwardly mobile preferring the Democratic

TABLE 28.--Subjective mobility and reported vote for president in 1956 and 1960

| Election Year and Reported Vote ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|--|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| <u>1956</u> | | | | |
| Voted Democratic | 28% | 29% | 35% | 30% |
| Voted Republican | 56 | 56 | 41 | 35 |
| Didn't Vote | 16 | 15 | 24 | 35 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 431 | 183 | 80 | 953 |
| <u>1960</u> | | | | |
| Voted Democratic | 30% | 43% | 39% | 40% |
| Voted Republican | 58 | 44 | 48 | 31 |
| Didn't Vote | 11 | 14 | 13 | 29 |
| | <u>99%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 230 | 140 | 46 | 689 |
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | | | |
| <u>1956</u> | | | | |
| X ² | 0.319 (df: 2) | | 3.882 (df: 2) | |
| Probability | NS | | | |
| X ² for table | | 4.201 (df: 4) | | |
| Probability | | NS | | |
| <u>1960</u> | | | | |
| X ² | 7.762 (df: 2) | | 7.675 (df: 2) | |
| Probability | .05 | | .05 | |
| X ² for table | | 15.437 (df: 4) | | |
| Probability | | .01 | | |

^a"In talking to people about the election we find that a lot of people weren't able to vote because they weren't registered or they were sick or they just didn't have time. How about you, did you vote this time? (If Yes) Who did you vote for for President?"

candidate recurs. In this connection it should be noted that 56 per cent of the status stable members of the middle class voted for Eisenhower in 1956 and a slightly higher 58 per cent voted for Nixon in 1960. Meanwhile the upwardly mobile changed from a 56 per cent vote for Eisenhower to but 44 per cent for Nixon. Thus within the middle class the swing to Kennedy took place exclusively among the upwardly mobile. There is a suggestion here that the mobile may more often change their votes from party to party, a possibility to be examined later in this chapter.

There is a difference between years in the subjectively working class portion of the sample as well. In 1956, due to the high proportion of non-voting among the status stable members of the working class, the downwardly mobile more often voted for both Stevenson and Eisenhower. In 1960, with a smaller rate of abstention the downwardly mobile less often voted for Kennedy, more often voted for Nixon, as compared with the status stable.

In contrast to the subjectively middle class, among the working class the swing to Kennedy took place primarily among the status stable. The downwardly mobile, who had given 41 per cent of their votes to Eisenhower in 1956 increased this to 48 per cent for Nixon in 1960. At the same time the proportion of status stable workers voting for the Republican candidate dropped from 35 per cent in 1956 to 31 per cent in 1960. In the more highly polarized 1960 election differences between the subjectively mobile and the non-mobile were more marked than in 1956.

The evidence suggests that the mobile carry with them some remnant of the voting habits of their status of origin along with the party identification, though the voting habits are perhaps retained with less tenacity than the party identification. The relationship of voting to mobility revealed by the evidence examined here is essentially the same as the relationship between mobility and party preference reported in the previous section.

Parents and Friends as a Political Influence

A point already made is that other people influence political preferences and attitudes. The mobile were born into a different social environment than they now inhabit and presumably have been exposed to the influence of people with attitudes somewhat different than those typical of their new stratum. As a specific example, the upwardly mobile should more often have Democratic parents than the status stable at the same occupational level, and the downwardly mobile should more often have Republican parents than do those of stable low status.

In 1952 respondents were asked for their parent's party identification, which provides a means for examining the relationship between mobility and parents' political preference. The data are presented in Table 29. In the professional and business category 46 per cent of the upwardly mobile had parents who thought of themselves as Democrats, compared with 38 per cent among the status stable. In the blue-collar category 40 per cent of the downwardly mobile had

TABLE 29.--Objective mobility and parent's political party

| Parent's ^a Political Party ^b | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---------|------|-----|--------------|---------|------|-------------|---------|------|----|----|
| | Professional and Business | | | DM | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | DM | SS |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Democratic | 38% | 46% | 54% | 42% | 35% | 53% | 53% | 40% | 51% | 35% | | |
| Republican | 38 | 28 | 31 | 33 | 41 | 23 | 28 | 30 | 25 | 28 | | |
| Ind., Mixed, Other | 25 | 25 | 15 | 24 | 24 | 23 | 19 | 30 | 25 | 37 | | |
| | 101% | 99% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | | |
| N | 122 | 204 | 93 | 45 | 17 | 60 | 36 | 30 | 338 | 238 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^c</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 3.346 | (df: 2) | | | 3.025 | (df: 4) | | 1.234 | (df: 2) | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | | NS | | | NS | | | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | | 7.605 | (df: 8) | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | NS | | | | | | | |

^a"Do you remember when you were growing up whether your parents thought of themselves mostly as Democrats or Republicans or did they shift around from one party to another?"

^bDemocratic and Republican categories include cases where both parents were of one party or where one had a preference but the other did not.

^cIn each case the ex-farm category is omitted from the chi square computation.

Data Source: 1952.

Democratic parents, while 51 per cent of the status stable's parents were Democrats. In each case the difference, though not statistically significant, is in the anticipated direction.

The information presented in the white-collar portion of Table 29 may help to shed some light on the persistent deviance shown by that group. The relationship between the upwardly mobile and the downwardly mobile is in the normal direction, the parents of the downwardly mobile being more often Republicans, those of the upwardly mobile more often Democrats. The status stable white-collar workers, however, more often came from Republican families than did any other group of any status. This finding is in harmony with the consistent deviance of the status stable white-collar group in the direction of allegiance to the Republican party. The status stable white-collar group not only contains a high proportion of Republicans but comes disproportionately from Republican families. Again, however, the numbers involved are quite small, and any generalization must be tentative.

Parents are only one kind of personal influence upon political attitudes. Friends are another important influence. It has been assumed that the mobile are more likely to retain ties with their old status group. If this is the case, the upwardly mobile should have more friends who intend to vote Democratic, the downwardly mobile more friends who intend to vote Republican. The relationship is recorded in Table 30.

TABLE 30.--Objective mobility and friend's votes

| Probable Vote of Friends ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|-----|------|
| | Professional and Business | | | DM | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | ex-F |
| All will vote Democratic | 24% | 29% | 20% | 31% | 13% | 32% | 32% | 42% | 46% | 49% |
| Most will vote Democratic | 4 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 13 | 5 | 12 | 0 | 7 | 6 |
| Split | 17 | 26 | 24 | 23 | 31 | 16 | 20 | 29 | 18 | 19 |
| Most will vote Republican | 13 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 13 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| All will vote Republican | 42 | 34 | 42 | 36 | 31 | 41 | 36 | 25 | 24 | 21 |
| | 100% | 99% | 99% | 100% | 101% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 99% |
| N | 105 | 174 | 74 | 39 | 16 | 44 | 25 | 24 | 284 | 170 |

Statistical Measures^b

| | | | |
|---------------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|
| χ^2 | 9.451 (df: 4) | 5.623 (df: 8) | 3.489 (df: 4) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for entire table | | 18.563 (df: 16) | |
| Probability | | NS | |

^a"Now how about your five best friends--how do you think they're most likely to vote?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952.

In the professional and business category in Table 30 the friends of the upwardly mobile are more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate than are the friends of the status stable. Among the blue-collar workers the friends of the status stable are somewhat more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate than are the friends of the downwardly mobile, while the friends of the downwardly mobile are more often split or Republican. In the white-collar category the friends of the status stable are perhaps somewhat less likely to be Democrats, but beyond that the pattern is not clear. In no case do differences reach statistical significance.

If the white-collar category is excepted, the upwardly mobile do seem to be somewhat more often exposed to Democratic personal influences than their status stable peers, both from parents and friends. In like manner the downwardly mobile somewhat more often have Republican parents and friends than those of stable low status.

Party Preference and the Passage of Time

While socialization is a life-long process, the importance of different socializing agencies tends to change with the passage of time. For most people the influence of family and school is most important during the first two decades of life. Thereafter the influence of the social environments provided by occupation, friends and neighborhood become relatively more important. The longer an individual is in a given social environment the more closely his attitudes and preferences should resemble those held by others in

the same position. Thus hypothesis 1.3 states: Political preferences of older mobile individuals are closer to those typical of their new stratum, whereas those of young mobile individuals are closer to those typical of their original stratum.

In terms of party preference the hypothesis would predict that among the upwardly mobile the young would be more often Democrats and the old more often Republicans. The downwardly mobile young should be more often Republicans, while the older downward mobiles should be Democrats.

Table 31 reports data on the relationship between age, party preference, and objective mobility. In the professional and business category 43 per cent of the young upwardly mobile are Democrats, with the proportion falling to 41 per cent for those of moderate age and to 33 per cent for the older respondents. At the same time preference for the Republican Party among the upwardly mobile increases from 24 per cent among the young to 32 per cent among the middle age group to 42 per cent among the older group. This by itself does not prove the operation of a socialization process, since on average older persons more frequently prefer the Republican Party anyway. A more direct test of the hypothesis is to see whether the distribution of party preference for the mobile more closely resembles that for the status stable with the passage of time.

Among the young in the professional and business category the difference in preference for the Democratic Party between the mobile and the stable is 14 per cent. In the middle age group the difference

TABLE 31.--Objective mobility and party preference by age groups

| Party Preference ^a and Age Group ^b | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|------|--------------|------|------|------|-------------|------|------|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | DM | White-Collar | | | DM | Blue-Collar | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | |
| <u>Young</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 29% | 43% | 57% | 54% | 25% | 49% | 43% | 30% | 49% | 45% | | |
| Republican | 33 | 24 | 14 | 27 | 50 | 20 | 29 | 36 | 18 | 21 | | |
| Ind., Other | 38 | 33 | 30 | 19 | 25 | 32 | 29 | 34 | 33 | 34 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 66 | 122 | 37 | 26 | 12 | 41 | 14 | 53 | 278 | 136 | | |
| <u>Med</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 36% | 41% | 45% | 38% | 7% | 44% | 56% | 56% | 52% | 51% | | |
| Republican | 35 | 32 | 33 | 36 | 73 | 25 | 26 | 19 | 21 | 23 | | |
| Ind., Other | 29 | 26 | 22 | 26 | 20 | 31 | 18 | 25 | 27 | 27 | | |
| | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | | |
| N | 175 | 198 | 88 | 42 | 15 | 84 | 39 | 72 | 384 | 290 | | |
| <u>Older</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 28% | 33% | 45% | 42% | 50% | 30% | 45% | 26% | 45% | 50% | | |
| Republican | 51 | 42 | 33 | 32 | 50 | 33 | 39 | 35 | 29 | 26 | | |
| Ind., Other | 21 | 25 | 22 | 26 | 0 | 37 | 15 | 39 | 26 | 24 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 67 | 85 | 64 | 19 | 8 | 27 | 33 | 23 | 121 | 151 | | |

TABLE 31.--Continued

| Age Group | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|---|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^c</u> | | | |
| <u>Young</u> | | | |
| X ² | 4.167 (df: 2) | 5.720 (df: 4) | 10.111 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | .01 |
| X ² for table | | 19.998 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | .02 | |
| <u>Med</u> | | | |
| X ² | 1.147 (df: 2) | 14.304 (df: 4) | 0.251 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | .01 | NS |
| X ² for table | | 15.702 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | .05 | |
| <u>Older</u> | | | |
| X ² | 1.064 (df: 2) | 4.560 (df: 4) | 3.203 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 8.828 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of X ² for age groups | 6.378 (df: 6) | 24.584 (df: 12) | 13.565 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | .05 | .05 |
| Sum of X ² for table | | 44.528 (df: 24) | |
| Probability | | .01 | |

^a"Generally speaking do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

^bBecause of differences in coding, age groups are not homogeneous. Age groups are as follows: 1952 and 1960, Young: 18-29, Med: 30-49, Older: 50 up; 1956, Young: 18-34, Med: 35-54, Older: 55 up.

^cIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

falls to 5 per cent, and remains at 5 per cent in the older age group. Thus the difference between the mobile and the stable is less for the older age groups, as hypothesized. This is not true when preference for the Republican Party is examined. While the difference does fall from 9 per cent in the youngest age group to 3 per cent in the middle age group, it rises again to 9 per cent in the oldest group. Thus the professional and business category offers only weak support for hypothesis 1.3.

In the blue-collar group the tendency for Republican preference to increase with age for all groups is less marked. While there is a small but steady increase in the per cent of Republicans among the status stable as age increases, the same thing is not true for the downwardly mobile. The highest per cent of Republicans among the downwardly mobile--36 per cent--occurs in the youngest age group. This is as would be anticipated on the assumption that the influence of their parental family was still strong compared to that of their new status environment. In the middle age group the proportion of Republicans among the downwardly mobile falls off to but 19 per cent, even less than among the status stable of the same age. In the oldest age group the proportion of Republicans among the downwardly mobile rises again to 35 per cent.

When the difference between the proportions of status stable and downwardly mobile who are Republicans is examined at each age level, the downwardly mobile report a Republican preference 18 per cent more often than do the status stable in the youngest age group, while the

difference falls to 3 per cent in the opposite direction in the middle group, and rises to 6 per cent at the oldest level. Preference for the Democratic Party occurs 19 per cent less often among the downwardly mobile at the youngest level, 4 per cent more often in the middle group, and 19 per cent less often in the oldest group. In the white-collar group no significant patterns are apparent. Again, the evidence in support of hypothesis 1.3 is weak at best.

The relationship between party preference, age, and subjective mobility is demonstrated in Table 32. In the middle class the young upwardly mobile are Democrats more often than the status stable 3 per cent of the time, while in the middle age group the upwardly mobile are Democrats 1 per cent less often than the status stable, and in the oldest group they are Democrats 8 per cent less often than the status stable. While the proportion of Democrats among the status stable stays about constant as age increases, among the upwardly mobile the proportion of Democrats falls slightly but steadily.

Preference for the Republican Party occurs 13 per cent more often among the young middle class status stables than among their upwardly mobile contemporaries. In the middle age group the difference falls to 6 per cent, while in the oldest group the upwardly mobile are 6 per cent more often Republicans. Among the status stable Republican preference increases by only 13 per cent from the youngest to the oldest group, while among the upwardly mobile it increases by 32 per cent. This would seem to confirm West's finding that the difference between

TABLE 32.--Subjective mobility and party preference by age groups

| Party Preference ^a and Age Group ^b | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | | |
|--|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|--|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable | |
| <u>Young</u> | | | | | |
| Democrat | 38% | 41% | 28% | 46% | |
| Republican | 33 | 20 | 17 | 20 | |
| Ind., Other | 29 | 39 | 55 | 33 | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | |
| N | 142 | 61 | 29 | 342 | |
| <u>Med</u> | | | | | |
| Democrat | 37% | 36% | 38% | 54% | |
| Republican | 39 | 33 | 32 | 22 | |
| Ind., Other | 25 | 32 | 30 | 24 | |
| | 101% | 101% | 100% | 100% | |
| N | 232 | 107 | 47 | 492 | |
| <u>Older</u> | | | | | |
| Democrat | 36% | 28% | 27% | 43% | |
| Republican | 46 | 52 | 55 | 30 | |
| Ind., Other | 18 | 20 | 18 | 27 | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | |
| N | 134 | 54 | 22 | 319 | |

TABLE 32.--Continued

| Age Group | Middle Class | Working Class |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
| <u>Young</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 4.213 (df: 2) | 5.808 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 10.021 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | .05 |
| <u>Med</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 2.203 (df: 2) | 4.700 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 6.903 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>Older</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 1.094 (df: 2) | 5.871 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 6.965 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for age groups | 7.510 (df: 6) | 16.379 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | .02 |
| Sum of χ^2 for table | | 23.889 (df: 12) |
| Probability | | .05 |

^a"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

^bBecause of differences in coding, age groups are not homogeneous. Age groups are as follows: 1956, Young: 18-34, Med: 35-54, Older: 55 up; 1960, Young: 18-29, Med: 30-49, Older: 50 up.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

the upwardly mobile and those who were initially more privileged declines with age.⁵

In the working class the differences between the subjectively mobile and the status stable do not appear to lessen with the passage of time, but seem to increase. In the youngest age group the downwardly mobile are 18 per cent less often Democrats and 3 per cent less often Republicans than the status stable, the majority of them considering themselves independents. In the oldest age group the downwardly mobile have become 16 per cent less often Democrats and 25 per cent more often Republicans than the status stable. The change is opposite to that predicted by hypothesis 1.3.

While the data for both objective and subjective mobility offer some support to hypothesis 1.3 in the case of the upwardly mobile, no support is afforded for the hypothesis with regard to the downwardly mobile in either case.

Level of Interest and Party Preference

The American Voter reports that the prevalence of status voting varies directly with political involvement.⁶ The more highly involved an individual is in politics the more likely it is that he will choose the "correct" party for his status. Knowing this, it could be hypothesized that those mobile individuals who are most strongly interested

⁵West, op. cit., p. 478.

⁶Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 354.

in politics would also be those most likely to have abandoned their old party loyalties and to have adopted a new party preference more appropriate to their new status. This hypothesis can be examined with the aid of Tables 33 and 34.

In Table 33 those high status individuals who report themselves very interested in the political campaign are more often Republicans and less often Democrats than are those of high status who are not as interested. In the blue-collar category the opposite is true, with the proportion of Democrats among the status stable increasing with increased interest. Thus Table 33 supports the finding of The American Voter reported above. Status polarization increases with political involvement, with highly involved individuals more often choosing the "correct" party for their status.

It is not at all clear, however, that increased involvement brings the political loyalties of the mobile into line with their new status. Although in Table 33 the very interested among the upwardly mobile in the professional and business category are more often Republicans and less often Democrats than are those who are not as interested, the same is true of the status stable and differences between the two groups remain relatively constant. In the blue-collar category the most interested among the downwardly mobile are least likely to prefer the Democratic Party, normally appropriate for their new status. It is among the least interested of blue-collar workers that differences between the downwardly mobile and status stable are

TABLE 33.--Objective mobility and party preference by level of political interest

| Interest in Campaign ^a and Party Preference ^b | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | ex-F | | |
| <u>Very Interested</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 27% | 35% | 45% | 38% | 18% | 41% | 52% | 34% | 57% | 55% | | |
| Ind., Other | 33 | 29 | 16 | 18 | 27 | 25 | 6 | 34 | 21 | 19 | | |
| Republican | 41 | 36 | 38 | 44 | 55 | 34 | 42 | 32 | 21 | 26 | | |
| | 101% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | | |
| N | 158 | 170 | 73 | 39 | 11 | 56 | 31 | 56 | 224 | 136 | | |
| <u>Somewhat Interested</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 38% | 41% | 54% | 53% | 25% | 45% | 50% | 47% | 49% | 49% | | |
| Ind., Other | 24 | 28 | 21 | 28 | 13 | 29 | 22 | 24 | 26 | 26 | | |
| Republican | 37 | 30 | 24 | 19 | 63 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 25 | 26 | | |
| | 99% | 99% | 99% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | | |
| N | 115 | 158 | 70 | 36 | 16 | 58 | 32 | 55 | 306 | 218 | | |
| <u>Not Interested</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 47% | 49% | 43% | 33% | 14% | 41% | 45% | 46% | 45% | 47% | | |
| Ind., Other | 22 | 26 | 38 | 33 | 14 | 49 | 32 | 35 | 39 | 33 | | |
| Republican | 31 | 26 | 19 | 33 | 71 | 11 | 23 | 19 | 16 | 20 | | |
| | 100% | 101% | 100% | 99% | 99% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 32 | 74 | 42 | 12 | 7 | 37 | 22 | 37 | 244 | 213 | | |

TABLE 33.--Continued

| Interest | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|--|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^c</u> | | | |
| <u>Very Interested</u> | | | |
| X ² | 2.872 (df: 2) | 3.116 (df: 4) | 17.538 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | .001 |
| X ² for table | | 23.526 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | .01 | |
| <u>Somewhat Interested</u> | | | |
| X ² | 1.569 (df: 2) | 10.639 (df: 4) | 0.540 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | .05 | NS |
| X ² for table | | 12.748 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>Not Interested</u> | | | |
| X ² | 0.357 (df: 2) | 13.317 (df: 4) | 0.240 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | .01 | NS |
| X ² for table | | 13.914 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of X ² for interest levels | 4.798 (df: 6) | 27.072 (df: 12) | 18.318 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | .01 | .01 |
| Sum of X ² for tables | | 50.188 (df: 24) | |
| Probability | | .01 | |

^a"Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns. How about you, would you say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political campaigns so far this year?"

^b"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

^cIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

smallest. Thus it cannot be concluded that increased involvement is associated with correct political choice in status terms. If anything, increased interest exaggerates the difference between the objectively mobile and non-mobile.

The situation is less clear for subjective mobility. In Table 34 the largest differences in party preference between mobile and non-mobile occur in the least interested group in the middle class, and in the "somewhat interested" group in the working class. Differences are statistically significant, however, only in the working class. As for objective mobility, the subjectively upwardly mobile are more likely to be Republicans at higher interest levels, but in this case the difference between mobile and non-mobile does reduce as interest increases. In the working class differences between the downwardly mobile and the status stable are least where interest is lowest.

It appears that any tendency for increased involvement to reduce differences in party preference between the upwardly mobile and the non-mobile of high status occurs only in the case of subjective mobility. It may be that the subjectively mobile are more class conscious than are the non-mobile, and that at high interest levels this operates more strongly in pulling subjective status and political preference into line than is the case for the non-mobile.

Increased interest seems to magnify the difference in party preference between the downwardly mobile and those of stable low status for both objective and subjective mobility. As interest levels

TABLE 34.--Subjective mobility and party preference by level of political interest

| Interest in Campaign ^a and Party Preference ^b | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | Working Class |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| <u>Very Interested</u> | | | | |
| Democrat | 37% | 34% | 34% | 53% |
| Ind., Other | 19 | 25 | 34 | 20 |
| Republican | 44 | 41 | 31 | 27 |
| | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% |
| N | 214 | 83 | 32 | 277 |
| <u>Somewhat Interested</u> | | | | |
| Democrat | 40% | 34% | 20% | 50% |
| Ind., Other | 25 | 33 | 40 | 25 |
| Republican | 36 | 34 | 40 | 25 |
| | 101% | 101% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 200 | 95 | 35 | 444 |
| <u>Not Interested</u> | | | | |
| Democrat | 32% | 41% | 48% | 45% |
| Ind., Other | 31 | 39 | 24 | 35 |
| Republican | 37 | 20 | 28 | 20 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 90 | 44 | 29 | 416 |

TABLE 34.--Continued

| Interest in Campaign | Middle Class | Working Class |
|--|---------------|-----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
| <u>Very Interested</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 1.389 (df: 2) | 4.919 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 6.308 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>Somewhat Interested</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 1.985 (df: 2) | 11.639 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | .01 |
| χ^2 for table | | 13.624 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | .01 |
| <u>Not Interested</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 3.623 (df: 2) | 1.753 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 5.376 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for interest levels | 6.997 (df: 6) | 18.311 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | .01 |
| Sum of χ^2 for table | | 25.308 (df: 12) |
| Probability | | .02 |

^a"Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns. How about you, would you say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political campaigns so far this year?"

^b"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

increase, those of stable low status prefer the Democratic Party in even larger measure, but the downwardly mobile are less apt to be Democrats. Apparently the most interested among the downwardly mobile are the least willing to adopt political loyalties in line with their new status.

Party Loyalty

Hypothesis 1.4 states: Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile have more often changed political party allegiance at some point in their lives than have the non-mobile. Table 35 presents data on the relationship of mobility to changes in party affiliation.

A slight tendency for the mobile to have changed parties more often is indicated in Table 35 for both the professional and business category and for the blue-collar category, though in neither case is the difference large or statistically significant. In the white-collar category the difference between the mobile and stable may be considered negligible.

Table 36 permits examination of the relationship between subjective mobility and change in party affiliation. When subjective mobility is the criterion, there is little difference between mobile and non-mobile in the middle class, but in the working class the downwardly mobile report having changed parties substantially more often than do the status stable. Differences are statistically significant for the working class and for the table as a whole.

TABLE 35.--Objective mobility and change in party affiliation

| Change in Party Affiliation ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|--------------|------|------|----|----|
| | Professional and Business | | | DM | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | DM | SS |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Change | 21% | 24% | 26% | 19% | 21% | 22% | 9% | 19% | 16% | 19% | | |
| No Change | 79 | 76 | 74 | 81 | 79 | 78 | 91 | 81 | 84 | 81 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 268 | 344 | 163 | 73 | 33 | 131 | 78 | 139 | 662 | 486 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | | 1.316 (df: 1) | | | .251 (df: 2) | | | .855 (df: 1) | | | | |
| Probability | | NS | | | NS | | | NS | | | | |
| X ² for table | | | | | 2.422 (df: 4) | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | NS | | | | | | | |

^a"Was there ever a time when you thought of yourself as a (Republican) (Democrat) rather than a (Democrat) (Republican)?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 36.--Subjective mobility and change in party affiliation

| Change in Party Affiliation ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|--|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Change | 24% | 25% | 31% | 19% |
| No Change | 76 | 75 | 69 | 81 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 498 | 217 | 98 | 1070 |

| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| X ² | 0.130 (df: 1) | 7.709 (df: 1) |
| Probability | NS | .01 |
| X ² for entire table | | 7.839 (df: 2) |
| Probability | | .02 |

^a"Was there ever a time when you thought of yourself as a (Republican)(Democrat) rather than a (Democrat)(Republican)?"

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

In all cases but that of the objectively mobile white-collar group some tendency in the hypothesized direction exists, though perhaps not of sufficient magnitude to consider the hypothesis confirmed. An alternative way of measuring party loyalty is available: party loyalty as expressed in actual voting behavior. This is done in Tables 37 and 38.

In the professional and business category in Table 37 the upwardly mobile are no more likely to have voted for various parties than are the status stable, though they more often report always having voted for the Democratic candidate for President. In the blue-collar category there is again little difference between the downwardly mobile and the status stable in regard to changing votes, though the downwardly mobile have more often been consistent Republican voters. In the white-collar group there is a slight tendency for the mobile to have more often been swing voters, though even here the difference is not statistically significant.

In Table 38 the subjectively upwardly mobile are not much more likely to have voted for various parties than are other members of the middle class, but the downwardly mobile members of the working class have substantially more often voted for presidential candidates of both parties than have their status stable peers. In spite of the fact that the downwardly mobile are more often Republicans than are other members of the working class they are not any more likely to be consistent supporters of Republican presidential candidates.

TABLE 37.--Objective mobility and party regularity

| Party Regularity ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---------|------|--------------|--------|---------|-------------|------|-------|---------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Always Democrat | 27% | 33% | 37% | 33% | 31% | 33% | 35% | 37% | 48% | 45% | | |
| Always Republican | 30 | 24 | 19 | 24 | 31 | 21 | 27 | 26 | 17 | 19 | | |
| Various | 44 | 43 | 44 | 43 | 38 | 47 | 38 | 37 | 35 | 36 | | |
| | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 278 | 338 | 160 | 70 | 26 | 120 | 77 | 115 | 561 | 390 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 3.504 | (df: 2) | | | 1.378 | (df: 4) | | | 6.996 | (df: 2) | | |
| Probability | NS | | | | NS | | | | .05 | | | |
| X ² for entire table | | | | | 11.878 | (df: 8) | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | NS | | | | | | | |

^a"Have you always voted for the same party or have you voted for different parties for president? (If same) Which party was that?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 38.--Subjective mobility and party regularity

| Party Regularity ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Always Democrat | 24% | 27% | 27% | 38% |
| Always Republican | 32 | 27 | 18 | 20 |
| Various | 44 | 46 | 56 | 41 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 443 | 190 | 79 | 841 |

| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | | | |
|---------------------------------|--|---------------|----------------|----------------|
| X ² | | 1.601 (df: 2) | | 16.575 (df: 2) |
| Probability | | NS | | .05 |
| X ² for entire table | | | 18.177 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | | NS | |

^a"Have you always voted for the same party or have you voted for different parties for president? (If same) Which party was that?"

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

No firm conclusions can be based on the data presented here, but there seems to be some tendency for the mobile to have more often changed their party identity or to have voted for candidates of more than one party than is true for the status stable. Any firm conclusion on the degree of association between mobility and party regularity would require data more reliable than retrospective recall.

Strength of Party Affiliation

Hypothesis 1.5 states: Both the upwardly and the downwardly mobile more often view themselves as "independents" or as "weak" party members than do the non-mobile at the same status level. Data against which this hypothesis can be tested are presented in Tables 39 and 40.

Table 39, which presents data on objective mobility and strength of party preference, lends almost no support to the hypothesis. There is virtually no difference between the upwardly mobile and the status stable in the business and professional category. In the blue-collar category there is a slight tendency for the downwardly mobile to be more often independents or weak party members, but the tendency falls far short of statistical significance. In the white-collar category no consistent pattern is discernible. On the basis of Table 39 no apparent relationship exists between objective mobility and the strength of party affiliation.

Table 40 presents data on the relationship between subjective mobility and strength of party preference. The mobile less often consider themselves strong supporters of a party than do the status stable

TABLE 39.--Objective mobility and strength of party preference

| Strength of Party Preference ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|------|--------------|------|------|------|-------------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | DM | White-Collar | | | DM | Blue-Collar | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | ex-F | | |
| Strong D or R | 32% | 32% | 33% | 36% | 34% | 30% | 42% | 31% | 35% | 36% | | |
| Weak D or R | 39 | 40 | 43 | 40 | 49 | 38 | 40 | 39 | 36 | 37 | | |
| Independent ^b | 29 | 28 | 23 | 24 | 17 | 32 | 18 | 30 | 29 | 27 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 308 | 405 | 189 | 87 | 35 | 152 | 86 | 148 | 783 | 577 | | |

| <u>Statistical Measures^c</u> | | |
|---|--------------|---------------|
| X ² | .134 (df: 2) | 4.345 (df: 4) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| X ² for entire table | | 5.340 (df: 8) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (If Rep or Dem) Would you call yourself a strong (R)(D) or not a very strong (R)(D)? (If Independent or Other) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?"

^bIncludes those who, when pressed, stated that they felt closer to one party or the other.

^cIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 40.--Subjective mobility and strength of party preference

| Strength of Party Preference ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---|---|--------------------|----------------------|--------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | Status |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Stable |
| Strong D or R | 39% | 31% | 33% | 35% |
| Weak D or R | 37 | 38 | 33 | 38 |
| Independent ^b | 24 | 31 | 35 | 27 |
| | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% |
| N | 508 | 222 | 98 | 1154 |

Statistical Measures

| | | |
|---------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| χ^2 | 6.271 (df: 2) | 2.425 (df: 2) |
| Probability | .05 | NS |
| χ^2 for entire table | | 8.696 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (If Rep or Dem) Would you call yourself a strong (R)(D) or not a very strong (R)(D)? (If Independent or Other) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?"

^bIncludes those who, when pressed, stated that they felt closer to one party or the other.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

in both the middle class and working class groups, although the relationship is not as strong in the working class. The difference is statistically significant for the middle class, but not in the working class.

The relationship between mobility and the strength of party preference is thus apparent only for subjective mobility, no relationship being apparent in the case of objective mobility. Hypothesis 1.5 may thus be accepted only if rephrased in terms of subjective mobility alone.

Objective Mobility and Subjective Class

Hypothesis 1.6 states: Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile are more often class misidentifiers than are non-mobile individuals. The relationship between objective mobility and subjective class is presented in Table 41.

If it is assumed that the professional and business and the white-collar categories are middle class, and that the blue-collar workers are working class, then the data of Table 41 support the hypothesis. While 79 per cent of the status stable in the professional and business category correctly place themselves in the middle class, only 58 per cent of the upwardly mobile do so. In the blue-collar category 78 per cent of the status stable properly consider themselves members of the working class, while 66 per cent of the downwardly mobile so classify themselves. In both cases the difference is in the hypothesized direction and statistically significant. In the white-collar group the status stable are apparently more convinced of their

TABLE 41.--Objective mobility and subjective class

| Subjective Class ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|------|----------------|------|------|------|---------------|------|------|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | DM | White-Collar | | | IM | Blue-Collar | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | |
| Middle | 79% | 58% | 45% | 51% | 60% | 43% | 43% | 34% | 22% | 13% | | |
| Working | 21 | 42 | 55 | 49 | 40 | 57 | 57 | 66 | 78 | 87 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | |
| N | 291 | 390 | 181 | 86 | 35 | 145 | 81 | 139 | 757 | 545 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 30.906 (df: 1) | | | | 3.955 (df: 2) | | | | 9.870 (df: 1) | | | |
| Probability | .001 | | | | NS | | | | .01 | | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | | 44.731 (df: 4) | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | .001 | | | | | | | |

^aTwo different questions were used: 1952 "There's quite a bit of talk these days about four different social classes. If you were asked to use one of these four names for your social class, which would you say you belonged in--the middle class, lower class, working class or upper class?" (Almost all respondents chose either middle or working class identification.) 1956 and 1960 "There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or to the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as being in one of these classes? Which one?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

membership in the middle class than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile, though in this case the difference is not statistically significant. With the exception of the white-collar group hypothesis 1.6 may be accepted.

The effect of class identification upon party preference can be examined with the help of Table 42, where party preference is controlled by subjective class. In the professional and business category this causes the difference in party preference between the status stable and mobile groups to wash out almost entirely. Apparently when the upwardly mobile shift their class perception to conform to their new objective status their party preference is also likely to be brought in line. In the white-collar category the status stable are still disproportionately Republicans whatever their subjective class. In the blue-collar category the difference in party preference between the status stable and the downwardly mobile washes out for those who are subjectively middle class, but not for those who are subjectively working class. Even where downwardly mobile individuals locate themselves in the working class they are more often Republicans than are their non-mobile peers.

Subjective class identification accounts for virtually all of the difference in party preference between the upwardly mobile and those of stable high status. The relationship of subjective class identification to the party preferences of the downwardly mobile is less clear. Among middle class identifiers there is no significant difference in party preference between those born to blue-collar status and those who have moved down from a higher status. But among working

TABLE 42.--Objective mobility and party preference by subjective class

| Subjective Class ^a and Party Preference ^b | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---------|------|------|--------------|---------|------|-------------|-------|---------|----|----|
| | Professional and Business ex-F | | | DM | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | DM | SS |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| <u>Middle Class</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democratic | 29% | 32% | 40% | 43% | 19% | 34% | 46% | 47% | 41% | 45% | | |
| Republican | 41 | 37 | 44 | 36 | 57 | 35 | 43 | 30 | 28 | 36 | | |
| Ind., Other | 30 | 30 | 16 | 20 | 24 | 31 | 11 | 23 | 31 | 19 | | |
| | 100% | 99% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 228 | 228 | 80 | 44 | 21 | 62 | 35 | 47 | 163 | 73 | | |
| <u>Working Class</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democratic | 47% | 52% | 53% | 45% | 29% | 51% | 57% | 39% | 53% | 50% | | |
| Republican | 26 | 23 | 17 | 26 | 64 | 18 | 24 | 28 | 19 | 23 | | |
| Ind., Other | 27 | 25 | 30 | 29 | 7 | 31 | 20 | 33 | 28 | 27 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 62 | 161 | 100 | 42 | 14 | 83 | 46 | 92 | 592 | 470 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^c</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Middle Class</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 0.714 | (df: 2) | | | 5.509 | (df: 4) | | | 0.975 | (df: 2) | | |
| Probability | NS | | | | NS | | | | NS | | | |
| X ² for table | | | | | 7.198 | (df: 8) | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | NS | | | | | | | |
| <u>Working Class</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 0.420 | (df: 2) | | | 13.961 | (df: 4) | | | 6.935 | (df: 2) | | |
| Probability | NS | | | | .01 | | | | .05 | | | |
| X ² for table | | | | | 21.316 | (df: 8) | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | .01 | | | | | | | |

TABLE 42.--Continued

| Subjective Class | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| Sum of χ^2 for class levels | 1.134 (df: 4) | 19.470 (df: 8) .02 | 7.910 (df: 4) NS |
| Probability | NS | | |
| Sum of χ^2 for table | | 28.514 (df: 16) .05 | |
| Probability | | | |

^aTwo different questions were used: 1952 "There's quite a bit of talk these days about four different social classes. If you were asked to use one of these four names for your social class, which would you say you belonged in--the middle class, lower class, working class or upper class?" (Almost all respondents chose either middle or working class identification.) 1956 and 1960 "There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or to the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as being in one of these classes? Which one?"

^b"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

^cIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

class identifiers the downwardly mobile are more often Republicans and less often Democrats than are their non-mobile status equals.

The fact that the upwardly mobile are more often working class identifiers than are those of stable high status serves as an adequate explanation of the fact that they also more often prefer the Democratic Party. But the fact that the downwardly mobile more often identify with the middle class than do those of stable low status does not adequately explain the greater preference of the downwardly mobile for the Republican Party. The data of Table 42 would seem to indicate that the party preference of the downwardly mobile is not substantially affected by their subjective class.

In Chapter III it was further hypothesized that it would be psychologically easier to shift one's self-assigned class position upward to conform to upward mobility than downward to conform to downward mobility. This assumed tendency was reflected in a formal hypothesis as follows: 1.7--The downwardly mobile are more often class misidentifiers than are the upwardly mobile. This hypothesis also may be examined using the data in Table 41. If it is again arbitrarily assumed that the blue-collar category constitutes the working class and that the other two occupational groupings constitute the middle class, then the hypothesis must be rejected. Using this criterion 42 per cent of the upwardly mobile in the professional and business category are misidentifiers, as are 57 per cent of the upwardly mobile in the white-collar group. The downwardly mobile are mis-identifiers 49 per cent of the time in the white-collar group and but

34 per cent of the time in the blue-collar group. If any difference does exist it is in the direction of the upwardly mobile more often being class misidentifiers.

Another possible approach is to assume that the percentage of status stable within a status category identifying with a class represent the "correct" proportion. This can then be used as a base figure against which to compare the proportion of the mobile who identify with the class. By this criterion, and again using Table 41, 79 per cent of the professional and business category should consider themselves middle class, while for the upwardly mobile only 58 per cent do so, a difference of 21 per cent. In the white-collar group 9 per cent of the downwardly mobile are "wrong" compared with 17 per cent of the upwardly mobile. In the blue-collar category there are 12 per cent more misidentifiers among the downwardly mobile than would be expected. Thus the downwardly mobile are again less often class misidentifiers than are the upwardly mobile. By either criterion hypothesis 1.7 must be rejected.

The available evidence thus indicates that mobility in either direction makes class misidentification more likely, but that contrary to expectations the downwardly mobile are not more likely to misidentify than are the upwardly mobile.

Summary

The evidence presented in this chapter supports the following conclusions. When compared with the status stable at the same status

level the upwardly mobile are more often Democrats and less often Republicans, while the downwardly mobile are more often Republicans and less often Democrats. The exception to the rule is the case of the status stable members of the white-collar category who are consistently more often Republicans than others of the same status, and in some cases more often Republicans than any other group in any category. The relationships do not wash out when controls for income, education, and religion are introduced. The pattern of voting behavior is much the same as for party preference, with the exception that Eisenhower was apparently particularly appealing for the subjectively upwardly mobile.

The upwardly mobile are more likely to have Democratic parents and Democratic friends than are others of equal status, while the downwardly mobile more often have Republican parents and friends than do their status peers. The status stable group in the white-collar category is again deviant, having a greater proportion of Republican parents than any other category--though not necessarily a higher proportion of Republican friends.

There is some tendency for the distribution of party preferences among the upwardly mobile to become more like that of the status stable in the older age groups, but the passage of time seems to exaggerate the differences between the downwardly mobile and those of stable lower status.

Increased levels of political interest seem to affect the degree of difference in party preference between the upwardly mobile and the

status stable only in the case of subjective mobility. At lower status levels increased political interest magnifies differences in political preference between the status stable and the downwardly mobile, the downwardly mobile becoming more often Republicans, the status stable more often Democrats as interest increases.

There is some tendency for the mobile to have more often changed party identification or to have voted for candidates of both parties than have the status stable. The similar hypothesis that the mobile should be weaker in their declared strength of party affiliation is supported only in the case of subjective mobility.

Finally, the evidence indicates that the mobile are more often class misidentifiers than are the status stable, but that contrary to the hypothesized relationship the downwardly mobile are not more often class misidentifiers than are the upwardly mobile. The tendency of the upwardly mobile to identify with the working class constitutes one possible explanation of their more frequent preference for the Democratic party, as compared with the non-mobile of their new status. When party preference is controlled by subjective class, the upwardly mobile are only slightly more likely to be Democrats than are the non-mobile. The same is not true of the downwardly mobile, who are Republicans in almost the same proportion whether they identify with the middle or the working class. Apparently even when the downwardly mobile are willing to admit their new working class status their political socialization at higher status levels continues to incline them toward the Republican party.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

That an individual prefers a certain political party or even that he has voted for a particular candidate does not tell us much about his attitude toward any set of political issues. The nature of the democratic political process is such that only rarely is a political contest fought on a single clear-cut issue. The task of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between social mobility and attitudes toward certain kinds of political issues.

Attitudes toward political issues are often treated as though they lay along a single conservative-liberal continuum. For many purposes this is an inadequate conceptualization, because conservatism on one type of issue need not imply conservatism on issues of other sorts. As V. O. Key points out, the

division of people into liberal and conservative categories is a great convenience in the description of political opinions. It is also misleading, for people do not divide into two camps, with members of one group in agreement on one side of all domestic economic issues and united to oppose the other group united within itself in opposition on the same issues.¹

¹V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 163.

Further, any classification of opinions that implies an organization of individual opinions into consistent liberal or conservative ideologies is unrealistic. As The American Voter demonstrates, few voters in the United States view politics from anything approaching an ideological stance.²

Yet there is a relationship between certain kinds of attitudes, and in the interest of clarity some oversimplification is justified. Key himself finds it useful to distinguish between opinions on foreign issues, which he classifies along an isolationist-internationalist dimension, and opinions on domestic welfare issues, which he classifies along a liberal-conservative dimension.³ A similar, but perhaps even more useful distinction is made by Seymour Lipset. In Political Man he distinguishes between economic liberalism (issues concerned with the distribution of wealth and power) and noneconomic liberalism (issues concerned with civil liberties, race relations and foreign affairs).⁴ He notes:

The fundamental factor in noneconomic liberalism is not actually class, but education, general sophistication, and probably to a certain extent psychic security. But since these factors are strongly correlated with class, noneconomic liberalism is positively associated with social status (the wealthier are more tolerant), while economic liberalism is inversely correlated with social status (the poor are more leftist on such issues).⁵

²Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), pp. 216-265.

³Key, op. cit., p. 155.

⁴Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 97-100, 318-322.

⁵Ibid., p. 318.

Lipset's distinction between economic and noneconomic liberalism is not only useful in itself, but his hypothesized relationship between education, general sophistication, psychic insecurity and noneconomic liberalism is particularly relevant to a study of social mobility because it is in just these qualities that the mobile are likely to differ from the non-mobile. Lipset himself suggests a relationship when he states:

Actually within the conservative strata it has not been the wealthier classes in general which have led the political struggle for noneconomic liberalism, but rather those of established 'old family' background as differentiated from the nouveaux riches.

Thus the upwardly mobile should be less inclined toward noneconomic liberalism than those of stable high status, because predisposed by their background more toward economic liberalism. In similar fashion the downwardly mobile, being better educated and exposed to a presumably more sophisticated home environment, should be more often noneconomic liberals than those of stable low status, and less often economic liberals.⁷

This chapter will investigate the relationship between social mobility and economic liberalism together with one dimension of non-economic liberalism, attitudes toward foreign affairs. The relationship between mobility and other kinds of noneconomic liberalism is examined in Chapter IX.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 318-319.

⁷ If the mobile are more often psychically insecure this would reinforce the tendency for the upwardly mobile to be less liberal on non-economic issues, but interfere with the tendency of the downwardly mobile to be more liberal on noneconomic issues. Investigating this relationship is one rather circuitous way to examine the degree of psychic insecurity accompanying mobility.

Economic Liberalism--Government Economic Activity

One recurrent political issue is whether or not government should perform certain kinds of economic functions, particularly in the fields of electric power and housing. Using Lipset's concepts, the economic liberal would favor publically owned power and housing, while the economic conservative would prefer that they be left to private businessmen. The hypothesis to be tested is that on economic issues of this kind the upwardly mobile are more liberal than their status equals, while the downwardly mobile are more conservative than their status equals.

The data for objective mobility in the professional and business category of Table 43 lend no support whatsoever to the hypothesis that the upwardly mobile are more economically liberal than their status stable peers, almost equal proportions of each group agreeing or disagreeing with the statement. In the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile are somewhat more likely to adopt an economically conservative attitude, though the result is not statistically significant. In the white-collar category the downwardly mobile are a bit more conservative than the upwardly mobile, as would be expected, but the status stable are more conservative than either. Again, the results are not statistically significant.

When subjective mobility is used as a criterion, as in Table 44, an interesting relationship emerges. In the middle class there is not a great deal of difference between the status stable and the upwardly

TABLE 43.--Objective mobility and attitude toward government economic activity

| Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|-----------------|-----|-----|---------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Agree strongly | 47% | 53% | 39% | 47% | 53% | 43% | 44% | 42% | 36% | 43% | | |
| Agree, but not very strongly | 15 | 10 | 14 | 13 | 13 | 16 | 29 | 19 | 17 | 15 | | |
| Not sure, it depends | 15 | 11 | 10 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 10 | | |
| Disagree, but not very strongly | 8 | 9 | 13 | 17 | 13 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 12 | 9 | | |
| Disagree strongly | 15 | 17 | 25 | 20 | 13 | 30 | 9 | 21 | 27 | 23 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 99% | 99% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 163 | 161 | 72 | 30 | 15 | 69 | 34 | 91 | 324 | 211 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 4.424 (df: 4) | | | 5.344 (df: 8) | | | 2.721 (df: 4) | | | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | NS | | | | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | 12.488 (df: 16) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | | | |

^a"The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 44.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward government economic activity

| Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Agree strongly | 48% | 50% | 59% | 37% |
| Agree, but not very strongly | 14 | 16 | 7 | 18 |
| Not sure, it depends | 11 | 8 | 14 | 9 |
| Disagree, but not very strongly | 7 | 11 | 11 | 12 |
| Disagree strongly | 19 | 15 | 10 | 24 |
| | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 411 | 175 | 73 | 771 |

Statistical Measures

| | | |
|---------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| χ^2 | 5.535 (df: 4) | 21.285 (df: 4) |
| Probability | NS | .001 |
| χ^2 for entire table | | 26.821 (df: 8) |
| Probability | | .001 |

^a"The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

mobile. If a difference does exist, it is in the direction of the mobile being more often economic conservatives. In the working class, however, a strong relationship is apparent. The downwardly mobile are much more conservative than the status stable, and even, in their response to this particular question, somewhat more conservative than either of the middle class groups.

To investigate the extent to which these relationships are due to differences in average income and educational level between the mobile and the status stable, data on attitudes toward government economic activity at various income and educational levels are reported in Tables 45 and 46 for subjective mobility. When attitude is controlled by income, as in Table 45, there is still no clear pattern in the middle class. In the low income group the upwardly mobile are more often economic liberals, while in the middle and high income groups the upwardly mobile are slightly more often economic conservatives. In no case, however, is the difference statistically significant. In the working class differences are substantial only in the middle income group, where the downwardly mobile more often are economic conservatives. Thus at least a certain amount of the greater conservatism of the downwardly mobile on this issue may be attributed to their income advantage over those of stable low status.

In Table 46 attitude toward government economic activity is controlled by educational level. In the middle class differences are small at all educational levels. In the working class the downwardly mobile are more often conservative in their view of what constitutes

TABLE 45.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward government economic activity, by income groups

| Income Group ^a and Attitude ^b | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | | |
|---|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable | |
| <u>\$0-3,999</u> | | | | | |
| Agree | 74% | 58% | | 59% | 58% |
| Not sure | 6 | 18 | | 14 | 9 |
| Disagree | 19 | 24 | | 27 | 34 |
| | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | | <u>100%</u> | <u>101%</u> |
| N | 77 | 33 | | 22 | 297 |
| <u>\$4,000-7,499</u> | | | | | |
| Agree | 61% | 67% | | 69% | 51% |
| Not sure | 13 | 4 | | 15 | 8 |
| Disagree | 26 | 29 | | 15 | 41 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 161 | 70 | | 39 | 352 |
| <u>\$7,500 up</u> | | | | | |
| Agree | 59% | 66% | | 58% | 66% |
| Not sure | 11 | 7 | | 8 | 11 |
| Disagree | 30 | 27 | | 33 | 23 |
| | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 166 | 67 | | 12 | 101 |

TABLE 45.--Continued

| Income Group | Middle Class | Working Class |
|--|---------------|-----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
| <u>\$0-3,999</u> | | |
| X ² | 4.312 (df: 2) | 0.796 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 5.108 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>\$4,000-7,499</u> | | |
| X ² | 4.062 (df: 2) | 10.853 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | .01 |
| X ² for table | | 14.915 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | .01 |
| <u>\$7,500 up</u> | | |
| X ² | 1.208 (df: 2) | 0.663 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 1.871 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| Sum of X ² for income groups | 9.582 (df: 6) | 12.312 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| Sum of X ² for entire table | | 21.894 (df: 12) |
| Probability | | .05 |

^a"About what do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family?"

^b"The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 46.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward government economic activity, by educational level

| Years of Education and Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|--|---|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 65% | 63% | 69% | 61% |
| Not sure | 16 | 10 | 19 | 9 |
| Disagree | 19 | 27 | 13 | 30 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 37 | 30 | 16 | 276 |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 70% | 71% | 70% | 52% |
| Not sure | 6 | 6 | 15 | 8 |
| Disagree | 24 | 24 | 15 | 39 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>99%</u> |
| N | 100 | 51 | 27 | 357 |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 61% | 67% | 62% | 54% |
| Not sure | 12 | 7 | 10 | 9 |
| Disagree | 27 | 25 | 28 | 37 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 255 | 83 | 29 | 138 |

TABLE 46.--Continued

| Years of Education | Middle Class | Working Class |
|--|---------------|-----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 0.918 (df: 2) | 3.415 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 4.333 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 0.000 (df: 2) | 6.798 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | .05 |
| χ^2 for table | | 6.798 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 1.835 (df: 2) | 0.933 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 2.768 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for educational groups | 2.753 (df: 6) | 11.146 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for entire table | | 13.899 (df: 12) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

appropriate government economic activity at every educational level, although the difference is statistically significant only at the medium education level. With education controlled little relationship exists between mobility and attitude in the middle class group. In the working class, however, the downwardly mobile are more often economic conservatives and the status stable more often economic liberals in every educational group, indicating that the economic conservatism of the downwardly mobile is not just a result of their better education.

The evidence indicates that little relationship exists between upward mobility and attitude toward government's role in housing and electric power at the higher status levels, either for objective or subjective mobility. At lower status levels, however, the downwardly mobile partly because of their income advantages, more often choose a conservative position on the question than do the status stable.

Economic Liberalism--Full Employment Policy

The government's role in maintaining full employment has been an important political issue in the United States since the early 1930's. Data on attitudes toward the issue are displayed in Tables 47 and 48. Both tables provide evidence supporting Lipset's thesis that economic liberalism is inversely correlated with social status, if economic liberalism is equated with agreement that "The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job."

TABLE 47.--Objective mobility and attitude toward government insuring full employment

| Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | |
|---|---|------|------|-----------------|------|------|----------------|------|-----|------|
| | Professional and Business | | | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | | | | | | | |
| Agree strongly | 26% | 34% | 31% | 57% | 38% | 56% | 33% | 40% | 58% | 58% |
| Agree, but not very strongly | 12 | 13 | 20 | 14 | 19 | 10 | 13 | 19 | 14 | 14 |
| Not sure, it depends | 10 | 9 | 11 | 0 | 12 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 6 | 6 |
| Disagree, but not very strongly | 16 | 17 | 16 | 14 | 12 | 10 | 19 | 11 | 9 | 9 |
| Disagree strongly | 35 | 27 | 22 | 14 | 19 | 14 | 25 | 22 | 12 | 13 |
| | 99% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% |
| N | 176 | 183 | 88 | 35 | 16 | 79 | 48 | 106 | 405 | 300 |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 4.225 (df: 4) | | | 6.246 (df: 8) | | | 12.872 (df: 4) | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | NS | | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | 23.344 (df: 16) | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | |

^a"The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 48.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward government insuring full employment

| Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Agree, strongly | 33% | 44% | 41% | 57% |
| Agree, but not very strongly | 13 | 15 | 10 | 15 |
| Not sure, it depends | 9 | 7 | 11 | 8 |
| Disagree, but not very strongly | 15 | 13 | 10 | 9 |
| Disagree strongly | <u>30</u> | <u>21</u> | <u>28</u> | <u>11</u> |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 463 | 207 | 90 | 1030 |

Statistical Measures

| | | |
|---------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| χ^2 | 11.240 (df: 4) | 24.321 (df: 4) |
| Probability | .05 | .001 |
| χ^2 for entire table | | 35.561 (df: 8) |
| Probability | | .001 |

^a"The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

Using objective mobility as a measure, Table 47 lends some slight support to the hypothesis that the mobile are influenced by attitudes typical of their status of origin. In the professional and business category 47 per cent of the upwardly mobile agree that the government should insure full employment, while only 38 per cent of the status stable are in agreement. In the blue-collar group 72 per cent of the status stable think the government should insure employment compared with 59 per cent of the downwardly mobile. The differences are in both cases in the anticipated direction, the upwardly mobile being more often economic liberals, the downwardly mobile more often economic conservatives when compared with their status peers. In the white-collar group the usual pattern of deviance is evident, the status stable being somewhat more conservative than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile.

The relationship between attitude toward full employment policy and subjective mobility is shown in Table 48. In the middle class group 59 per cent of the upwardly mobile agree that the government should insure full employment, as compared with 46 per cent of the status stable. In the working class the difference between mobile and stable is even larger, with 72 per cent of the status stable favoring full employment policy as opposed to but 51 per cent of the downwardly mobile. As was the case for objective mobility, the upwardly mobile are more often economic liberals and the downwardly mobile more often economic conservatives than are their status peers. In both cases this is the hypothesized relationship.

It is worth investigating what happens when the relationship between subjective mobility and attitude toward full employment policy is controlled for income and education. Table 49 breaks down attitudes by income groups. In the middle class category the upwardly mobile remain more often economic liberals in each income group. In the working class the downwardly mobile remain more conservative within each income group. For both middle and working classes the results remain statistically significant. Thus it may be concluded that the relationship is not an artifact of the differences in income between the mobile and the status stable.

Table 50 illustrates the relationship between attitude and mobility within educational groups. It will be recalled that the upwardly mobile are less well educated than their status peers, while the downwardly mobile are on average better educated than other members of the working class. In the middle class the upwardly mobile remain more often economically liberal within each educational group, while in the working class the downwardly mobile remain consistently more often conservative. For the table as a whole differences are statistically significant, and it would appear clear from the consistency of the relationship within each educational group that the relationship is not just the result of differing educational levels.

When presented with the statement that the government ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job, the upwardly mobile more often agree, the downwardly mobile more often

TABLE 49.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward government insuring full employment, by income groups

| Income ^a and Attitude ^b | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | | |
|---|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|--|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable | |
| <u>\$0-3,999</u> | | | | | |
| Agree | 55% | 78% | 54% | 81% | |
| Not sure | 11 | 2 | 12 | 6 | |
| Disagree | 35 | 20 | 35 | 13 | |
| | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> | |
| N | 95 | 50 | 26 | 446 | |
| <u>\$4,000-7,499</u> | | | | | |
| Agree | 44% | 55% | 49% | 64% | |
| Not sure | 11 | 6 | 6 | 9 | |
| Disagree | 44 | 39 | 45 | 27 | |
| | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | |
| N | 178 | 80 | 49 | 445 | |
| <u>\$7,500 up</u> | | | | | |
| Agree | 39% | 49% | 50% | 58% | |
| Not sure | 7 | 11 | 21 | 12 | |
| Disagree | 55 | 40 | 29 | 31 | |
| | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>101%</u> | |
| N | 174 | 71 | 14 | 111 | |

TABLE 49.--Continued

| Income Group | Middle Class | Working Class |
|--|-----------------|----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
| <u>\$0-3,999</u> | | |
| X ² | 8.317 (df: 2) | 11.441 (df: 2) |
| Probability | .02 | .01 |
| X ² for table | | 19.758 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | .001 |
| <u>\$4,000-7,499</u> | | |
| X ² | 3.184 (df: 2) | 6.935 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | .05 |
| X ² for table | | 10.119 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | .05 |
| <u>\$7,500 up</u> | | |
| X ² | 4.840 (df: 2) | 1.044 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 5.884 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| Sum of X ² for income groups | 16.341 (df: 6) | 19.420 (df: 6) |
| Probability | .02 | .01 |
| Sum of X ² for entire table | 35.761 (df: 12) | |
| Probability | .001 | |

a "About what do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family?"

b "The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 50.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward insuring full employment,
by educational level

| Years of Education and Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 70% | 78% | 75% | 82% |
| Not sure | 2 | 9 | 7 | 5 |
| Disagree | 28 | 13 | 18 | 13 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 47 | 46 | 28 | 413 |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 58% | 73% | 50% | 69% |
| Not sure | 6 | 4 | 15 | 9 |
| Disagree | 37 | 23 | 35 | 22 |
| | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 125 | 73 | 34 | 478 |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 36% | 44% | 38% | 56% |
| Not sure | 12 | 7 | 9 | 10 |
| Disagree | 52 | 49 | 53 | 34 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 272 | 82 | 32 | 157 |

TABLE 50.--Continued

| Years of Education | Middle Class | Working Class |
|--|----------------|-----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 4.491 (df: 2) | 0.872 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 5.363 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 4.470 (df: 2) | 5.384 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 9.854 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | .05 |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 2.350 (df: 2) | 4.287 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 6.637 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for educational groups | 11.311 (df: 6) | 10.543 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for entire table | | 21.854 (df: 12) |
| Probability | | .05 |

^a"The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

disagree than do others at the same status levels. The relationship holds whether objective or subjective mobility is used as a measure, though it is stronger in the case of subjective mobility. This finding supports the hypothesis that on questions of economics the upwardly mobile are more liberal than their status peers, while the downwardly mobile are more conservative.

Economic Liberalism--Medicare

One further dimension of economic liberalism for which data are available is that of attitudes toward government assistance in obtaining medical care. In 1956 and 1960 respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statement "The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost." Those of high status more often adopted an economically conservative position, disagreeing with the statement, while those of low status more often agreed.

Data on the relationship between objective mobility and attitudes toward medicare is reported in Table 51. In the professional and business category only a weak relationship exists. The status stable and the upwardly mobile adopt a liberal attitude in equal measure, 45 per cent of each group agreeing with the statement in some degree. While there is some slight tendency for the status stable to more often make a conservative choice--45 per cent of the time as against 40 per cent for the upwardly mobile--the difference falls short of statistical significance. In the white-collar group

TABLE 51.--Objective mobility and attitude toward medicare

| Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|-----------------|------|------|------|----------------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | | Blue-Collar | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Agree strongly | 28% | 29% | 37% | 45% | 39% | 38% | 37% | 39% | 54% | 53% | | |
| Agree, but not very strongly | 17 | 16 | 20 | 15 | 11 | 20 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 16 | | |
| Not sure, it depends | 10 | 15 | 11 | 3 | 17 | 8 | 19 | 12 | 10 | 8 | | |
| Disagree, but not very strongly | 11 | 14 | 6 | 10 | 6 | 9 | 12 | 12 | 6 | 6 | | |
| Disagree strongly | 34 | 26 | 26 | 28 | 28 | 25 | 21 | 25 | 15 | 17 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 101% | 100% | 101% | 101% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 175 | 183 | 87 | 40 | 18 | 79 | 43 | 103 | 389 | 289 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 4.295 (df: 4) | | | 5.022 (df: 8) | | | | 11.847 (df: 4) | | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | | .05 | | | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | 21.165 (df: 16) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | | | |

^a"The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

the status stable are somewhat more conservative than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile, but again the difference is not significant. In the blue-collar group differences are more marked, 69 per cent of the status stable blue-collar group favoring medicare as compared with 52 per cent of the downwardly mobile. In this case the difference is statistically significant.

For subjective mobility the pattern is much the same. As Table 52 illustrates, in the middle class the upwardly mobile are more liberal on the question than the status stable, and in the working class the downwardly mobile are notably more conservative than are the status stable.

The belief that the government ought to help people get low cost medical care is related to economic need, with those of low income more often desiring government medical assistance. An examination of Table 53 confirms this. In all instances except that of the downwardly mobile with high incomes the proportion of people wanting government medical assistance increases as income decreases. To determine whether the comparative liberalism of the upwardly mobile and conservatism of the downwardly mobile on this issue is due just to the income differentials between them and the status stable it is necessary to control for income. This is done in Table 53.

In the middle class differences disappear in the medium income group, but in the high and low income groups the upwardly mobile are more often liberals. In the working class the downwardly mobile are

TABLE 52.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward medicare

| Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Agree strongly | 28% | 33% | 40% | 57% |
| Agree, but not very strongly | 16 | 21 | 14 | 16 |
| Not sure, it depends | 12 | 9 | 11 | 8 |
| Disagree, but not very strongly | 11 | 12 | 11 | 6 |
| Disagree strongly | 33 | 25 | 24 | 13 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 458 | 204 | 91 | 1007 |

Statistical Measures

| | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| X ² | 6.909 (df: 4) | 16.493 (df: 4) |
| Probability | NS | .01 |
| X ² for entire table | | 23.402 (df: 8) |
| Probability | | .01 |

^a"The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 53.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward medicare, by income

| Income ^a and Attitude ^b | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---|---|--------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Working Class Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| <u>\$0-3,999</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 51% | 77% | 58% | 84% |
| Not sure, depends | 9 | 6 | 13 | 6 |
| Disagree | 40 | 17 | 29 | 10 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 94 | 48 | 31 | 455 |
| <u>\$4,000-7,499</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 47% | 46% | 48% | 67% |
| Not sure, depends | 12 | 12 | 10 | 9 |
| Disagree | 41 | 42 | 42 | 24 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 180 | 81 | 48 | 454 |
| <u>\$7,500 up</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 34% | 45% | 73% | 57% |
| Not sure, depends | 10 | 8 | 0 | 12 |
| Disagree | 56 | 46 | 27 | 32 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>101%</u> |
| N | 177 | 71 | 11 | 111 |

TABLE 53.--Continued

| Income Group | Middle Class | Working Class |
|---|----------------|-----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
| <u>\$0-3,999</u> | | |
| X ² | 9.306 (df: 2) | 13.672 (df: 2) |
| Probability | .01 | .01 |
| X ² for table | | 22.978 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | .001 |
| <u>\$4,000-7,499</u> | | |
| X ² | 0.029 (df: 2) | 8.175 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | .02 |
| X ² for table | | 8.204 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>\$7,500 up</u> | | |
| X ² | 2.772 (df: 2) | 1.797 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 4.569 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| Sum of X ² for income groups | 12.107 (df: 6) | 23.644 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | .001 |
| Sum of X ² for entire table | | 35.751 (df: 12) |
| Probability | | .001 |

a "About what do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family?"

b "The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

more conservative at the low and medium income levels, but not in the high income group. In this last case, however, only eleven cases fall into the downwardly mobile high income group, and the reversal is probably due to chance variation. The table as a whole is highly significant statistically even after controlling for income. Thus it would appear that differences in attitude toward medicare between the mobile and the status stable are due more to differences in early political socialization than to income differences.

On the issue of medicare the data indicate that the upwardly mobile are more often economic liberals, the downwardly mobile more often economic conservatives than are their status peers, although the evidence is more convincing in the case of the downwardly mobile. The differences appear for both objective and subjective mobility. In the objectively white-collar group the status stable, as on other issues, are more conservative than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile.

Noneconomic Liberalism--Isolationism

Attitudes on only one dimension of noneconomic liberalism are to be examined here, that of foreign affairs. Other dimensions of non-economic liberalism, those concerned with civil liberties and race relations, are treated in Chapter IX. In this section the relationship of mobility to isolationism is examined.

Lipset's thesis is that on issues of noneconomic liberalism those of high status are more liberal than those of low status--a reversal of the relationship on economic issues. On this basis those

of low status should more often adopt an isolationist position than those of high status. That those of low status do more often express agreement with an isolationist sentiment is shown in Tables 54 and 55. If the mobile carry with them traces of the attitude structures of their original status, the upwardly mobile should be more often isolationists than others of high status, and the downwardly mobile less often isolationists than others of low status.

Support for this formulation in the case of objective mobility is provided by Table 54. In the professional and business group 33 per cent of the upwardly mobile agree with an isolationist statement compared with 27 per cent of the status stable. In the white-collar group the status stable somewhat more often evidence an isolationist attitude than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile. Thus the consistently deviant status stable white-collar workers would seem to be more conservative on issues of both economic and noneconomic liberalism than would be expected on the basis of their status. In the blue-collar group the downwardly mobile are considerably less often isolationists than the status stable, 27 per cent of the downwardly mobile expressing isolationist sentiment as against 42 per cent of the status stable.

The data in Table 55 on subjective mobility shows the same trend as for objective mobility, though not so strongly. In the middle class 72 per cent of the upwardly mobile disagreed with the isolationist statement, while 78 per cent of the status stable expressed disagreement. In the working class 62 per cent of the status stable disagreed, compared with 67 per cent of the downwardly mobile.

TABLE 54.--Objective mobility and attitude toward isolationism

| Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----|------|--------------|-----------------|------|-------------|-----|----------------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Agree strongly | 20% | 26% | 27% | 22% | 34% | 32% | 22% | 18% | 33% | 36% | | |
| Agree, but not very strongly | 7 | 7 | 12 | 12 | 9 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 14 | | |
| Not sure, it depends | 3 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 12 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | |
| Disagree, but not very strongly | 13 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 9 | 14 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 11 | | |
| Disagree strongly | 58 | 50 | 42 | 48 | 43 | 42 | 43 | 57 | 42 | 36 | | |
| | 101% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 99% | 99% | 100% | 101% | | |
| N | 292 | 386 | 176 | 81 | 35 | 133 | 76 | 141 | 707 | 475 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 6.380 (df: 4) | | | | 5.208 (df: 8) | | | | 14.601 (df: 4) | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | | NS | | | | .01 | | | |
| X ² for entire table | | | | | 26.189 (df: 16) | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | NS | | | | | | | |

^a"Two different questions were used: 1952: "Some people think that since the end of the last world war this country has gone too far in concerning itself with problems in other parts of the world. How do you feel about this?" 1956 and 1960: "This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 55.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward isolationism

| Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Agree strongly | 8% | 12% | 11% | 21% |
| Agree, but not very strongly | 8 | 8 | 15 | 11 |
| Not sure, it depends | 6 | 9 | 7 | 6 |
| Disagree, but not very strongly | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| Disagree strongly | 63 | 57 | 51 | 46 |
| | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 471 | 199 | 88 | 975 |
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | | | |
| X ² | 4.951 | (df: 4) | 5.358 | (df: 4) |
| Probability | NS | | NS | |
| X ² for entire table | | 10.309 | (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | | |

^a"This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

When attitude toward isolationism is controlled by education, as in Tables 56 and 57, differences between the mobile and the status stable are reduced. In Table 56 the objectively upwardly mobile in the professional and business category are more often isolationists only in the relatively small group of low education. In the white-collar category there is no substantial difference between the mobile and the status stable. In the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile are somewhat less often isolationists at each educational level, but the difference approaches statistical significance only in the high education group.

In Table 57 subjective mobility and attitude toward isolationism is controlled by education. In the middle class differences again wash out, except in the low education group where the upwardly mobile are more often isolationists, as before. In the working class differences may be considered to be washed out at all educational levels.

Thus the tendency of the upwardly mobile to be more often isolationists and of the downwardly mobile to be less often isolationists than are their status peers seems to be largely a product of the differences in education between the mobile and the status stable. On this particular issue of noneconomic liberalism the upwardly mobile are more conservative, the downwardly mobile less conservative than are their status peers. Both differences are in the hypothesized direction.

TABLE 56.--Objective mobility and attitude toward isolationism, by educational level

| Years of Education and Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | ex-F | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 17% | 60% | 50% | 30% | 100% | 26% | 56% | 48% | 56% | 58% | | |
| Not sure, depends | 0 | 2 | 7 | 10 | 0 | 5 | 17 | 3 | 4 | 4 | | |
| Disagree | 83 | 38 | 43 | 60 | 0 | 68 | 28 | 48 | 41 | 39 | | |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>99%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>99%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>101%</u> | | |
| N | 12 | 55 | 46 | 10 | 2 | 19 | 18 | 29 | 227 | 249 | | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 41% | 37% | 42% | 41% | 38% | 47% | 31% | 28% | 35% | 43% | | |
| Not sure, depends | 5 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 10 | 4 | 7 | 3 | | |
| Disagree | 53 | 60 | 52 | 52 | 54 | 47 | 59 | 68 | 58 | 54 | | |
| | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | | |
| N | 73 | 144 | 64 | 27 | 13 | 59 | 29 | 69 | 370 | 178 | | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 22% | 22% | 29% | 32% | 40% | 35% | 17% | 14% | 32% | 31% | | |
| Not sure, depends | 2 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 10 | 2 | 4 | 6 | | |
| Disagree | 76 | 71 | 67 | 68 | 55 | 60 | 72 | 84 | 65 | 63 | | |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>99%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> | | |
| N | 207 | 187 | 66 | 44 | 20 | 55 | 29 | 43 | 110 | 48 | | |

TABLE 56.--Continued

| Years of Education | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|--|---------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 8.100 (df: 2) | 4.821 (df: 4) | 0.575 (df: 2) |
| Probability | .02 | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 13.495 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 1.600 (df: 2) | 0.669 (df: 4) | 2.778 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 5.047 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 5.250 (df: 2) | 3.086 (df: 4) | 5.470 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 13.805 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of X ² for educational groups | 14.950 (df: 6) | 8.576 (df: 12) | 8.823 (df: 6) |
| Probability | .05 | NS | NS |
| Sum of X ² for entire table | | 32.347 (df: 24) | |
| Probability | | NS | |

^a"This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with the rest of the world."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 57.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward isolationism, by educational level

| Years of Education and Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | | |
|--|---|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | | |
| Agree | 25% | 39% | | 55% | 47% |
| Not sure, it depends | 2 | 16 | | 5 | 6 |
| Disagree | 73 | 45 | | 41 | 47 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 48 | 38 | | 22 | 378 |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | | |
| Agree | 24% | 22% | | 20% | 24% |
| Not sure, it depends | 7 | 7 | | 6 | 7 |
| Disagree | 69 | 71 | | 74 | 69 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 141 | 73 | | 35 | 443 |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | | |
| Agree | 11% | 8% | | 13% | 18% |
| Not sure, it depends | 5 | 8 | | 10 | 4 |
| Disagree | 84 | 84 | | 77 | 78 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 282 | 88 | | 31 | 154 |

TABLE 57.--Continued

| Years of Education | Middle Class | Working Class |
|--|----------------|-----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 9.096 (df: 2) | 0.505 (df: 2) |
| Probability | .02 | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 9.600 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | .05 |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 0.144 (df: 2) | 0.385 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 0.529 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 1.267 (df: 2) | 2.189 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 3.456 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for educational groups | 10.507 (df: 6) | 3.079 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for table | | 13.585 (df: 12) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

Noneconomic Liberalism--Foreign Aid

The other foreign affairs issue to be examined here is that of attitudes toward foreign aid. The attitude of a noneconomic liberal in this case would be in favor of foreign aid, while that of a non-economic conservative would be against foreign aid--a formulation which must be viewed with some trepidation, since there is also an economic issue involved. Those of high status, who would be presumed to be in favor of foreign aid as noneconomic liberals, could also be presumed to be opposed to it as economic conservatives because it raised their taxes. The resulting conflict of motives is likely to lessen status polarization on the issue.

The relatively low status polarization on the foreign aid issue may be seen in Tables 58 and 59. In Table 58, 58 per cent of the status stable in the professional and business category favor foreign aid, but so do 48 per cent of the status stable in the blue-collar category. In Table 59, 54 per cent of the subjectively status stable middle class favor foreign aid, but so do 51 per cent of the status stable working class. In view of this small range the difference in the attitudes of the mobile and the status stable would not be expected to be large.

In Table 58 the status stable in the professional and business group are slightly more likely to favor foreign aid than are the upwardly mobile. In the white-collar group the status stable slightly less often favor foreign aid than do either the upwardly or downwardly mobile. In the blue-collar group the downwardly mobile are more often in favor of foreign aid than are the status stable. Thus in spite of

TABLE 58.--Objective mobility and attitude toward foreign aid

| Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----|------|--------------|-----------------|------|------|------|---------------|-------------|-----|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | | | | Blue-Collar | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Agree strongly | 35% | 26% | 18% | | 32% | 33% | 30% | 20% | 29% | 24% | 26% | |
| Agree, but not very strongly | 23 | 27 | 31 | | 34 | 22 | 27 | 24 | 28 | 24 | 27 | |
| Not sure, it depends | 20 | 24 | 14 | | 3 | 28 | 18 | 17 | 19 | 17 | 17 | |
| Disagree, but not very strongly | 9 | 4 | 10 | | 18 | 11 | 11 | 20 | 10 | 13 | 10 | |
| Disagree strongly | 13 | 18 | 27 | | 13 | 6 | 14 | 20 | 14 | 22 | 19 | |
| | 100% | 99% | 100% | | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 99% | |
| N | 173 | 180 | 84 | | 38 | 18 | 79 | 46 | 97 | 354 | 258 | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 8.041 (df: 4) | | | | 8.990 (df: 8) | | | | 3.655 (df: 4) | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | | NS | | | | NS | | | |
| X ² for entire table | | | | | 20.686 (df: 16) | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | NS | | | | | | | |

^a"The United States should give economic help to the poorer countries of the world even if they can't pay for it."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 59.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward foreign aid

| Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Agree strongly | 30% | 28% | 26% | 26% |
| Agree, but not very strongly | 24 | 31 | 19 | 25 |
| Not sure, it depends | 20 | 17 | 26 | 17 |
| Disagree, but not very strongly | 10 | 8 | 13 | 12 |
| Disagree strongly | 16 | 17 | 17 | 21 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>101%</u> |
| N | 462 | 196 | 86 | 928 |

Statistical Measures

| | | |
|---------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| χ^2 | 3.831 (df: 4) | 5.573 (df: 4) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for entire table | | 9.404 (df: 8) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"The United States should give economic help to the poorer countries of the world even if they can't pay for it."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

the small range all differences are in the same direction as found in the case of attitudes toward isolationism.

For subjective mobility, however, the data as recorded in Table 59 provide no evidence of a relationship between subjective mobility and attitudes toward foreign aid in either the middle class or working class.

When attitudes toward foreign aid are controlled by education, as in Tables 60 and 61, differences between the mobile and the status stable remain negligible. The exceptions are the objectively downwardly mobile groups of high education in the white-collar and blue-collar categories. Contrary to what might be expected, a higher proportion of these groups favor foreign aid than do any other groups in the table, although even here the differences fall just short of statistical significance. It is only at the highest educational level that the downwardly mobile differ in attitude from the status stable, and the difference does not appear in the case of subjective mobility. The evidence is far from conclusive, but there is a hint here that where the downwardly mobile are markedly better educated than most of their new status peers they may use enlightened attitudes to emphasize the difference between themselves and other blue-collar workers. This would explain the failure of the difference to appear for the subjectively downwardly mobile, for where working class status is accepted (an essential part of the definition of subjective downward mobility used here) no such attitude differentiation would be expected to appear.

TABLE 60.--Objective mobility and attitude toward foreign aid, by education level

| Years of Education and Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|------|------|------|--------------|------|------|------|-------------|------|------|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | DM | White-Collar | | | DM | Blue-Collar | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 57% | 50% | 64% | 67% | 0% | 60% | 29% | 53% | 53% | 57% | | |
| Not sure, depends | 0 | 29 | 0 | 17 | 0 | 20 | 29 | 16 | 14 | 13 | | |
| Disagree | 43 | 21 | 36 | 17 | 0 | 20 | 43 | 32 | 33 | 30 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 0% | 100% | 101% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | |
| N | 7 | 14 | 14 | 6 | 0 | 10 | 7 | 19 | 100 | 127 | | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 59% | 54% | 38% | 50% | 56% | 64% | 43% | 47% | 46% | 50% | | |
| Not sure, depends | 13 | 18 | 25 | 0 | 22 | 9 | 10 | 24 | 19 | 21 | | |
| Disagree | 28 | 28 | 38 | 50 | 22 | 27 | 48 | 29 | 35 | 29 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | |
| N | 32 | 65 | 32 | 10 | 9 | 33 | 21 | 45 | 192 | 102 | | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 57% | 53% | 53% | 73% | 56% | 50% | 50% | 73% | 48% | 52% | | |
| Not sure, depends | 23 | 27 | 11 | 0 | 33 | 25 | 22 | 12 | 15 | 21 | | |
| Disagree | 19 | 20 | 37 | 27 | 11 | 25 | 28 | 15 | 37 | 28 | | |
| | 99% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | | |
| N | 134 | 101 | 38 | 22 | 9 | 36 | 18 | 33 | 62 | 29 | | |

TABLE 60.--Continued

| Years of Education | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|--|---------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> ^b | | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 2.795 (df: 2) | 0.071 (df: 4) | 0.046 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 2.913 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 0.581 (df: 2) | 4.275 (df: 4) | 0.877 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 5.733 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 0.472 (df: 2) | 8.110 (df: 4) | 5.854 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 14.436 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of X ² for educational groups | 3.848 (df: 6) | 12.456 (df: 12) | 6.777 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| Sum of X ² for entire table | | 23.082 (df: 24) | |
| Probability | | NS | |

^a"The United States should give economic help to the poorer countries of the world even if they can't pay for it."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 61.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward foreign aid, by educational level

| Years of Education and Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|--|---|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 57% | 61% | 59% | 54% |
| Not sure, depends | 17 | 12 | 18 | 14 |
| Disagree | 26 | 27 | 23 | 32 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 47 | 41 | 22 | 370 |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 46% | 54% | 36% | 48% |
| Not sure, depends | 18 | 19 | 30 | 19 |
| Disagree | 37 | 28 | 33 | 33 |
| | 101% | 101% | 99% | 100% |
| N | 136 | 69 | 33 | 410 |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 57% | 60% | 42% | 51% |
| Not sure, depends | 22 | 19 | 26 | 18 |
| Disagree | 21 | 21 | 32 | 30 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% |
| N | 279 | 86 | 31 | 148 |

TABLE 61.--Continued

| Years of Education | Middle Class | Working Class |
|--|---------------|----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 0.406 (df: 2) | 1.039 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 1.444 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 1.806 (df: 2) | 2.916 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 4.723 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 0.541 (df: 2) | 1.235 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 1.776 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for educational groups | 2.753 (df: 6) | 5.191 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for table | | 7.943 (df: 12) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"The United States should give economic help to the poorer countries of the world even if they can't pay for it."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

Although attitudes on foreign aid do not constitute a clear test of noneconomic liberalism, the evidence for objective mobility lends some support to the conclusion that the upwardly mobile are more conservative on noneconomic issues than their status stable counterparts and that the downwardly mobile are more liberal on noneconomic issues than are their non-mobile status equals. For subjective mobility, however, there seems to be no difference between the mobile and stable on the issue of foreign aid.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the political attitudes of the mobile on several economic and noneconomic issues. As Lipset has stated, and as the data of this chapter have confirmed, on economic issues those of high status tend to be conservative and those of low status liberal, while on noneconomic issues the relationship is reversed. If the mobile are influenced by the attitudes prevailing in their status of origin the upwardly mobile should be more liberal on economic questions and more conservative on noneconomic issues than others of equal status. In like manner the downwardly mobile should be more conservative on economic matters and more liberal on non-economic matters than those of stable low status.

The data presented in this chapter in large part support the hypothesis. The upwardly mobile are somewhat more liberal than those of stable high status on the issues of full employment policy and medicare, though not on the issue of public power and housing. On

noneconomic issues of foreign affairs the upwardly mobile are somewhat more often conservative on the issues of isolationism and foreign aid than are their stable counterparts.

The relationship is even clearer for the downwardly mobile. They are more conservative than those of stable low status on each of the economic issues, more liberal on both of the foreign affairs issues. No important differences are apparent between objective and subjective mobility in this regard, except perhaps for a hint that the well educated among the downwardly mobile utilize enlightened attitudes to distinguish themselves from other blue-collar workers.

The status stable members of the white-collar group are apparently more conservative than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile members of the group on both economic and noneconomic questions, though rarely at a statistically significant level.

On both economic and noneconomic questions the upwardly and downwardly mobile show attitude distributions intermediate between those typical of groups of stable high status and groups of stable low status. Some of this difference is attributable to their early political socialization at a different status level, some to the differences in income and education between the mobile and the status stable. The evidence presented in this chapter in large part supports hypothesis 1.0: For both the upwardly and downwardly mobile political loyalties and attitudes tend to change in the direction appropriate to their new status, but tend to lag behind their change in status.

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT

Individuals vary greatly in the extent to which they are interested or involved in politics. Some people feel they understand the issues, follow the political campaigns with interest, and never fail to vote. Others feel baffled by politics, are little interested, and vote sporadically if at all. This chapter attempts to investigate the relationship of mobility to these aspects of orientation to the political system.

One explanation of individual differences in orientation to politics is the cross-pressure hypothesis, first set forth in The People's Choice.¹ This hypothesis states that voters exposed to conflicting political influences react by political withdrawal and indecision. There have been several attempts to apply the cross-pressure hypothesis to the political behavior of the socially mobile, the assumption being that the mobile are more likely to be cross-pressured than are the non-mobile. Lipset and Bendix conclude that because of cross-pressure both upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals "are more likely to be apathetic, to abstain from voting

¹P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. R. Berelson, and Helen Gaudet, The People's Choice (2d ed.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).

and to show low levels of political interest than are the immobile."² Elsewhere Lipset suggests that cross-pressure related to mobility are a factor making for lower voting rates in the United States than in Europe.³ The authors of The American Voter suggest that the tendency to class misidentification typical of the mobile leads to cross-pressure.⁴

As a result of these suggestions in the literature, several hypotheses were stated in Chapter III based upon the assumption that the mobile, if cross-pressured, will evidence it by having lower levels of interest and involvement than do others at the same status level. In testing these hypotheses in this chapter three aspects of political orientation and their relationship to social mobility are treated. These are (1) political interest and activity, (2) feeling of political understanding and efficacy, and (3) voting turnout.

Social Mobility and Political Interest

Interest in politics is associated with status, with those of high status usually more interested in politics than those of low status. If the mobile are cross-pressured they should be less interested in politics than are others at the same status level. This has been stated formally: 2.1--Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more often

² Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), p. 69.

³ S. M. Lipset et al., "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.) Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. II (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), 1134.

⁴ Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 372.

show low levels of political interest than do the non-mobile at the same status level.

Table 62 demonstrates the relationship between interest in a political campaign and objective mobility. If only the professional and business category were examined the hypothesis would seem to be supported, a statistically significant proportion of the upwardly mobile reporting less interest in the campaign than is true for the status stable. In the white-collar category, however, both the upwardly and downwardly mobile report more interest in the campaign than do the status stable. Since the status stable white-collar group has been consistently deviant in other regards this could be considered a part of that same pattern of deviance. But in the blue-collar category the results are clearly contrary to the hypothesis, though falling just short of statistical significance. Thus the hypothesized relationship seems to hold only in the case of upward mobility.

An alternative explanation of the data of Table 62 is available. The pattern is quite similar to that found on a number of variables in previous chapters: the mobile occupy a position on the characteristic intermediate between that typical of their status of origin and that of their new status. Table 62 merits re-examination with this hypothesis in mind. This is as would be expected if the mobile are still influenced by their early political socialization at a different status level. The upwardly mobile in the professional and business category are less interested in the campaign than are the status stable members

TABLE 62.--Objective mobility and interest in the campaign

| Interest Level ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|----------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|------|--|--|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | ex-F | | | | |
| Very much interested | 52% | 42% | 39% | 45% | 32% | 37% | 36% | 38% | 29% | 24% | | | | |
| Somewhat interested | 38 | 39 | 38 | 41 | 47 | 39 | 38 | 37 | 40 | 38 | | | | |
| Not much interested | 10 | 19 | 23 | 14 | 21 | 24 | 26 | 25 | 32 | 38 | | | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | | | | |
| N | 309 | 403 | 186 | 87 | 34 | 152 | 85 | 148 | 776 | 573 | | | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 11.486 (df: 2) | | | 4.810 (df: 4) | | | 5.243 (df: 2) | | | | | | | |
| Probability | .01 | | | NS | | | NS | | | | | | | |
| X ² for entire table | | | | 21.540 (df: 8) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | .01 | | | | | | | | | | |

^a"Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns. How about you, would you say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political campaigns so far this year?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

of the group, but more interested than are the status stable members of any lower status group. Similarly, the downwardly mobile members of the white-collar group are less interested than the status stable professional and business people, but more interested than any group of lower status. The same explanation accounts for the fact that the upwardly mobile white-collar and the downwardly mobile blue-collar members are more often very much interested in the campaign than are the status stable blue-collar workers. From this viewpoint the only deviant group is that of the status stable white-collar people, who are a trifle less interested in the campaign than would be expected, though even this deviation is quite small.

Table 63 breaks down interest in the campaign by income level. As may be seen, tendencies largely remain in the same directions, though the white-collar group is inconsistent and the magnitude of differences is somewhat reduced. Still, the upwardly mobile are on average somewhat less interested than the status stable at the same level, while the downwardly mobile tend to be somewhat more interested in the campaign than are their status peers.

Essentially the same thing is true when a control for education is introduced, as in Table 64. While differences are no longer statistically significant, the upwardly mobile are in each case less interested in the campaign than are the status stable in the professional and business group, and the downwardly mobile in the blue-collar category are more interested than are the status stable in the highest and lowest educational groups, though the difference washes out

TABLE 63.--Objective mobility and interest in the campaign by income

| Interest in the Campaign ^a and Income ^b | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|------|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F |
| <u>\$0-3,999</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Very much in- terested | 45% | 33% | 30% | 54% | 33% | 31% | 17% | 28% | 30% | 23% |
| Somewhat in- terested | 45 | 46 | 43 | 32 | 22 | 42 | 42 | 45 | 36 | 34 |
| Not much interested | 10 | 21 | 26 | 14 | 14 | 27 | 41 | 28 | 34 | 43 |
| | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 29 | 91 | 69 | 28 | 9 | 55 | 29 | 29 | 321 | 337 |
| <u>\$4,000-7,499</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Very much in- terested | 52% | 42% | 47% | 45% | 25% | 41% | 43% | 42% | 28% | 26% |
| Somewhat in- terested | 35 | 39 | 34 | 50 | 56 | 36 | 36 | 34 | 41 | 46 |
| Not much interested | 12 | 20 | 19 | 5 | 19 | 23 | 20 | 24 | 31 | 28 |
| | 99% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 124 | 189 | 77 | 38 | 16 | 74 | 44 | 91 | 372 | 203 |
| <u>\$7,500 up</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Very much in- terested | 53% | 53% | 42% | 37% | 44% | 47% | 55% | 39% | 32% | 38% |
| Somewhat in- terested | 39 | 35 | 42 | 42 | 56 | 32 | 36 | 39 | 47 | 33 |
| Not much interested | 8 | 12 | 15 | 21 | 0 | 21 | 9 | 22 | 21 | 29 |
| | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 148 | 114 | 33 | 19 | 9 | 19 | 11 | 23 | 68 | 21 |

TABLE 63.--Continued

| Income | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|--|------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^c</u> | | | |
| <u>\$0-3,999</u> | | | |
| X ² | 2.203 (df: 2) | 6.379 (df: 4) | 0.934 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 9.516 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>\$4,000-7,499</u> | | | |
| X ² | 4.555 (df: 2) | 7.547 (df: 4) | 6.031 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 18.133 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | .05 | |
| <u>\$7,500 up</u> | | | |
| X ² | 1.341 (df: 2) | 3.042 (df: 4) | 0.482 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 4.865 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of X ² for income groups | 8.099 (df: 6) | 16.968 (df: 12) | 7.447 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| Sum of X ² for entire table | | 32.515 (df: 24) | |
| Probability | | NS | |

^a"Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns. How about you, would you say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political campaigns so far this year?"

^b"About what do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family?"

^cIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 64.--Objective mobility and interest in the campaign by education

| Interest in the Campaign ^a and Years of Education | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | White-Collar | Blue-Collar | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | ex-F | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | | | | |
| Very much in- terested | 58% | 45% | 31% | 17% | 0% | 30% | 32% |
| Somewhat in- terested | 33 | 27 | 38 | 58 | 50 | 25 | 18 |
| Not much in- terested | 8 | 28 | 31 | 25 | 50 | 45 | 50 |
| | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 12 | 60 | 48 | 12 | 2 | 20 | 22 |
| | | | | | | | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | | | | |
| Very much in- terested | 38% | 32% | 38% | 50% | 15% | 26% | 34% |
| Somewhat in- terested | 41 | 47 | 39 | 36 | 62 | 46 | 47 |
| Not much in- terested | 21 | 21 | 23 | 14 | 23 | 28 | 19 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 78 | 154 | 69 | 28 | 13 | 72 | 32 |
| | | | | | | | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | | | | |
| Very much in- terested | 56% | 50% | 46% | 49% | 47% | 52% | 42% |
| Somewhat in- terested | 37 | 37 | 38 | 40 | 37 | 35 | 42 |
| Not much in- terested | 7 | 13 | 16 | 11 | 16 | 13 | 16 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 219 | 189 | 69 | 47 | 19 | 60 | 31 |
| | | | | | | | |

TABLE 64.--Continued

| Years of Education | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|--|---------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> ^b | | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 2.136 (df: 2) | 4.185 (df: 4) | 5.858 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 12.179 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 1.071 (df: 2) | 7.655 (df: 4) | 0.240 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 8.965 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 4.998 (df: 2) | 0.599 (df: 4) | 1.798 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 7.395 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of X ² for education groups | 8.205 (df: 6) | 12.439 (df: 12) | 7.896 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| Sum of X ² for table | | 28.540 (df: 24) | |
| Probability | | NS | |

^a"Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns. How about you, would you say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political campaigns so far this year?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

at the intermediate level. The white-collar pattern is again somewhat variable, though the status stable are inclined to be less interested in the campaign than the mobile at each educational level.

The relationship between interest in the campaign and subjective mobility is shown in Table 65. Here again the original hypothesis based on the assumption of cross-pressures would make a correct prediction only in the case of the upwardly mobile, while a hypothesis based on persistence of patterns of the status of origin would predict correctly for both the upwardly and downwardly mobile. The upwardly mobile are slightly less interested than are the status stable members of the middle class, while the downwardly mobile are more interested in the campaign than those who have inherited their working class status.

Another aspect of political interest against which the alternative hypotheses may be tested is the intensity with which people hold their preferences for a political candidate. Data on intensity of political preference and objective mobility is reported in Table 66. As is the case for interest in the campaign, a cross-pressure hypothesis predicts correctly only in the case of the upwardly mobile. On the other hand, a hypothesis based on the persistence of status patterns correctly predicts the direction of all differences except for the low level of intensity reported by the white-collar status stable. With this single exception, the upwardly mobile are less apt to care intensely which party wins the election than are their status stable peers, while the downwardly mobile are more likely to care intensely than are their status equals.

TABLE 65.--Subjective mobility and interest in the campaign

| Interest Level ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Very much interested | 42% | 37% | 34% | 24% |
| Somewhat interested | 40 | 43 | 37 | 39 |
| Not much interested | 18 | 20 | 30 | 37 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 506 | 222 | 98 | 1147 |

| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| χ^2 | 1.569 (df: 2) | 4.492 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for entire table | | 6.060 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns. How about you, would you say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political campaigns so far this year?"

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 66.--Objective mobility and intensity of political preference

| Intensity ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|-----------------|--------------|------|---------------|-------------|------|------|----|----|
| | Professional and Business | | | DM | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | DM | SS |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Care very much | 42% | 33% | 30% | 40% | 18% | 33% | 37% | 35% | 24% | 21% | | |
| Care pretty much | 38 | 42 | 41 | 38 | 42 | 41 | 29 | 31 | 41 | 40 | | |
| Don't care very much | 13 | 18 | 19 | 10 | 24 | 19 | 21 | 22 | 21 | 21 | | |
| Don't care at all | 7 | 8 | 10 | 12 | 15 | 8 | 13 | 12 | 14 | 18 | | |
| | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 298 | 395 | 184 | 84 | 33 | 145 | 82 | 147 | 756 | 547 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 7.499 (df: 3) | | | 9.802 (df: 6) | | | 9.530 (df: 3) | | | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | .05 | | | | | |
| χ^2 for table | | | | 26.831 (df: 12) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | .01 | | | | | | | | |

^a"Generally speaking, would you say that you personally care a good deal which party wins the presidential election this fall or that you don't care very much which party wins?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

Since the intensity an individual feels about the outcome of an election is likely to fluctuate from one election to the next, depending on the candidates involved, Table 67 breaks down intensity of political preference by election years. An inspection of the table reveals that the pattern remains consistent in each election year. In every election year the downwardly mobile more often care very much who wins than do their status stable peers, while with the exception of the white-collar group the upwardly mobile are less likely to care very much who wins than are their status equals.

One further aspect of the intensity of political preference worth examination is the relationship of intensity to party preference. It could be argued that those mobile who retain the party allegiance typical of their status of origin find it in conflict with self-interest in their new status position, and so are not likely to care very much who wins, while those who adhere to the "correct" party for their new status "over-identify" and thus care more strongly than do others in the same circumstances. Such a supposition would not be supported by the data reported in Table 68. In the professional and business category the upwardly mobile less often report caring very much who wins in each case, whether they are Republicans, Democrats, or Independents. In the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile are a little less likely to care strongly if they are Democrats, but much more likely to have an intense preference when they are Republicans. It is in the group of downwardly mobile Republicans that one finds those who would "rather fight than switch."

TABLE 67.--Objective mobility and intensity of political preference by election years

| Election Year ^a and Intensity | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| <u>1952</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Care very much | 45% | 32% | 28% | 45% | 25% | 32% | 39% | 45% | 27% | 22% | | |
| Care pretty much | 36 | 45 | 48 | 34 | 31 | 46 | 30 | 29 | 40 | 42 | | |
| Don't care very much | 14 | 17 | 19 | 9 | 19 | 13 | 24 | 19 | 19 | 21 | | |
| Don't care at all | 4 | 6 | 4 | 11 | 25 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 13 | 15 | | |
| | 99% | 100% | 99% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 99% | 99% | 100% | | |
| N | 118 | 206 | 91 | 44 | 16 | 56 | 33 | 31 | 329 | 236 | | |
| <u>1956</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Care very much | 38% | 34% | 32% | 33% | 14% | 35% | 33% | 33% | 23% | 19% | | |
| Care pretty much | 39 | 36 | 35 | 45 | 50 | 39 | 28 | 32 | 40 | 38 | | |
| Don't care very much | 14 | 20 | 19 | 9 | 29 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 23 | | |
| Don't care at all | 9 | 10 | 14 | 12 | 7 | 5 | 18 | 14 | 16 | 20 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | | |
| N | 145 | 156 | 84 | 33 | 14 | 75 | 39 | 96 | 371 | 273 | | |
| <u>1960</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Care very much | 47% | 36% | 29% | 45% | 30% | 40% | 35% | 31% | 23% | 22% | | |
| Care pretty much | 32 | 42 | 27 | 27 | 50 | 33 | 32 | 43 | 42 | 36 | | |
| Don't care very much | 16 | 12 | 27 | 14 | 10 | 19 | 23 | 20 | 20 | 22 | | |
| Don't care at all | 5 | 10 | 16 | 14 | 10 | 8 | 10 | 6 | 15 | 20 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 96 | 105 | 51 | 22 | 10 | 52 | 31 | 49 | 191 | 152 | | |

TABLE 67.--Continued

| Election Year | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|--|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | |
| <u>1952</u> | | | |
| χ^2 | 5.825 (df: 3) | 6.742 (df: 6) | 5.243 (df: 3) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 17.810 (df: 12) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>1956</u> | | | |
| χ^2 | 2.330 (df: 3) | 6.113 (df: 6) | 4.974 (df: 3) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 13.417 (df: 12) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>1960</u> | | | |
| χ^2 | 4.259 (df: 3) | 2.657 (df: 6) | 3.120 (df: 3) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 10.036 (df: 12) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of χ^2 for election years ^c | 12.414 (df: 9) | 15.512 (df: 18) | 13.337 (df: 9) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for table | | 41.263 (df: 36) | |
| Probability | | NS | |

^a"Generally speaking, would you say that you personally care a good deal which party wins the presidential election this fall or that you don't care very much which party wins?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

^cSumming is not entirely legitimate in this case, since some of the same respondents were interviewed in 1960 who had been interviewed in 1956.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 68.--Objective mobility and intensity of political preference by party preference

| Party Preference ^a and Intensity ^b | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|------|------|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | |
| <u>Democrat</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Care very much | 36% | 33% | 29% | 46% | 0% | 28% | 44% | 24% | 27% | 21% | | |
| Care pretty much | 41 | 39 | 46 | 38 | 71 | 55 | 24 | 34 | 44 | 43 | | |
| Don't care very much | 16 | 18 | 16 | 5 | 29 | 9 | 24 | 27 | 19 | 20 | | |
| Don't care at all | 8 | 10 | 8 | 11 | 0 | 8 | 7 | 15 | 10 | 15 | | |
| | 101% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 99% | | |
| N | 101 | 160 | 85 | 37 | 7 | 64 | 41 | 62 | 377 | 273 | | |
| <u>Republican</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Care very much | 51% | 42% | 38% | 46% | 20% | 57% | 35% | 61% | 30% | 29% | | |
| Care pretty much | 38 | 41 | 42 | 39 | 30 | 32 | 50 | 22 | 43 | 41 | | |
| Don't care very much | 10 | 12 | 16 | 7 | 30 | 8 | 8 | 12 | 17 | 20 | | |
| Don't care at all | 2 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 20 | 3 | 8 | 5 | 10 | 10 | | |
| | 101% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 114 | 128 | 55 | 28 | 20 | 37 | 26 | 41 | 162 | 125 | | |
| <u>Ind., Other</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Care very much | 39% | 22% | 23% | 21% | 33% | 20% | 20% | 27% | 16% | 13% | | |
| Care pretty much | 34 | 47 | 30 | 37 | 50 | 27 | 7 | 34 | 34 | 35 | | |
| Don't care very much | 14 | 24 | 27 | 21 | 0 | 41 | 33 | 23 | 27 | 24 | | |
| Don't care at all | 13 | 7 | 20 | 21 | 17 | 11 | 40 | 16 | 24 | 28 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | | |
| N | 83 | 107 | 44 | 19 | 6 | 44 | 15 | 44 | 217 | 149 | | |

TABLE 68.--Continued

| Party Preference | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|---|---------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^c</u> | | | |
| <u>Democrat</u> | | | |
| X ² | 0.683 (df: 3) | 11.033 (df: 6) | 4.065 (df: 3) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 15.781 (df: 12) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>Republican</u> | | | |
| X ² | 3.000 (df: 3) | 14.970 (df: 6) | 14.257 (df: 3) |
| Probability | NS | .05 | .01 |
| X ² for table | | 32.227 (df: 12) | |
| Probability | | .01 | |
| <u>Ind., Other</u> | | | |
| X ² | 10.445 (df: 3) | 6.083 (df: 6) | 3.699 (df: 3) |
| Probability | .02 | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 20.227 (df: 12) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of X ² for preference groups | | | |
| | 14.128 (df: 9) | 32.086 (df: 18) | 22.021 (df: 9) |
| Probability | NS | .05 | .01 |
| Sum of X ² for table | | | |
| | | 68.236 (df: 36) | |
| Probability | | .001 | |

^a"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

^b"Generally speaking, would you say that you personally care a good deal which party wins the presidential election this fall or that you don't care very much which party wins?"

^cIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

An explanation of the tendency of the downwardly mobile Republicans to care intensely who wins in terms of the persistence of attitudes learned earlier at a higher status level is in this case insufficient. Although the hypothesis would correctly predict the direction of difference, it is inadequate to explain the magnitude of the difference, because the downwardly mobile Republicans care intensely who wins even more often than do the Republicans in higher status groups. It may be that these downwardly mobile individuals use their Republican identification as one way of rejecting working class status.

The relationship of subjective mobility to intensity of preference is reported in Table 69. As before, the upwardly mobile less often report caring very much than do other members of the middle class, and the downwardly mobile are more apt to care very much who wins than are the status stable members of the working class.

A final aspect of political interest to be examined is the extent to which individuals take some political action other than voting. The least demanding kind of action is that of talking to other people in the attempt to get them to support one's preferred candidate. Yet less than one-third of respondents report even this limited activity, as may be seen in Table 70. The pattern of Table 70 for political activity as evidenced by talking to other people is identical to that found for other indicators of political interest and intensity. The upwardly mobile less often talked to other people than did others of equal status, while the downwardly mobile more often

TABLE 69.--Subjective mobility and intensity of political preference

| Intensity ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Care very much | 37% | 30% | 33% | 22% |
| Care pretty much | 38 | 36 | 37 | 38 |
| Don't care very much | 16 | 21 | 22 | 23 |
| Don't care at all | 9 | 12 | 8 | 17 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 488 | 211 | 95 | 1101 |

Statistical Measures

| | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------|---------------|
| X ² | 5.748 (df: 3) | 7.652 (df: 3) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| X ² for entire table | 13.401 (df: 6) | |
| Probability | .05 | |

^a"Generally speaking, would you say that you personally care a good deal which party wins the presidential election this fall or that you don't care very much which party wins?"

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 70.--Objective mobility and political activity

| Activity ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|----------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Talked | 42% | 35% | 32% | 39% | 25% | 25% | 34% | 35% | 29% | 19% | | |
| Didn't talk | 58 | 65 | 68 | 61 | 75 | 75 | 66 | 65 | 71 | 81 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 292 | 376 | 184 | 83 | 32 | 142 | 82 | 143 | 745 | 550 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 3.699 (df: 1) | | | 4.751 (df: 2) | | | 2.236 (df: 1) | | | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | NS | | | | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | 10.686 (df: 4) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | .05 | | | | | | | | |

^a"Did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

tried to convince others. The same pattern is repeated in the case of subjective mobility as shown in Table 71. Though the differences are not statistically significant, the upwardly mobile less often talked than did other members of the middle class, while the downwardly mobile more often tried to convince other people than did the status stable members of the working class.

The evidence compels rejection of hypothesis 2.1. If the mobile are cross-pressured it is not revealed in these data. The results are much better explained by the same basic hypothesis that has been supported in previous chapters: that the mobile tend to be intermediate between their status of origin and their new status on traits of political relevance. In the case of political interest and involvement such a hypothesis would predict differences between the mobile and the status stable in virtually every instance reported here, with the familiar exception of the status stable white-collar workers, who tend to evidence lower degrees of interest and involvement than anticipated. With this exception the upwardly mobile are less interested and involved in politics than are their status equals, while the downwardly mobile tend to be more interested and involved than are those of stable low status.

Social Mobility and Political Efficacy

Related to an individual's degree of political interest and involvement is the extent to which he feels he is able to understand political issues and has an effective voice in government. A hypothesis

TABLE 71.--Subjective mobility and political activity

| Activity ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Talked | 38% | 33% | 30% | 24% |
| Didn't talk | 62 | 67 | 70 | 76 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 502 | 218 | 96 | 1133 |
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | | | |
| χ^2 | | 1.138 (df: 1) | | 1.784 (df: 1) |
| Probability | | NS | | NS |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | 2.922 (df: 2) | |
| Probability | | | NS | |

^a"Did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates?"

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

based upon the assumption that the mobile are cross-pressured has been stated formally: 2.2--Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more often feel politically ineffectual than do the non-mobile at the same status level.

Table 72 reports the relationship of objective mobility to feelings of political efficacy. As was the case for various indicators of political interest, a cross-pressure hypothesis is supported only by the data for upward mobility, that for downward mobility showing a difference opposite to that hypothesized. As before, a hypothesis based upon the persistence of patterns learned in the status of origin offers a better explanation. In the case of feelings of political efficacy reported in Table 72 the upwardly mobile more often feel that they have no say about what the government does than do the status stable members of the professional and business group. The downwardly mobile less often feel politically ineffectual than do the status stable in either the white-collar or blue-collar group. The status stable members of the white-collar group are again the only ones unaccounted for by the hypothesis: they feel more ineffectual politically than any other group of any status.

When feeling of political efficacy is controlled by income, as in Table 73, differences persist in the same direction. In the professional and business category the upwardly mobile more often feel unable to affect what government does than do the status stable in both the highest and the lowest income groups, though the difference washes out at medium income levels. In the blue-collar category the

TABLE 72.--Objective mobility and feeling of political efficacy

| Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|---------------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | | | | Blue-Collar | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Agree | 12% | 19% | 19% | 23% | 43% | 24% | 24% | 19% | 31% | 40% | | |
| Disagree | 88 | 81 | 81 | 77 | 57 | 76 | 76 | 81 | 69 | 60 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 309 | 404 | 186 | 86 | 35 | 152 | 84 | 146 | 774 | 559 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 6.544 (df: 1) | | | 5.928 (df: 2) | | | | | | 8.326 (df: 1) | | |
| Probability | .02 | | | NS | | | | | | .01 | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | 20.798 (df: 4) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | .001 | | | | | | | | |

^a"People like me don't have any say about what the government does."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 73.--Objective mobility and feeling of political efficacy by income

| Attitude ^a and Income ^b | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business ex-F | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | | |
| <u>\$0-3,999</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 0% | 30% | 28% | 21% | 56% | 35% | 36% | 29% | 35% | 46% | | |
| Disagree | 100 | 70 | 72 | 79 | 44 | 65 | 64 | 71 | 65 | 54 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 29 | 92 | 69 | 28 | 9 | 55 | 28 | 28 | 319 | 324 | | |
| <u>\$4,000-7,499</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 15% | 15% | 15% | 21% | 41% | 18% | 24% | 18% | 29% | 31% | | |
| Disagree | 85 | 85 | 85 | 79 | 59 | 82 | 76 | 82 | 71 | 69 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 124 | 189 | 78 | 38 | 17 | 74 | 43 | 90 | 372 | 202 | | |
| <u>\$7,500 up</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 11% | 16% | 6% | 32% | 33% | 16% | 0% | 13% | 20% | 27% | | |
| Disagree | 89 | 84 | 94 | 68 | 67 | 84 | 100 | 87 | 80 | 73 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 148 | 114 | 33 | 19 | 9 | 19 | 12 | 23 | 69 | 22 | | |

TABLE 73.--Continued

| Income | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|---|------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^c</u> | | | |
| <u>\$0-3,999</u> | | | |
| X ² | 11.483 (df: 1) | 3.843 (df: 2) | 0.709 (df: 1) |
| Probability | .001 | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 16.035 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | .01 | |
| <u>\$4,000-7,499</u> | | | |
| X ² | 0.005 (df: 1) | 4.548 (df: 2) | 5.173 (df: 1) |
| Probability | NS | NS | .05 |
| X ² for table | | 9.726 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | .05 | |
| <u>\$7,500 up</u> | | | |
| X ² | 1.030 (df: 1) | 1.602 (df: 2) | 0.601 (df: 1) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 3.233 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of X ² for income groups | 12.518 (df: 3) | 9.993 (df: 6) | 6.483 (df: 3) |
| Probability | .01 | NS | NS |
| Sum of X ² for table | | 28.994 (df: 12) | |
| Probability | | .01 | |

^a"People like me don't have any say about what the government does."

^b"About what do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family?"

^cIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

downwardly mobile more often feel politically efficacious than do the status stable at every income level. In the white-collar group the deviance of the status stable is consistent: they are more apt to feel politically ineffectual than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile at each income level. For the table as a whole differences remain statistically significant even after controlling for income differences.

The results of controlling for education, as in Table 74, are virtually identical to those when income is controlled. In the professional and business category the mobile more often feel ineffectual in both the highest and lowest education categories, though again the difference washes out at the intermediate level. In the blue-collar group the downwardly mobile more often feel politically effective than the status stable at every education level, and in the white-collar group the status stable are more apt to feel ineffectual than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile at every level. Again, differences remain statistically significant for the table as a whole.

When subjective mobility is used as a criterion, as in Table 75, differences are in the same direction, although statistically significant only in the middle class. The upwardly mobile more often feel politically impotent than do the status stable in the middle class, and in the working class the downwardly mobile less often feel themselves politically impotent than do the status stable.

Closely related to feelings of political efficacy are feelings of political understanding. A man who does not feel he understands

TABLE 74.--Objective mobility and feeling of political efficacy, by education

| Attitude ^a and Years of Education | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|------|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 17% | 34% | 28% | 50% | 100% | 30% | 45% | 30% | 43% | 50% |
| Disagree | 83 | 66 | 72 | 50 | 0 | 70 | 55 | 70 | 57 | 50 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 12 | 61 | 47 | 12 | 2 | 20 | 20 | 30 | 261 | 308 |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 21% | 19% | 23% | 22% | 54% | 29% | 19% | 19% | 26% | 32% |
| Disagree | 79 | 81 | 77 | 78 | 46 | 71 | 81 | 81 | 74 | 69 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% |
| N | 78 | 153 | 69 | 27 | 13 | 72 | 32 | 72 | 402 | 200 |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 9% | 14% | 10% | 17% | 30% | 15% | 16% | 11% | 21% | 14% |
| Disagree | 91 | 86 | 90 | 83 | 70 | 85 | 84 | 89 | 79 | 86 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 219 | 190 | 70 | 47 | 20 | 60 | 32 | 44 | 111 | 51 |

TABLE 74.--Continued

| Years of Education | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|--|---------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 1.466 (df: 1) | 4.274 (df: 2) | 2.208 (df: 1) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 7.948 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 0.080 (df: 1) | 7.357 (df: 2) | 1.810 (df: 1) |
| Probability | NS | .05 | NS |
| X ² for table | | 9.247 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 3.122 (df: 1) | 2.335 (df: 2) | 1.864 (df: 1) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 7.321 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of X ² for educational groups | 4.668 (df: 3) | 13.966 (df: 6) | 5.882 (df: 3) |
| Probability | NS | .05 | NS |
| Sum of X ² for table | | 24.516 (df: 12) | |
| Probability | | .02 | |

^a"People like me don't have any say about what the government does."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 75.--Subjective mobility and feeling of political efficacy

| Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|-----------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Agree | 15% | 23% | 29% | 35% |
| Disagree | 85 | 77 | 71 | 65 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 508 | 222 | 97 | 1136 |

| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| χ^2 | | 6.934 (df: 1) | | 1.588 (df: 1) |
| Probability | | .01 | | NS |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | 8.522 (df: 2) | |
| Probability | | | .02 | |

^a"People like me don't have any say about what the government does."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

politics is unlikely to believe he can affect the course of events.

Data on objective mobility and feeling of political understanding are reported in Table 76.

The relationship of feelings of political understanding to objective mobility is similar to that already reported for feelings of political efficacy. The upwardly mobile less often feel that they understand politics than do the status stable in the professional and business category, while in the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile are more likely to feel they understand what is going on than do other members of the working class. In the white-collar group, however, a difference is to be noted. The status stable members of the white-collar category who were consistently less likely to believe they could affect the course of political events than either of the mobile groups, somewhat more often feel they understand politics than do either mobile group. This difference is virtually meaningless statistically however, while the differences in both the professional and business and blue-collar groups are highly significant statistically.

Because feelings of political understanding are likely to be closely related to the amount of education an individual has had it is desirable to introduce a control for education. This is done in Table 77. In the professional and business category the upwardly mobile less often feel they understand politics than do the status stable at both the highest and lowest levels, while the difference washes out at the intermediate level. In the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile more often feel they understand politics than do the

TABLE 76.--Objective mobility and feeling of political understanding

| Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|----------------|------|------|----------------|------|------|------|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F |
| Agree | 43% | 57% | 61% | 57% | 54% | 60% | 64% | 47% | 69% | 79% |
| Disagree | 57 | 43 | 39 | 43 | 46 | 40 | 36 | 53 | 31 | 21 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 308 | 403 | 189 | 86 | 35 | 151 | 85 | 145 | 779 | 564 |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 13.773 (df: 1) | | | 0.532 (df: 2) | | | 25.581 (df: 1) | | | |
| Probability | .001 | | | NS | | | .001 | | | |
| χ^2 for table | | | | 39.886 (df: 4) | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | .001 | | | | | | |

^a"Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 77.--Objective mobility and feeling of political understanding, by education

| Attitude ^a and Years of Education | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | ex-F | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 42% | 61% | 67% | 92% | 100% | 60% | 90% | 60% | 79% | 88% | | |
| Disagree | 58 | 39 | 33 | 9 | 0 | 40 | 10 | 40 | 21 | 12 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 12 | 61 | 49 | 12 | 2 | 20 | 21 | 30 | 266 | 315 | | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 65% | 64% | 64% | 59% | 69% | 71% | 56% | 48% | 64% | 71% | | |
| Disagree | 35 | 36 | 36 | 41 | 31 | 29 | 44 | 52 | 36 | 29 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 78 | 154 | 70 | 27 | 13 | 72 | 32 | 71 | 401 | 198 | | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 34% | 49% | 54% | 47% | 40% | 47% | 53% | 36% | 60% | 53% | | |
| Disagree | 66 | 51 | 46 | 53 | 60 | 53 | 47 | 64 | 40 | 47 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 218 | 188 | 70 | 47 | 20 | 59 | 32 | 44 | 112 | 51 | | |

TABLE 77.--Continued

| Years of Education | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|--|---------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> ^b | | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 1.480 (df: 1) | 4.629 (df: 2) | 5.748 (df: 1) |
| Probability | NS | NS | .02 |
| X ² for table | | 11.857 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | .02 | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 0.069 (df: 1) | 4.259 (df: 2) | 7.263 (df: 1) |
| Probability | NS | NS | .01 |
| X ² for table | | 11.592 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | .05 | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 9.444 (df: 1) | 0.353 (df: 2) | 6.982 (df: 1) |
| Probability | .01 | NS | .01 |
| X ² for table | | 16.778 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | .01 | |
| Sum of X ² for education groups | 10.993 (df: 3) | 9.241 (df: 6) | 19.993 (df: 3) |
| Probability | .02 | NS | .001 |
| Sum of X ² for table | | 40.227 (df: 12) | |
| Probability | | .001 | |

^a"Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

status stable at every educational level. In the white-collar group the pattern is inconsistent, showing no clear evidence of difference between groups. For the table as a whole differences between the mobile and status stable remain statistically significant at a high level.

As has been the case for the other variables considered in this chapter, subjective mobility presents a pattern similar to that for objective mobility, but with reduced magnitude. As Table 78 illustrates, in the middle class the upwardly mobile are somewhat less likely than are the status stable to feel they understand politics, while in the working class the downwardly mobile somewhat more often believe they understand politics than do the status stable. In neither case, however, are the differences statistically significant.

On the basis of the evidence hypothesis 2.2 must be rejected. As was the case for political interest, a cross-pressure hypothesis is able to correctly predict differences only in the case of the upwardly mobile, while the downwardly mobile show a trend opposite to that predicted. A hypothesis based upon the persistence of the influence of early political socialization at a different status level is able to correctly predict all differences except for the case of the status stable white-collar group. In that case individuals less often report feelings of political efficacy than do their status peers, though they do as often feel that they understand politics. With this exception the upwardly mobile less often feel that they understand or

TABLE 78.--Subjective mobility and feeling of political understanding

| Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|-----------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Agree | 48% | 53% | 64% | 70% |
| Disagree | 52 | 47 | 36 | 30 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 503 | 222 | 98 | 1135 |

| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| X ² | 1.414 (df: 1) | 1.506 (df: 1) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| X ² for entire table | | 2.920 (df: 2) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

can affect politics than do their status equals, while the downwardly mobile more often believe they understand and can affect political events than do their status equals.

Social Mobility and Voting Turnout

One of the traits supposed to accompany political cross-pressure is a lower voting rate. This was stated as a formal hypothesis: 2.3--Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more often abstain from voting than do the non-mobile at the same status level. But since the evidence already examined does not support the assumption that the mobile are cross-pressured, there is no reason to expect the hypothesis to hold in the case of voting rates. A more probable result is that those groups which evidence high interest and involvement in politics will have a high rate of voting turnout, and that those less interested and involved will more often abstain from voting.

Evidence on the relationship of objective mobility to voting turnout is reported in Table 79. An examination of the table reveals that the pattern is identical to that to be expected if high interest levels are assumed to lead to high turnout rates. In the professional and business category the status stable have voted more regularly than have the upwardly mobile. In the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile have voted more regularly than have the status stable. Finally, in the white-collar category the status stable group evidence their lesser interest in politics by having voted less regularly than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile. Differences between the mobile and

TABLE 79.--Objective mobility and voting turnout

| Elections in which Respondent Voted ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|-----------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| All of them | 61% | 55% | 47% | 48% | 40% | 55% | 51% | 42% | 38% | 27% | | |
| Most of them | 24 | 20 | 26 | 21 | 17 | 13 | 22 | 20 | 19 | 20 | | |
| Some of them | 7 | 9 | 12 | 14 | 17 | 13 | 16 | 17 | 16 | 21 | | |
| None | 8 | 16 | 15 | 17 | 26 | 19 | 11 | 21 | 27 | 31 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | | |
| N | 309 | 406 | 188 | 86 | 35 | 151 | 85 | 147 | 782 | 579 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 11.996 (df: 3) | | | 4.769 (df: 6) | | | 2.280 (df: 3) | | | | | |
| Probability | .01 | | | NS | | | NS | | | | | |
| χ^2 for table | | | | 19.045 (df: 12) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | | | |

^a"In the elections for president since you have been old enough to vote, would you say that you have voted in all of them, most of them, some of them, or none of them?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952, 1956, 1960.

the status stable are statistically significant in this case only for the professional and business category.

The relationship of subjective mobility to voting turnout, as shown in Table 80, is similar to that for objective mobility. In the middle class the status stable have voted slightly more regularly than have the upwardly mobile, though the difference has no statistical significance. In the working class the downwardly mobile have voted quite a bit more regularly than have the status stable, and in this case the difference is statistically significant.

Thus hypothesis 2.3 must also be rejected on the basis of the evidence. As was the case for other variables examined in this chapter the facts accord more closely to the hypothesis that the mobile are intermediate between their status of origin and their new status on political traits.

Conclusion

All three hypotheses derived from the assumption that the mobile are cross-pressured examined in this chapter have had to be rejected on the evidence. Although the data reveals clear and consistent differences between the status stable and the mobile with regard to levels of political interest, feelings of political efficacy and regularity of voting turnout, these differences are not compatible with a cross-pressure interpretation. An alternative interpretation fits the data better: that the mobile are still sufficiently influenced by their status of origin that they retain traces of the political

TABLE 80.--Subjective mobility and voting turnout

| Voted ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|--------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| All of them | 56% | 52% | 47% | 34% |
| Most of them | 22 | 24 | 26 | 22 |
| Some of them | 10 | 11 | 11 | 19 |
| None | 12 | 13 | 16 | 25 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 508 | 222 | 98 | 1155 |

Statistical Measures

| | | |
|---------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| χ^2 | 0.898 (df: 3) | 10.916 (df: 3) |
| Probability | NS | .02 |
| χ^2 for entire table | | 11.814 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | |

^a"In the elections for president since you have been old enough to vote, would you say that you have voted in all of them, most of them, some of them, or none of them?"

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

behavior typical of that status. As this hypothesis would predict, the mobile evidence a distribution on all measures of political interest and involvement that is between that shown by the status stable in their status of origin and the status stable in their new status.

Whether objective or subjective mobility is used as a measure, at high status levels the upwardly mobile are less often interested in politics, less often feel they understand or can affect political events, and vote less regularly than do those of stable high status. At the lower end of the status scale the downwardly mobile tend to be more interested in politics, to feel they understand and can affect political events, and to vote more regularly than do those of stable low status. The one deviant group is again the status stable white-collar category, where though the status stable feel they understand politics as well as do the mobile at the same level, they are less often interested or involved in politics, less often feel they can affect political events, and are less often regular voters than are either the upwardly or downwardly mobile members of the white-collar category.

CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL MOBILITY, PREJUDICE, AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

The literature on social mobility is full of suggestions that the mobile are less secure or less well integrated in their social environment than are the non-mobile. This presumed insecurity of the mobile has been said to be reflected in hostility toward minority groups, reduced concern for the rights of others, lower rates of participation in voluntary organizations, lower rates of union membership, and dissatisfaction with society and their place in it. While evidence of varied scope and quality has been offered in support of these generalizations, varying sample bases and differing definitions of mobility make it difficult to determine their validity for the mobile as a whole.

This chapter offers data bearing on several kinds of attitude in which the mobile have been said to differ from the non-mobile. Since all of the data are from the same source, handled in the same manner, and subject to the same criteria of mobility, generalization is easier and it is possible to determine whether varying results reflect different issue orientations rather than simply different sample bases.

Most of the questions treated in this chapter are of the kind to which Lipset's term "noneconomic liberalism" was applied

in Chapter VII. As will be seen, however, not all of these noneconomic issues fit easily on the same liberal-conservative dimension. The race issue in particular seems not to share the same attitude distribution with other noneconomic issues.

Attitudes of the mobile toward minority groups and the rights of others are examined in this chapter in terms of attitudes toward Negroes getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, toward school desegregation, and toward rights of government employees. The membership rates of the mobile in voluntary organizations and in unions are compared with those of the non-mobile. The general orientation of the mobile toward society is examined by comparing them with the non-mobile in terms of trusting or distrusting groups and on several expressions of attitude which reflect satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their social situation.

Fair Treatment of Negroes in Jobs and Housing

One of the issues of noneconomic liberalism specifically mentioned by Lipset is that of race relations. It is Lipset's thesis that on noneconomic issues, of which race relations is an example, those of high status are more tolerant than those of low status.¹ If racial prejudice is associated with status there are grounds for suspecting that it may also be associated with mobility. But research on the relationship between mobility and prejudice has resulted in

¹ Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 318.

conflicting findings. Various studies have reported that prejudice is: (1) associated with both upward and downward mobility,² (2) associated with downward mobility only,³ (3) unrelated to mobility except through the individual's attitude toward mobility,⁴ and (4) highest among those of stable low status and lowest among those of stable high status, with both upwardly and downwardly mobile in the middle.⁵

Unfortunately the data used here do not include questions permitting a direct test of racial tolerance. Data are available, however, on two issues of race relations from which tolerance or intolerance may be inferred. The first of these is the issue of whether government should take action to see that Negroes receive fair treatment in jobs and housing. The second is whether the government should take action on the question of school desegregation.⁶

²Joseph Greenblum and Leonard I. Pearlin, "Vertical Mobility and Prejudice: A Socio-Psychological Analysis," in Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix (eds.), Class, Status and Power (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 480-491.

³Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, The Dynamics of Prejudice (New York: Harpers, 1950).

⁴Fred B. Silberstein and Melvin Seeman, "Social Mobility and Prejudice," AJS, LXV, No. 3 (November, 1959), 258-264.

⁵Melvin M. Tumin and Ray C. Collins, Jr., "Status Mobility and Anomie: A Study in Readiness for Desegregation," British Journal of Sociology, X, No. 3 (September, 1959), 253-267.

⁶Any inference must be cautious, however. An individual may be personally tolerant, but against government action to insure that Negroes get fair treatment because he is against any expansion of government activity. Alternatively, a man may be personally intolerant, but agree with the abstract proposition that Negroes should get fair treatment. In spite of these objections it is reasonable to infer that a higher proportion of intolerant people will be found among those opposed to government action on behalf of the Negro than among those who favor such action.

To the extent that attitudes on whether the government should see to it that Negroes receive fair treatment in jobs and housing reflect racial tolerance the evidence does not support Lipset's thesis that those of high status are more tolerant. As Table 81 shows, in the professional and business category 62 per cent of both the status stable and the upwardly mobile agree that the government should insure fairness, but an even larger 73 per cent of the status stable blue-collar group take the same stand.⁷ Objective mobility appears unrelated to attitudes on the racial issue in either the professional and business category or the white-collar category, but in the blue-collar category a strong relationship is apparent. The downwardly mobile in the blue-collar category oppose government action to insure fair treatment of Negroes considerably more often than do the status stable in the same category, and the difference is statistically significant at a high level.

The same relationship is apparent when subjective mobility is used as a criterion, as in Table 82. Mobility appears unrelated to the attitude for the middle class, but in the working class the downwardly mobile are more often opposed to government action on behalf of the Negro than are the status stable. The downwardly mobile, who in Chapter VII were found to be more liberal than their status stable peers on noneconomic foreign affairs issues, are less liberal on the noneconomic issue of race relations.

⁷ The direction of this difference can probably be better explained in terms of greater reluctance on the part of high status individuals to see any kind of expansion of government activity rather than necessarily indicating greater racial prejudice.

TABLE 81.--Objective mobility and attitude toward government insuring fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing

| Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|-----------------|------|------|------|------|------|----------------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | | | | Blue-Collar | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Agree strongly | 43% | 43% | 48% | 57% | 50% | 63% | 30% | 34% | 53% | 53% | | |
| Agree, but not very strongly | 19 | 19 | 19 | 14 | 25 | 10 | 28 | 23 | 20 | 24 | | |
| Not sure, it depends | 14 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 11 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 | | |
| Disagree, but not very strongly | 9 | 12 | 9 | 11 | 13 | 5 | 10 | 19 | 3 | 5 | | |
| Disagree strongly | 16 | 16 | 16 | 11 | 6 | 11 | 28 | 19 | 17 | 13 | | |
| | 101% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 101% | 100% | 101% | | |
| N | 172 | 182 | 86 | 37 | 16 | 82 | 40 | 106 | 378 | 283 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 1.596 (df: 4) | | | 5.574 (df: 8) | | | | | | 35.970 (df: 4) | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | | | | .001 | | |
| χ^2 for entire table | | | | 43.139 (df: 16) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | .001 | | | | | | | | |

^a"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do."

^bIn each case chi-square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 82.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward government insuring fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing

| Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Agree strongly | 44% | 44% | 45% | 54% |
| Agree, but not very strongly | 19 | 18 | 19 | 22 |
| Not sure, it depends | 12 | 8 | 5 | 6 |
| Disagree, but not very strongly | 8 | 13 | 12 | 5 |
| Disagree strongly | 17 | 19 | 20 | 12 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>102%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>99%</u> |
| N | 464 | 200 | 85 | 975 |

Statistical Measures

| | | |
|--------------------|---------------|----------------|
| χ^2 | 6.982 (df: 4) | 11.081 (df: 4) |
| Probability | NS | .05 |
| χ^2 for table | | 18.062 (df: 8) |
| Probability | | .05 |

^a"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

It is to be expected that attitudes on race relations will vary with the respondent's place of residence, with Southern residents being less liberal on the subject. Table 83 reports differences on attitudes toward fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing by regions of the country. Surprisingly, on this particular issue Southern respondents are not markedly less liberal than non-Southerners. The principal difference to be noted is that in the South mobility is apparently unrelated to attitude toward the issue in all occupational categories, while outside the South the downwardly mobile blue-collar workers remain markedly less in favor of government action on behalf of the Negro than their stable peers.

When subjective mobility is controlled by region, as in Table 84, the upwardly mobile somewhat more often oppose government action on behalf of the Negro than do the status stable members of the middle class. In the working class mobility is apparently unrelated to attitude in the South, but outside the South the downwardly mobile disagree with the proposal twice as often as do the status stable.

When attitude is controlled by race, as in Tables 85 and 86, the result is as would be anticipated. Negroes are virtually unanimous in believing that the government should act to insure their fair treatment. Among whites a majority in every group agree that the government should take such action, but with less unanimity than is true of Negroes. As before, mobility is related to attitude only in the case of those of low status, and as before it is the downwardly mobile who are most apt to disagree. The results for the downwardly mobile are statistically significant both for objective and subjective mobility.

TABLE 83.--Objective mobility and attitude toward government insuring fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing, by region

| Region ^a and Attitude ^b | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------|---------|--------------|------|------|-------------|---------|------|------|--------|---------|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| <u>Non-South</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 65% | 64% | 67% | 70% | 79% | 85% | 59% | 56% | 75% | 76% | | |
| Depends | 15 | 10 | 6 | 11 | 7 | 2 | 9 | 2 | 5 | 6 | | |
| Disagree | 21 | 26 | 27 | 19 | 14 | 14 | 32 | 42 | 21 | 18 | | |
| | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | | |
| N | 124 | 136 | 49 | 27 | 14 | 58 | 22 | 84 | 309 | 175 | | |
| <u>South</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 54% | 57% | 65% | 70% | 50% | 46% | 56% | 59% | 65% | 77% | | |
| Depends | 13 | 11 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 0 | 18 | 16 | 6 | | |
| Disagree | 33 | 33 | 24 | 30 | 50 | 21 | 44 | 23 | 19 | 18 | | |
| | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | | |
| N | 48 | 46 | 37 | 10 | 2 | 24 | 18 | 22 | 69 | 108 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^c</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-South | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | | 1.571 | (df: 2) | | | | 4.098 | (df: 4) | | | 15.564 | (df: 2) |
| Probability | | NS | | | | | NS | | | | .001 | |
| χ^2 for table | | | | | | | 21.233 | (df: 8) | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | | | .01 | | | | | |
| South | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | | 0.081 | (df: 2) | | | | 5.551 | (df: 4) | | | 0.276 | (df: 2) |
| Probability | | NS | | | | | NS | | | | NS | |
| χ^2 for table | | | | | | | 5.908 | (df: 8) | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | | | NS | | | | | |

TABLE 83.--Continued

^aSouthern sample includes interviews in Maryland, Washington, D.C., Kentucky, Arkansas, Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Florida, Virginia, South Carolina, and Mississippi.

^b"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do."

^cIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 84.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward government insuring fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing, by region

| Region ^a and Attitude ^b | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| <u>Non-South</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 67% | 66% | 59% | 76% |
| Depends | 12 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| Disagree | 21 | 29 | 36 | 18 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 301 | 154 | 66 | 683 |
| <u>South</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 55% | 46% | 79% | 76% |
| Depends | 13 | 15 | 5 | 7 |
| Disagree | 32 | 39 | 16 | 17 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 163 | 46 | 19 | 292 |
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | | | |
| <u>Non-South</u> | | | | |
| X ² | 7.247 (df: 2) | | 13.654 (df: 2) | |
| Probability | .05 | | .01 | |
| X ² for table | | | 20.901 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | | .001 | |
| <u>South</u> | | | | |
| X ² | 1.301 (df: 2) | | 0.054 (df: 2) | |
| Probability | NS | | NS | |
| X ² for table | | | 1.355 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | | NS | |

TABLE 84.--Continued

^aSouthern sample includes interviews in Maryland, Washington, D.C., Kentucky, Arkansas, Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Florida, Virginia, South Carolina, Mississippi.

^b"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 85.--Objective mobility and attitude toward government insuring fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing, by race

| Race and Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|----------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|------|------|--|
| | Professional and Business ex-F | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | DM | SS | UM | DM | SS | UM | DM | SS | ex-F | |
| <u>White</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 61% | 62% | 65% | 69% | 73% | 71% | 55% | 55% | 70% | 70% | 71% | |
| Depends | 14 | 11 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 12 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 | |
| Disagree | 25 | 28 | 27 | 23 | 20 | 17 | 39 | 39 | 23 | 23 | 22 | |
| | 100% | 101% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | |
| N | 168 | 180 | 83 | 35 | 15 | 77 | 38 | 100 | 329 | 228 | | |
| <u>Negro</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 83% | 96% | 98% | | |
| Depends | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 2 | |
| Disagree | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | |
| N | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 48 | 54 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>White</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 1.245 (df: 2) | | | 0.948 (df: 4) | | | 9.481 (df: 2) | | | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | .01 | | | | | |
| χ^2 for table | | | | 11.674 (df: 8) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Negro</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 0.000 (df: 2) | | | 0.000 (df: 4) | | | c | | | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | - | | | | | |
| χ^2 for table | | | | c | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | - | | | | | | | | |

TABLE 85.--Continued

^a"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

^cNot computed because of small number involved.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 86.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward government insuring fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing, by race

| Race and Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| <u>White</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 62% | 60% | 62% | 73% |
| Depends | 12 | 8 | 5 | 7 |
| Disagree | 25 | 32 | 33 | 20 |
| | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 458 | 195 | 81 | 836 |
| <u>Negro</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 100% | 100% | 100% | 97% |
| Depends | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Disagree | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 9 | 4 | 5 | 145 |
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | | | |
| <u>White</u> | | | | |
| X ² | 5.120 (df: 2) | | 7.485 (df: 2) | |
| Probability | NS | | .05 | |
| X ² for table | | | 12.605 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | | .02 | |
| <u>Negro</u> | | | | |
| X ² | b | | b | |
| Probability | | | | |
| X ² for table | | | b | |
| Probability | | | | |

TABLE 86.--Continued

^a"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing,
the government should see to it that they do."

^bNot computed because of low cell frequencies.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

Since the evidence on attitudes toward government action to insure fair treatment of Negroes does not support Lipset's contention that those of high status are more liberal on the subject of race relations, one further relationship is worth examination. Lipset argues that the liberalism of those of high status on noneconomic issues is due to "education, general sophistication, and probably to a certain extent psychic security."⁸ The relationship between education and attitude may be examined by controlling for education. This is done in Tables 87 and 88.

Neither table affords clear evidence that tolerance increases with education any more than it seems to increase with status. For the downwardly mobile the evidence of Table 87 is that for those who have been downwardly mobile into the blue-collar group tolerance decreases at higher educational levels. The downwardly mobile blue-collar workers with more than twelve years of education are the only group in the entire table with less than 50 per cent of respondents agreeing that the government should insure fair treatment of Negroes. Essentially the same thing is true for subjective mobility, where the group most opposed to government action is that of downwardly mobile members of the working class with more than twelve years of education. For both objective and subjective mobility the downwardly mobile are less tolerant than the status stable at low status levels for every educational level.

⁸Lipset, op. cit., p. 318.

TABLE 87.--Objective mobility and attitude toward government insuring fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing, by education

| Years of Education and Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|------|----|------|
| | Professional and Business ex-F | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | DM | SS | ex-F |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 71% | 93% | 65% | 100% | 0% | 78% | 67% | 56% | 80% | 83% | | |
| Depends | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 17 | 5 | 5 | | |
| Disagree | 29 | 7 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 33 | 28 | 15 | 12 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 7 | 14 | 17 | 7 | 0 | 9 | 6 | 18 | 111 | 136 | | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 55% | 63% | 68% | 60% | 75% | 81% | 61% | 65% | 70% | 70% | | |
| Depends | 21 | 7 | 13 | 10 | 13 | 8 | 11 | 2 | 8 | 6 | | |
| Disagree | 24 | 30 | 19 | 30 | 13 | 11 | 28 | 33 | 21 | 23 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 99% | | |
| N | 33 | 67 | 31 | 10 | 8 | 37 | 18 | 51 | 203 | 115 | | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 63% | 57% | 66% | 65% | 75% | 64% | 50% | 46% | 69% | 69% | | |
| Depends | 13 | 14 | 5 | 10 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 9 | | |
| Disagree | 24 | 29 | 29 | 25 | 25 | 22 | 50 | 49 | 27 | 22 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | | |
| N | 132 | 101 | 38 | 20 | 8 | 36 | 16 | 37 | 64 | 32 | | |

TABLE 87.--Continued

| Years of Education | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|---|---------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | |
| χ^2 | 1.750 (df: 2) | 1.778 (df: 4) | 6.329 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 9.856 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | |
| χ^2 | 3.976 (df: 2) | 2.631 (df: 4) | 5.107 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 11.714 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | |
| χ^2 | 0.759 (df: 2) | 1.354 (df: 4) | 5.343 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 7.457 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of χ^2 for education groups | 6.485 (df: 6) | 5.763 (df: 12) | 16.779 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS | .02 |
| Sum of χ^2 for table | | 29.027 (df: 24) | |
| Probability | | NS | |

^a"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 88.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward government insuring fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing, by education

| Years of Education and Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|--|---|-----------------|---------------------------------|---------------|
| | Middle Class Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Working Class Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 78% | 74% | 68% | 83% |
| Depends | 6 | 5 | 8 | 4 |
| Disagree | 16 | 21 | 24 | 12 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>99%</u> |
| N | 50 | 43 | 25 | 385 |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 57% | 63% | 68% | 74% |
| Depends | 13 | 9 | 6 | 7 |
| Disagree | 29 | 29 | 26 | 19 |
| | <u>99%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 136 | 70 | 31 | 443 |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 63% | 53% | 55% | 66% |
| Depends | 13 | 8 | 0 | 8 |
| Disagree | 24 | 39 | 45 | 26 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 278 | 87 | 29 | 147 |

TABLE 88.--Continued

| Years of Education | Middle Class | Working Class |
|--|---------------|-----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | |
| X ² | 0.424 (df: 2) | 3.674 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 4.099 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | |
| X ² | 1.110 (df: 2) | 0.805 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 1.915 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | |
| X ² | 7.368 (df: 2) | 5.819 (df: 2) |
| Probability | .05 | NS |
| X ² for table | | 13.187 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | .02 |
| Sum of X ² for education groups | 8.902 (df: 6) | 10.298 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| Sum of X ² for table | | 19.201 (df: 12) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

Joseph Greenblum and Leonard Pearlin indicate that prejudice is linked with subjective class identification. They report that the upwardly mobile individual who claims middle class membership and is presumably less secure about his status tends to be more prejudiced than the upwardly mobile individual who claims working class status.⁹ This relationship may be examined in Table 89, where the attitude of the objectively mobile is controlled by subjective class.

If a "depends" or "disagree" answer to the question of whether government should see to it that Negroes get fair treatment in jobs and housing is taken as indicating some degree of racial prejudice, the data of Table 89 offer some support to the Greenblum-Pearlin hypothesis. The upwardly mobile who claim middle class membership are somewhat more often prejudiced than those who claim working class membership. Of the upwardly mobile who place themselves in the middle class, 42 per cent of the professional and business category and 38 per cent of the white-collar category may be classified as prejudiced, compared with 32 and 19 per cent respectively for those who claim working class membership. But if the examination of Table 89 is pursued further it may be seen that the tendency is not confined to the upwardly mobile. In each occupational status and each mobility category those who claim middle class membership are more often prejudiced than are those who claim working class membership. There is no indication that this tendency is any more marked for the mobile than for the status stable.

⁹Greenblum and Pearlin, loc. cit.

TABLE 89.--Objective mobility and attitude toward government insuring fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing, by subjective class

| Subjective Class ^a and Attitude ^b | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---------|------|--------------|-------|---------|-------------|------|-------|---------|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | ex-F |
| <u>Middle Class</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 58% | 58% | 60% | 67% | 71% | 61% | 53% | 48% | 61% | 67% |
| Depends | 16 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 19 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 11 |
| Disagree | 26 | 31 | 31 | 25 | 29 | 19 | 41 | 45 | 32 | 22 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 99% | 101% | 100% |
| N | 137 | 117 | 35 | 24 | 7 | 36 | 17 | 31 | 79 | 36 |
| <u>Working Class</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 74% | 68% | 71% | 77% | 78% | 81% | 57% | 61% | 76% | 78% |
| Depends | 6 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 11 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 |
| Disagree | 19 | 23 | 21 | 15 | 11 | 14 | 38 | 33 | 17 | 16 |
| | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 31 | 57 | 48 | 13 | 9 | 43 | 21 | 66 | 290 | 236 |
| <u>Statistical Measures^c</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Middle Class</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 1.737 | (df: 2) | | | 2.839 | (df: 4) | | | 1.782 | (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | | | | NS | | | | NS | |
| X ² for table | | | | | 6.358 | (df: 8) | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | NS | | | | | |
| <u>Working Class</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 0.342 | (df: 2) | | | 0.670 | (df: 4) | | | 8.689 | (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | | | | NS | | | | .02 | |
| X ² for table | | | | | 9.700 | (df: 8) | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | NS | | | | | |

TABLE 89.--Continued

| Attitude | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|---|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Sum of χ^2 for occupational groups | 2.079 (df: 4) | 3.509 (df: 8) | 10.471 (df: 4) |
| Probability | NS | NS | .05 |
| Sum of χ^2 for entire table | | 16.058 (df: 16) | |
| Probability | | NS | |

^a"There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or to the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as being in one of these classes? Which one?"

^b"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do."

^cIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

With subjective class controlled there is little difference between the mobile and the status stable in either the professional and business or the white-collar category in Table 89. In the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile are somewhat more often prejudiced than the status stable within both the subjectively middle class and subjectively working class groups, although the difference is statistically significant only in the latter case.

Three conclusions can be drawn from the evidence examined in this section. First, attitudes on the issue of whether the government should see that Negroes get fair treatment in jobs and housing are not closely related to social status. Second, upward mobility is at best only weakly related to attitudes on the issue, but there is a clear association between downward mobility and attitude. Those who are downwardly mobile into the blue-collar or working class categories are much less likely to favor government action to insure fair treatment of Negroes than are those of stable low status. Finally, there is a relationship between tolerance and subjective class, but it is not confined just to the mobile as Greenblum and Pearlin suggest. When objective status is held constant, middle class identifiers in all status and mobility categories are less in favor of government action on behalf of Negroes than are working class identifiers.

School Desegregation

An issue closely related to that of fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing is the issue of government intervention to enforce

school desegregation. As before, the data from the 1956 and 1960 elections reveal no evidence that those of high status are any more consistently liberal on the issue than are those of low status. In Table 90, 42 per cent of the status stable in the professional and business category think the government should stay out of the desegregation issue compared with 40 per cent of the status stable in the blue-collar category who take the same stand.

Attitude patterns on the school desegregation issue are quite similar to those already reported for the jobs and housing issue. In Table 90 no relationship is apparent between upward mobility and attitude. In the blue-collar category, however, 54 per cent of the downwardly mobile believe that the government should stay out of the school desegregation issue, compared with 40 per cent of the status stable. The difference is statistically significant.

When subjective mobility is used as the measure of mobility, as in Table 91, there is again no difference between the status stable and the upwardly mobile in the middle class. In the working class 51 per cent of the downwardly mobile think the government should stay out of the school desegregation issue, compared to 46 per cent of the status stable. The difference, though small and not statistically significant, is in the same direction as for all other instances of race relations examined.

Attitudes toward school desegregation are controlled by education in Tables 92 and 93. For objective mobility, as shown in Table 92, there is not much difference between attitudes of the mobile and the status

TABLE 90.--Objective mobility and attitude toward government's role in school desegregation

| Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|---------------|------|------|------|------|------|---------------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | | | | Blue-Collar | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Agree | 42% | 44% | 50% | 41% | 44% | 45% | 57% | 54% | 40% | 51% | | |
| Not sure, it depends | 8 | 7 | 13 | 7 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 6 | | |
| Disagree | 50 | 50 | 38 | 51 | 56 | 46 | 34 | 40 | 55 | 42 | | |
| | 100% | 101% | 101% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 99% | | |
| N | 171 | 179 | 88 | 41 | 16 | 85 | 47 | 105 | 388 | 290 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 0.354 (df: 2) | | | 1.917 (df: 4) | | | | | | 7.580 (df: 2) | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | | | | .05 | | |
| X ² for table | | | | 9.851 (df: 8) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | | | |

^a"The government in Washington should stay out of the question of whether white and colored children go to the same school."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 91.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward government's role in school desegregation

| Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Agree | 49% | 49% | 51% | 46% |
| Not sure, it depends | 7 | 7 | 6 | 8 |
| Disagree | 44 | 44 | 43 | 45 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% |
| N | 465 | 204 | 83 | 990 |
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | | | |
| X ² | | 0.011 (df: 2) | | 0.787 (df: 2) |
| Probability | | NS | | NS |
| X ² for table | | | 0.798 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | | NS | |

^a"The government in Washington should stay out of the question of whether white and colored children go to the same school."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 92.--Objective mobility and attitude toward government's role in school desegregation, by education

| Years of Education and Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | ex-F | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 29% | 50% | 53% | 29% | 0% | 56% | 43% | 55% | 43% | 53% | | |
| Depends | 29 | 7 | 18 | 14 | 0 | 11 | 14 | 0 | 9 | 4 | | |
| Disagree | 43 | 43 | 29 | 57 | 0 | 33 | 43 | 45 | 48 | 43 | | |
| | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 7 | 14 | 17 | 7 | 0 | 9 | 7 | 20 | 110 | 143 | | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 48% | 42% | 67% | 42% | 44% | 38% | 57% | 52% | 39% | 48% | | |
| Depends | 3 | 5 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 9 | | |
| Disagree | 48 | 53 | 24 | 58 | 56 | 51 | 38 | 44 | 57 | 44 | | |
| | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 101% | | |
| N | 31 | 62 | 33 | 12 | 9 | 39 | 21 | 48 | 213 | 117 | | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 41% | 44% | 34% | 45% | 43% | 49% | 63% | 57% | 38% | 57% | | |
| Depends | 8 | 8 | 13 | 9 | 0 | 8 | 11 | 11 | 3 | 7 | | |
| Disagree | 51 | 49 | 53 | 45 | 57 | 43 | 26 | 32 | 58 | 37 | | |
| | 100% | 101% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 101% | | |
| N | 133 | 103 | 38 | 22 | 7 | 37 | 19 | 37 | 65 | 30 | | |

TABLE 92.--Continued

| Years of Education | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|--|---------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> ^b | | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 2.000 (df: 2) | 1.197 (df: 4) | 2.425 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 5.623 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 0.414 (df: 2) | 2.325 (df: 4) | 3.015 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| X ² for table | | 5.754 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | |
| X ² | 0.228 (df: 2) | 0.919 (df: 4) | 7.406 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | .05 |
| X ² for table | | 8.553 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of X ² for education groups | 2.642 (df: 6) | 4.441 (df: 12) | 12.846 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS | .05 |
| Sum of X ² for entire table | | 19.930 (df: 24) | |
| Probability | | NS | |

^a"The government in Washington should stay out of the question of whether white and colored children go to the same school."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 93.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward government's role in school desegregation, by education

| Years of Education and Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|--|---|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| | Middle Class Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Working Class Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 47% | 49% | 48% | 51% |
| Depends | 6 | 10 | 10 | 9 |
| Disagree | 47 <u>100%</u> | 41 <u>100%</u> | 43 <u>101%</u> | 40 <u>100%</u> |
| N | 49 | 41 | 21 | 385 |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 54% | 45% | 47% | 43% |
| Depends | 7 | 3 | 3 | 8 |
| Disagree | 39 <u>100%</u> | 52 <u>100%</u> | 50 <u>100%</u> | 49 <u>100%</u> |
| N | 137 | 73 | 32 | 451 |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 47% | 52% | 57% | 44% |
| Depends | 7 | 9 | 7 | 8 |
| Disagree | 46 <u>100%</u> | 39 <u>100%</u> | 37 <u>101%</u> | 47 <u>99%</u> |
| N | 279 | 90 | 30 | 154 |

TABLE 93.--Continued

| Years of Education | Middle Class | Working Class |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 0.545 (df: 2) | 0.103 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 0.649 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 3.795 (df: 2) | 0.898 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 4.693 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 1.620 (df: 2) | 1.582 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 3.202 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for education groups | 5.960 (df: 6) | 2.583 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for entire table | | 8.544 (df: 12) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"The government in Washington should stay out of the question of whether white and colored children go to the same school."

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

stable in either the professional and business or white-collar categories at any educational level. In the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile more often agree that the government should stay out of the school desegregation question than do the status stable at every educational level, although the difference is statistically significant only at the high education level.

For subjective mobility, as reported in Table 93, differences between the subjectively mobile and subjectively status stable are small in both the middle and working classes. The largest percentage difference is again between the well-educated downwardly mobile and the status stable of low status, but even here the difference does not approach statistical significance.

Thus on both the issues of whether the government should insure fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing and the issue of whether the government should act on school desegregation the downwardly mobile are less liberal than are their status peers. This is in contrast to the earlier finding that they were more liberal than those of stable status on noneconomic issues of foreign affairs. It is necessary to examine the relationship between downward mobility and other types of noneconomic issues before any conclusion can be reached on whether the downwardly mobile exhibit a generalized pattern of intolerance, or whether they react specifically to the issue of race relations.

Rights of Government Employees

Noneconomic issues are not confined to race relations.

Evidence is available which bears on an issue of individual rights of another sort. In 1956, at a time when Senator McCarthy's charges of communism in government were still a fresh memory, respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statement "The government ought to fire any government worker who is accused of being a communist even though they don't prove it." Responses to this question are recorded in Tables 94 and 95.

The pattern of responses to the question conforms to that for Lipset's noneconomic liberalism. Those of high status more often disagreed with the proposal to fire government employees subject to unproved accusations than did those of low status. The pattern is thus similar to that for foreign affairs issues--those of high status are more often liberals, those of low status comparatively more often conservatives.

The relationship of mobility to this dimension of noneconomic liberalism is also similar to that found in the case of foreign affairs. In the professional and business category of Table 94 only 12 per cent of the status stable want to see government employees fired on the basis of unproved charges, compared with 22 per cent of the upwardly mobile. In the white-collar category no relationship between mobility and attitude is apparent. In the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile are somewhat more liberal than the status stable, 79 per cent

TABLE 94.--Objective mobility and attitude toward rights of government employees

| Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|----------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Agree | 12% | 22% | 21% | 22% | 20% | 16% | 30% | 20% | 21% | 29% | | |
| Not sure, it depends | 8 | 6 | 10 | 3 | 7 | 12 | 11 | 1 | 11 | 7 | | |
| Disagree | 80 | 72 | 70 | 75 | 73 | 72 | 59 | 79 | 68 | 64 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 142 | 152 | 73 | 32 | 15 | 68 | 37 | 89 | 323 | 229 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 5.831 (df: 2) | | | 2.396 (df: 4) | | | 8.784 (df: 2) | | | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | .02 | | | | | |
| X ² for table | | | | 17.011 (df: 8) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | .05 | | | | | | | | |

^a"The government ought to fire any government worker who is accused of being a communist even though they don't prove it."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956.

TABLE 95.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward rights of government employees

| Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Agree | 20% | 25% | 28% | 27% |
| Not sure, it depends | 7 | 11 | 5 | 9 |
| Disagree | 73 | 65 | 67 | 64 |
| | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 403 | 167 | 75 | 766 |
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | | | |
| χ^2 | | 4.030 (df: 2) | | 0.937 (df: 2) |
| Probability | | NS | | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | | 4.967 (df: 4) | |
| Probability | | | NS | |

^a"The government ought to fire any government worker who is accused of being a communist even though they don't prove it."

Data Source: 1956.

of the mobile expressing disagreement as opposed to 68 per cent of the status stable. The difference is just short of statistical significance for the professional and business category, but is significant in the blue-collar category.

For subjective mobility, as reported in Table 95, 25 per cent of the upwardly mobile middle class would fire accused employees, an attitude shared by 20 per cent of the status stable. In the working class sample there is no relationship between mobility and attitude on the issue.

Attitudes toward firing accused government employees are controlled by education in Tables 96 and 97. In Table 96 the upwardly mobile in the professional and business category are somewhat more willing to fire government employees arbitrarily than are the status stable at each educational level. In the white-collar category no clear pattern is evident. In the blue-collar category, however, differences between the downwardly mobile and the status stable wash out at the two lower educational levels. On this issue the greater tolerance of the downwardly mobile is confined to the high education group--the same individuals who were least often tolerant on racial issues. Apparently their good education and their early socialization influence them toward a liberal position on noneconomic issues of foreign affairs and civil liberties but do not prevent them from being racially intolerant.

In Table 97 differences between the subjectively mobile and the subjectively status stable approach statistical significance only

TABLE 96.--Objective mobility and attitude toward rights of government employees, by education

| Years of Education and Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|------|------|--------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 0% | 25% | 17% | 33% | 0% | 0% | 43% | 35% | 28% | 30% | | |
| Depends | 17 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 7 | 9 | | |
| Disagree | 83 | 75 | 75 | 67 | 0 | 100 | 43 | 65 | 65 | 61 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 6 | 12 | 12 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 17 | 94 | 105 | | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 18% | 28% | 25% | 25% | 14% | 20% | 39% | 28% | 19% | 27% | | |
| Depends | 14 | 5 | 18 | 0 | 14 | 10 | 6 | 0 | 11 | 6 | | |
| Disagree | 68 | 67 | 57 | 75 | 71 | 70 | 56 | 73 | 70 | 67 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 101% | 101% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 28 | 58 | 28 | 8 | 7 | 30 | 18 | 40 | 172 | 96 | | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agree | 11% | 18% | 18% | 17% | 25% | 16% | 8% | 3% | 18% | 32% | | |
| Depends | 6 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 16 | 17 | 3 | 16 | 4 | | |
| Disagree | 82 | 74 | 79 | 78 | 75 | 68 | 75 | 94 | 67 | 64 | | |
| | 99% | 99% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | | |
| N | 108 | 82 | 33 | 18 | 8 | 31 | 12 | 32 | 57 | 28 | | |

TABLE 96.--Continued

| Years of Education | Professional and Business | White-Collar | Blue-Collar |
|---|---------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | |
| χ^2 | 3.536 (df: 2) | 2.758 (df: 4) | 1.557 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 7.850 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | |
| χ^2 | 2.660 (df: 2) | 1.219 (df: 4) | 5.534 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 9.413 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | |
| χ^2 | 2.119 (df: 2) | 2.657 (df: 4) | 8.340 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS | .02 |
| χ^2 for table | | 13.117 (df: 8) | |
| Probability | | NS | |
| Sum of χ^2 for education groups | 8.315 (df: 6) | 6.634 (df: 12) | 15.431 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS | .02 |
| Sum of χ^2 for table | | 30.380 (df: 24) | |
| Probability | | NS | |

^a"The government ought to fire any government worker who is accused of being a communist even though they don't prove it."

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956.

TABLE 97.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward rights of government employees, by education

| Years of Education and Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|--|---|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 24% | 44% | 43% | 34% |
| Depends | 9 | 15 | 5 | 8 |
| Disagree | 67 | 41 | 52 | 58 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 46 | 34 | 21 | 284 |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 22% | 27% | 18% | 25% |
| Depends | 11 | 11 | 7 | 8 |
| Disagree | 67 | 62 | 75 | 67 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 123 | 63 | 28 | 357 |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | | | |
| Agree | 18% | 13% | 27% | 19% |
| Depends | 6 | 9 | 4 | 11 |
| Disagree | 77 | 79 | 69 | 70 |
| | <u>101%</u> | <u>101%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 234 | 70 | 26 | 125 |

TABLE 97.--Continued

| Years of Education | Middle Class | Working Class |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
| <u>Low (0-8)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 5.472 (df: 2) | 0.768 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 6.240 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>Med. (9-12)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 0.655 (df: 2) | 0.795 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 1.450 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| <u>High (12+)</u> | | |
| χ^2 | 1.516 (df: 2) | 1.797 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| χ^2 for table | | 3.313 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for education groups | 7.643 (df: 6) | 3.360 (df: 6) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| Sum of χ^2 for table | | 11.003 (df: 12) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"The government ought to fire any government worker who is accused of being a communist even though they don't prove it."

Data Source: 1956.

in the case of those with little education who classify themselves as middle class, where 44 per cent of the upwardly mobile would fire accused employees, compared with only 24 per cent of the status stable.

It may be concluded that for both objective and subjective mobility differences between the attitudes of the mobile and the stable on this issue are at least partially due to differences in education. The pattern found here for this non-racial noneconomic issue differs from that found on racial noneconomic issues, and is similar to that reported earlier for foreign affairs issues. As is the case for foreign affairs, the attitudes of both the upwardly and downwardly mobile may be accounted for by a socialization hypothesis: that the mobile are influenced both by the attitudes held by others in their status of origin and in their new status, and as a result show an attitude distribution intermediate between that typical of the status stable at high and at low levels. The upwardly mobile are less liberal on the issue than are those of stable high status, the downwardly mobile more liberal than those of stable low status.

Group Membership

Several previous studies have examined the relationship of mobility to membership in organizations. Works on mobility and trade union membership have reported that the downwardly mobile are less likely to be union members than are non-mobile workers, and that upwardly mobile non-manual workers are more likely to belong to a

union than are the non-mobile.¹⁰ Other work on mobility and membership in a variety of types of organization suggests that the upwardly mobile have a rate of participation about the same or only slightly less than others of the same status, while the downwardly mobile have a somewhat lower rate of participation than their status equals.¹¹

Two formal hypotheses are to be tested here: 3.2--Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile less often belong to voluntary organizations than do the non-mobile at the same status level; and 3.3--The downwardly mobile less often belong to trade unions than do the non-mobile at the same status level.

Data to test hypothesis 3.2 are available from the 1952 study, as reported in Table 98. In the professional and business category 67 per cent of the status stable belong to two or more groups or organizations, while only 41 per cent of the upwardly mobile belong to as many. In the white-collar category, probably due to the small number of cases, no clear pattern emerges. In the blue-collar category 31 per cent of the status stable belong to two or more organizations, compared with only 22 per cent of the downwardly mobile. The evidence

¹⁰ Seymour Martin Lipset and Joan Gordon, "Mobility and Trade Union Membership," in Bendix and Lipset (eds.), op. cit., pp. 491-500; Richard F. Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Union Membership in Detroit: A Replication," Social Forces, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (October, 1959), 69-71.

¹¹ Morris Janowitz, "Consequences of Social Mobility in the United States," Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, 1956, Vol. III, 193; Richard F. Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Membership in Formal Voluntary Associations: A Note on Research," ASR, Vol. XXIV, No. 6 (August, 1959), 846-848.

TABLE 98.--Objective mobility and membership in groups or organizations

| Number of Groups to Which Respondent Belongs ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|----------------|------|------|------|---------------|-----|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business ex-F | | | White-Collar | | | | Blue-Collar | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | ex-F | | |
| None | 14% | 29% | 30% | 33% | 50% | 26% | 30% | 44% | 33% | 43% | | |
| One | 19 | 30 | 30 | 25 | 0 | 53 | 30 | 33 | 35 | 31 | | |
| Two or more | 67 | 41 | 40 | 42 | 50 | 21 | 40 | 22 | 31 | 26 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 99% | 100% | | |
| N | 36 | 63 | 30 | 12 | 4 | 19 | 10 | 9 | 108 | 68 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 6.053 (df: 2) | | | 5.290 (df: 4) | | | | 0.540 (df: 2) | | | | |
| Probability | .05 | | | NS | | | | NS | | | | |
| χ^2 for table | | | | 11.883 (df: 8) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | | | |

^aTotal number of groups or organizations (formal and informal) to which R belongs. (Question asked only in post-election study of about one-third of the respondents.)

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952.

supports hypothesis 3.2 in both the professional and business and the blue-collar categories, though statistically significant only in the former case.

Data on union membership are reported in Tables 99 and 100. Using objective mobility as the criterion of mobility, as in Table 99, in the professional and business group the upwardly mobile slightly more often report union membership than do the status stable. The difference, though not statistically significant, is noteworthy because as noted above, the upwardly mobile are less often members of organizations in general. In the white-collar category the status stable report no union memberships at all, which accords with the generally conservative orientation of the group. In the blue-collar category the data support hypothesis 3.3. The downwardly mobile report union membership in 41 per cent of cases, while 53 per cent of the status stable are union members.

The situation is different in the case of subjective mobility. In the middle class portion of Table 100 the subjectively upwardly mobile are more frequently union members than are the status stable. But in the working class the status stable are less often union members than are the subjectively downwardly mobile, a difference opposite to that hypothesized, though not statistically significant. As noted before, classification as subjectively downwardly mobile implies acceptance of working class status, because it depends on class self-identification. Thus the reduced rate of union membership of the downwardly mobile depends on their rejection of working class status.

TABLE 99.--Objective mobility and union membership, males only

| Union Membership | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---------------|------|--------------|---------------|------|-------------|---------------|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| R. belongs | 5% | 9% | 7% | 17% | 0% | 22% | 31% | 41% | 53% | 39% | | |
| R. doesn't belong | 95 | 91 | 93 | 83 | 100 | 78 | 69 | 59 | 47 | 61 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 92 | 97 | 44 | 18 | 7 | 37 | 13 | 51 | 219 | 148 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | | 1.000 (df: 1) | | | 1.792 (df: 2) | | | 2.515 (df: 1) | | | | |
| Probability | | NS | | | NS | | | NS | | | | |
| X ² for table | | | | | 5.307 (df: 4) | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | NS | | | | | | | |

^a"Does anyone in this household belong to a labor union? (IF YES)
Who is it that belongs?" Table is in terms of respondent's membership or non-membership only.

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE 100.--Subjective mobility and union membership, males only

| Union Membership ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|----------------------|------------------|-------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| Status | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable | |
| Stable | Mobile | Mobile | Stable | |
| R. belongs | 10% | 22% | 40% | 35% |
| R. doesn't belong | 90 | 78 | 60 | 65 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| N | 212 | 111 | 47 | 521 |

| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| X ² | 8.268 (df: 1) | 0.636 (df: 1) |
| Probability | .01 | NS |
| X ² for table | | 8.904 (df: 2) |
| Probability | | .02 |

^a"Does anyone in this household belong to a labor union? (IF YES) Who is it that belongs?" Table is in terms of respondent's membership or non-membership only.. .

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

Where membership in the working class is accepted, the downwardly mobile are union members as often as are those who inherit their class membership.

Both hypotheses 3.2 and 3.3 are supported in the case of objective mobility. The mobile are less often members of groups or organizations than the non-mobile at the same status level, and the upwardly mobile are more often union members, the downwardly mobile less often union members than others at the same status levels. In the case of subjective mobility, however, evidence was not available to test group membership, and in the case of union membership the findings for the working class were opposite to those hypothesized, a difference explained in terms of the influence of subjective class identification. Thus the hypotheses may be accepted in the case of objective mobility, but not in the case of subjective mobility.

Groups Trusted or Distrusted

The lower rate of participation by the mobile in groups and organizations is presumably evidence that they are less closely integrated in their social environments than are the non-mobile. Pitirim Sorokin suggests that "Mobility favors skepticism, cynicism, . . . diminishes intimacy and increases psycho-social isolation and loneliness of individuals."¹² One means of examining the prevalence of skepticism and cynicism among the mobile is to inquire into their attitude of trust or distrust toward other groups in the society.

¹²Pitirim Sorokin, Social Mobility (New York: Harper, 1927), pp. 519, 522.

The evidence presented in Table 101 for objective mobility does not reveal any marked tendency for the mobile to be less willing to express trust in groups than are the non-mobile. In all three occupational categories the proportion of respondents trusting various numbers of groups is relatively uniform.

For subjective mobility, as reported in Table 102, both the upwardly and downwardly mobile are somewhat less likely to express trust in groups than are the status stable, although the difference is statistically significant only for the middle class.

Perhaps a more direct test of cynicism is the number of groups distrusted. Table 103 reports the numbers of groups distrusted by respondents in the various objective mobility categories. As before, little difference exists between the mobile and the non-mobile, though in the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile are somewhat more likely to report distrusting two or more groups than are the status stable. Even here, however, the difference is not statistically significant.

Subjective mobility and number of groups trusted is reported in Table 104. Both the subjectively upwardly and downwardly mobile, who somewhat less often express trust in groups than do the status stable also somewhat less often express distrust. The mobile are thus less likely to express either strong negative or strong positive feelings about groups.

The evidence on numbers of groups trusted or distrusted does not reveal any marked difference between the mobile and the non-mobile.

TABLE 101.--Objective mobility and number of groups trusted

| Number of Groups Trusted ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|-----------------|------|------|---------------|-----|-----|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| None | 64% | 72% | 44% | 65% | 60% | 64% | 69% | 51% | 50% | 45% | | |
| One | 17 | 7 | 25 | 26 | 30 | 25 | 6 | 18 | 26 | 25 | | |
| Two | 12 | 12 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 13 | 22 | 13 | 17 | | |
| Three or more | 7 | 9 | 17 | 9 | 10 | 6 | 13 | 8 | 10 | 14 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 101% | 99% | 99% | 101% | | |
| N | 104 | 107 | 52 | 23 | 10 | 53 | 32 | 49 | 204 | 162 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 6.062 (df: 3) | | | 2.360 (df: 6) | | | 3.389 (df: 3) | | | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | NS | | | | | |
| X ² for table | | | | 11.812 (df: 12) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | | | |

^a"In election campaigns, different groups work for one candidate or another. Are there any groups on this list (GIVE CARD) that you particularly trust--that is, would you be more likely to vote for candidates they recommend? Which group? Are there any groups on the list that you don't trust, that is, would you be more likely to vote against candidates that they recommend? Which groups?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1960.

TABLE 102.--Subjective mobility and number of groups trusted

| Number of Groups Trusted ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| None | 57% | 68% | 71% | 53% |
| One | 13 | 24 | 24 | 23 |
| Two | 15 | 3 | 6 | 14 |
| Three or more | 15 | 5 | 0 | 10 |
| | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% |
| N | 72 | 37 | 17 | 185 |

Statistical Measures

| | | |
|--------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| X ² | 8.033 (df: 3) | 3.320 (df: 3) |
| Probability | .05 | NS |
| X ² for table | | 11.352 (df: 6) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"In election campaigns, different groups work for one candidate or another. Are there any groups on this list (GIVE CARD) that you particularly trust--that is, would you be more likely to vote for candidates they recommend? Which group? Are there any groups on the list that you don't trust, that is, would you be more likely to vote against candidates that they recommend? Which groups?"

Data Source: 1960.

TABLE 103.--Objective mobility and number of groups distrusted

| Number of Groups Distrusted ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Group | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|-----|------|-----------------|------|------|---------------|-----|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| None | 65% | 70% | 58% | 70% | 70% | 60% | 63% | 61% | 68% | 67% | | |
| One | 16 | 12 | 25 | 9 | 20 | 23 | 19 | 18 | 21 | 15 | | |
| Two | 14 | 8 | 12 | 17 | 10 | 9 | 16 | 12 | 8 | 12 | | |
| Three or more | 4 | 9 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 6 | | |
| | 99% | 99% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 99% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 104 | 107 | 52 | 23 | 10 | 53 | 32 | 49 | 204 | 162 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 4.906 (df: 3) | | | 3.804 (df: 6) | | | 3.302 (df: 3) | | | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | NS | | | | | |
| X ² for table | | | | 12.012 (df: 12) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | | | |

^a"In election campaigns, different groups work for one candidate or another. Are there any groups on this list (GIVE CARD) that you particularly trust--that is, would you be more likely to vote for candidates they recommend? Which group? Are there any groups on the list that you don't trust, that is, would you be more likely to vote against candidates that they recommend? Which groups?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1960.

TABLE 104.--Subjective mobility and number of groups distrusted

| Number of Groups Distrusted ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|--|---|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| None | 51% | 57% | 76% | 64% |
| One | 28 | 24 | 0 | 22 |
| Two | 13 | 11 | 24 | 9 |
| Three or more | 8 | 8 | 0 | 5 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 72 | 37 | 17 | 185 |

Statistical Measures

| | | |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------|
| χ^2 | 0.302 (df: 3) | 7.934 (df: 3) |
| Probability | NS | .05 |
| χ^2 for table | | 8.236 (df: 6) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"In election campaigns, different groups work for one candidate or another. Are there any groups on this list (GIVE CARD) that you particularly trust--that is, would you be more likely to vote for candidates they recommend? Which group? Are there any groups on the list that you don't trust, that is, would you be more likely to vote against candidates that they recommend? Which groups?"

Data Source: 1960

If the mobile as a group tend to be suspicious, cynical, and skeptical it is not revealed in these data. While there is some suggestion that the mobile may hold themselves somewhat more withdrawn from strong feelings about groups than do their non-mobile peers, the difference is apparently of small magnitude.

Satisfaction--Dissatisfaction

Another approach to the question of whether the mobile are more isolated from society and unhappy with their place in society is to examine their response to questions designed to determine their general level of satisfaction with their lives. Data on several such questions are reported in this section.

In the 1960 survey respondents were asked: "Do you feel that you are the kind of person who gets his share of bad luck or do you feel that you have mostly good luck?" The results for objective mobility are reported in Table 105. Those of high status seem to find their luck better than do those of lower status, but in none of the three occupational categories do very large differences exist between the mobile and non-mobile. Such differences as do exist are in the direction of the upwardly mobile in the business and professional category somewhat more often feeling they have bad luck than do the status stable, while in the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile find their luck somewhat better than do the status stable.

When subjective mobility is used as a measure as in Table 106, differences remain small. In the middle class sample there is virtually no difference between the response of the mobile and the non-mobile.

TABLE 105.--Objective mobility and feeling of being lucky

| Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|---------------|------|------|---------------|-----|------|------|--|--|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | | |
| Mostly good luck | 84% | 76% | 71% | 67% | 67% | 78% | 66% | 67% | 61% | 65% | | |
| Depends, both | 4 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 11 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 8 | | |
| Bad luck | 12 | 19 | 21 | 29 | 22 | 20 | 28 | 28 | 33 | 27 | | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 99% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 97 | 102 | 48 | 21 | 9 | 50 | 29 | 46 | 188 | 146 | | |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 1.624 (df: 2) | | | 2.576 (df: 4) | | | 0.784 (df: 2) | | | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | NS | | | | | |
| χ^2 for table | | | | 4.984 (df: 8) | | | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | | | |

^a"Do you feel that you are the kind of person who gets his share of bad luck or do you feel that you have mostly good luck?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1960.

TABLE 106.--Subjective mobility and feeling of being lucky

| Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|-----------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Mostly good luck | 78% | 76% | 67% | 58% |
| Depends, both | 3 | 3 | 0 | 11 |
| Bad luck | 18 | 21 | 33 | 32 |
| | <u>99%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>101%</u> |
| N | 65 | 33 | 15 | 168 |

| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| X ² | 0.106 (df: 2) | 1.809 (df: 2) |
| Probability | NS | NS |
| X ² for entire table | | 1.915 (df: 4) |
| Probability | | NS |

^a"Do you feel that you are the kind of person who gets his share of bad luck or do you feel that you have mostly good luck?"

Data Source: 1960.

In the working class sample the downwardly mobile again somewhat more often feel that they have good luck than do the status stable.

Another question asked in the 1960 survey was "Some people feel like other people push them around a good bit. Others feel that they run their own lives pretty much the way they want to. How is it with you?" Responses to this question in the various objective mobility categories are reported in Table 107. As was the case for feelings of being lucky, there is little difference between the mobile and non-mobile on feelings of being pushed around. The status stable in the white-collar category show a differential from the mobile, but with only nine respondents in the group the difference is not significant. In the blue-collar group the downwardly mobile somewhat less often feel pushed around than do the status stable, though this difference too is well short of statistical significance.

The pattern is the same for subjective mobility, as reported in Table 108. There is virtually no difference in the middle class sample, while in the working class sample there is a small difference in the direction of the status stable more often feeling pushed around than do the downwardly mobile.

While it might be expected that there would be an association between mobility and belief in the availability of opportunity, the data reported in Table 109 do not reveal one. In the professional and business category 91 per cent of both the status stable and the upwardly mobile think that there is opportunity to get ahead in America.

TABLE 107.--Objective mobility and feeling of being pushed around

| Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | |
|---|---|------|------|---------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|------|
| | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | ex-F |
| Run own lives | 94% | 92% | 92% | 91% | 78% | 90% | 90% | 96% | 90% | 87% |
| Depends, both | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 11 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Get pushed around | 3 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 11 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 9 | 11 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 100 | 105 | 48 | 22 | 9 | 51 | 31 | 47 | 191 | 149 |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| χ^2 | 0.211 (df: 2) | | | 5.140 (df: 4) | | | 1.579 (df: 2) | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | NS | | | |
| χ^2 for table | | | | 6.930 (df: 8) | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | |

^a"Some people feel like other people push them around a good bit. Others feel that they run their own lives pretty much the way they want to. How is it with you?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1960.

TABLE 108.--Subjective mobility and feeling of being pushed around

| Attitude ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|-----------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Run own lives | 93% | 86% | 87% | 89% |
| Depends, both | 1 | 6 | 13 | 1 |
| Get pushed around | 6 | 9 | 0 | 9 |
| | 100% | 101% | 100% | 99% |
| N | 69 | 35 | 15 | 170 |

| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|
| χ^2 | 1.857 (df: 2) | 10.845 (df: 2) ^b |
| Probability | NS | .01 |
| χ^2 for entire table | | 12.702 (df: 4) ^b |
| Probability | | .02 |

^a"Some people feel like other people push them around a good bit. Others feel that they run their own lives pretty much the way they want to. How is it with you?"

^bValue is artificially high because of lack of a correction for continuity.

Data Source: 1960.

TABLE 109.--Objective mobility and belief in opportunity in America

| Attitude ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----|------|-----------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|------|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | Blue-Collar | | | |
| | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | UM | ex-F | IM | SS | ex-F |
| Opportunity--yes | 75% | 71% | 77% | 78% | 71% | 72% | 71% | 65% | 67% | 62% |
| Opportunity--yes, qualified | 16 | 20 | 15 | 18 | 12 | 17 | 21 | 32 | 21 | 21 |
| Pro-Con | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 |
| Little opportunity--no, qualified | 5 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 12 | 7 | 9 | 3 | 6 | 6 |
| Little opportunity--no | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 7 |
| | 99% | 99% | 99% | 100% | 101% | 101% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 99% |
| N | 122 | 206 | 93 | 45 | 17 | 60 | 34 | 31 | 336 | 234 |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 1.944 (df: 4) | | | 5.046 (df: 8) | | | 3.723 (df: 4) | | | |
| Probability | NS | | | NS | | | NS | | | |
| X ² for table | | | | 10.714 (df: 16) | | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | NS | | | | | | |

^a"Some people say there's not much opportunity in America, today --that the average man doesn't have much chance to really get ahead. Others say there's plenty of opportunity, and anyone who works hard can go as far as he wants. How do you feel about this?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1952.

In the white-collar category the status stable may be somewhat more pessimistic about the availability of opportunity than are either the upwardly or downwardly mobile, but the difference is small and not statistically significant. In the blue-collar category a full 97 per cent of the downwardly mobile think that there is opportunity in America, a sentiment with which 88 per cent of the status stable are in agreement. The data give no indication that upward mobility is associated with optimism about chances or that downward mobility is associated with pessimism, as might be assumed. The downwardly mobile are not only not pessimistic, but more often than any other group believe that opportunity exists in America.

One final question is available for the examination of the relative satisfaction levels of the mobile. In the 1956 and 1960 surveys respondents were asked how well satisfied they were with the way they were getting along financially. The results for objective mobility are recorded in Table 110. In the professional and business category the mobile and the status stable express virtually identical levels of satisfaction. In the white-collar category the upwardly mobile are perhaps the most satisfied, but in view of the sample sizes the differences are not large. In the blue-collar category differences are again quite small, but the downwardly mobile may be a bit more satisfied with finances than are the status stable.

The results for subjective mobility are somewhat different, as reported in Table 111. In the middle class sample the status stable are better satisfied with their finances than are the upwardly mobile,

TABLE 110.--Objective mobility and satisfaction with financial situation

| Financial Satisfaction ^a | Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|------|---------------|------|------|---------------|-------------|------|------|
| | Professional and Business | | | White-Collar | | | | Blue-Collar | | |
| SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | UM | ex-F | DM | SS | ex-F | |
| Satisfied | 49% | 48% | 48% | 36% | 28% | 42% | 43% | 44% | 40% | 40% |
| More-or-less satisfied | 35 | 37 | 40 | 45 | 61 | 46 | 37 | 36 | 39 | 41 |
| Not satisfied at all | 16 | 14 | 13 | 19 | 11 | 12 | 20 | 21 | 21 | 19 |
| | 100% | 99% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 187 | 195 | 96 | 42 | 18 | 91 | 49 | 117 | 440 | 333 |
| <u>Statistical Measures^b</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| X ² | 0.387 (df: 2) | NS | | 2.769 (df: 4) | NS | | 0.594 (df: 2) | NS | | |
| X ² for table | | | | 3.750 (df: 8) | NS | | | | | |
| Probability | | | | | | | | | | |

^a"We are also interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are pretty well satisfied, more-or-less satisfied, or not satisfied at all?"

^bIn each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

TABLE III.--Subjective mobility and satisfaction with financial situation

| Financial Satisfaction ^a | Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| | Middle Class | | Working Class | |
| | Status Stable | Upwardly Mobile | Downwardly Mobile | Status Stable |
| Satisfied | 52% | 42% | 33% | 37% |
| More-or-less satisfied | 34 | 43 | 41 | 41 |
| Not satisfied at all | 14 | 15 | 26 | 21 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% |
| N | 507 | 221 | 97 | 1145 |
| <u>Statistical Measures</u> | | | | |
| χ^2 | 6.107 (df: 2) | | 1.219 (df: 2) | |
| Probability | .05 | | NS | |
| χ^2 for table | | 7.327 (df: 4) | | |
| Probability | | NS | | |

^a"We are also interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are pretty well satisfied, more-or-less satisfied, or not satisfied at all?"

Data Source: 1956, 1960.

and the difference is statistically significant. In the working class sample differences are much smaller, but the downwardly mobile are somewhat less satisfied than are the status stable.

The principal conclusion to be drawn from the evidence presented in this section is that there isn't very much difference between the mobile and the non-mobile with regard to their levels of satisfaction with various aspects of their lives. While differences are not consistent, they seem to incline in the direction of the upwardly mobile being somewhat less satisfied than their non-mobile peers, while the downwardly mobile, somewhat surprisingly, seem to be a bit more satisfied with at least some aspects of their lives than are the status stable at the same level. Quite certainly none of the evidence here supports a contention that the mobile are much more likely to be bitter, dissatisfied, or alienated from society than are the non-mobile.

Conclusion

With the exception of attitudes on race relations the findings of the chapter are largely that there is not much difference between the mobile and the non-mobile with regard to their adjustment to society. On the two issues of race relations there was no difference at high status levels between the mobile and the non-mobile, but at low status levels the downwardly mobile less often were in favor of government action to insure fair treatment of Negroes than were those of stable low status. This is noteworthy because it is a reversal of the relationship on other kinds of noneconomic issues. On both foreign

affairs and the issue of protection of rights of accused government employees the downwardly mobile are more liberal than their status stable peers.

On membership in organizations, both the upwardly and the downwardly mobile tend to belong to fewer organizations than do their equals of stable status. The downwardly mobile less often belong to unions than do status stable blue-collar workers, while at higher status levels the upwardly mobile somewhat more often belong to unions than do the status stable at the same level.

The lesser participation of the mobile in groups is apparently not a reflection of any very deep-seated dissatisfaction with society. While the upwardly mobile slightly more often report bad luck or dissatisfaction with finances than do others of high status, they do not seem to feel any more pushed around or distrustful of groups in the society. The downwardly mobile, while a bit less satisfied with finances, tend to feel luckier, more in charge of their own lives, and to see more opportunity than do those of stable low status.

Thus although the mobile may be considered less well integrated in society to the extent that they have a lower rate of participation in groups and organizations than do the non-mobile, with the exception of the attitudes of the downwardly mobile on race relations there is little evidence in these data that the mobile are any more bitter, cynical or unhappy than are the non-mobile.

CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The ever-increasing polarization of society into politically antagonistic classes predicted by Karl Marx has not come to pass. The influence of social mobility on the political system is almost certainly one of the most important reasons that Marx's prediction failed. Although many authors have suggested that social mobility tends to reduce status polarization in politics, little previous empirical evidence has existed to support this view.

As noted in Chapter III, there is implicit in the suggestion that mobility reduces status polarization an assumption about the effect of mobility upon individual political behavior. Social mobility can operate to reduce political polarization only if the mobile individual's political behavior is less status polarized than is that of the non-mobile individual, or if his presence in a new social position somehow reduces the status polarization of those around him, or both. The evidence, although more directly applicable to the first point than the second, suggests that mobility operates in both ways. Before discussing the effects of mobility upon the political system in any detail, it is worthwhile to review briefly some of the more important findings of this study about the political characteristics of the mobile.

The Upwardly Mobile

Perhaps the best characterization of the upwardly mobile is that in many ways their transition from one status level to another is incomplete. Whether objective or subjective mobility is used as a measure the upwardly mobile average less income and less education than do those of stable high status, and are more often of the Catholic faith. In each instance the upwardly mobile group is intermediate between those of stable high status and those of stable low status.

The upwardly mobile care less about politics and are less likely to vote than are those of stable high status. They less often feel they understand or can affect politics than do others of high status. But though less interested and involved in politics than are those of stable high status, the upwardly mobile are more interested and involved than are those of stable low status. Thus the mobile again are intermediate between those of stable high status and those of stable low status.

On political preferences, too, the upwardly mobile display an intermediate distribution. They are more often Democrats than are those of stable high status, but less often Democrats than are those of stable low status. On political issues they are somewhat more often liberals on economic questions than the non-mobile of high status, but less often than the non-mobile of low status. On noneconomic issues they are less liberal than the non-mobile of high status on foreign affairs and government employee rights, but show about the same attitude distribution as the non-mobile on rights of Negroes. With

the exception of the issue of Negro rights their position is again intermediate between the non-mobile of high and low status.

Finally, on a series of questions intended to determine how well integrated the mobile are in their social environments the upwardly mobile report themselves less often participants in voluntary groups or organizations than do those of stable high status, but more often than do those of stable low status. They are more often union members than others of high status, but less often than those of low status. Although they may be somewhat less satisfied with their lives than are those who inherited high status, they are more often satisfied than are those who inherited low status. There is no suggestion in any of the data that the upwardly mobile are disproportionately unhappy or maladjusted.

The picture of the upwardly mobile painted by the evidence is of individuals in the process of fairly smooth passage from a low status in society to a higher status. They have adopted a certain measure of the attitude structure typical of those who inherited their high status, but retain clear traces of the attitudes toward politics that were learned in their youth. Consequently, on almost every measure of political relevance the upwardly mobile occupy a position in between those of low status and those of high.

The Downwardly Mobile

As with the upwardly mobile, on most traits of political relevance the downwardly mobile are intermediate between those of

stable high status and those of stable low status. In comparison with those of stable low status they are more often Protestants, and on the average have higher incomes and better educations.

Compared with those of stable low status the downwardly mobile are more interested and active in politics and more often feel they understand political events. They are more often Republicans than are their new status peers, but less often Republicans than those of stable high status. They are much more conservative than the non-mobile of low status on economic issues, but more liberal on issues of foreign affairs and the rights of government employees--each of these attitudes reflecting their higher status origin.

Questions on satisfaction with their social situation indicate that the downwardly mobile are, if anything, slightly more satisfied with their lives than are those of stable low status. On the other hand, there is some indication that they are more often mistrustful, belong to fewer voluntary groups, and are less often union members, though only in the case of union membership are the differences statistically significant. Though no evidence was available that directly reflected racial intolerance, the downwardly mobile are considerably less often willing to see the government act on behalf of Negro rights than are any other group, a finding in harmony with that of previous studies which report an association between prejudice and downward mobility.

The downwardly mobile retain even clearer evidence of their origin at a different status level than they now inhabit than do the

upwardly mobile. On all traits of political relevance examined other than the racial issue their attitudes reflect their higher status origin.

The White-Collar Category

The status stable group in the white-collar category is consistently deviant on almost all of the dimensions of political behavior examined, although due to the relatively small sample involved the differences are in most cases not statistically significant.

Within the white-collar category the upwardly mobile and the downwardly mobile in most regards differ from each other in the hypothesized way--the upwardly mobile closer to those of stable low status, the downwardly mobile closer to those of stable high status, thus reflecting their early political socialization. The status stable group, however, does not occupy an intermediate position between the two mobile groups as might have been expected.

Compared with either the upwardly mobile or downwardly mobile members of the white-collar category the status stable are more often of native stock, are more often Protestants (none are Jewish), are more often Republicans, and more often have Republican parents--though not necessarily Republican friends. They tend to be conservative on both economic and noneconomic issues, but though they feel they understand politics as well as do their socially mobile peers, they are less often interested or involved in politics. The status stable members of the white-collar group would appear to be worth further investigation

to determine if the deviant tendencies exhibited by the small sample used here hold up to more searching investigation.

Political Extremism

One of the most often repeated assertions about the mobile, and particularly about the downwardly mobile, is that they are inclined toward political extremism. In all the rather considerable data examined in the last several chapters the only evidence to support such an assertion concerned racial attitudes. The downwardly mobile more often oppose government action on behalf of Negroes than do any other group, and this tendency is most marked among those downwardly mobile individuals with the best educations. This hints that downward mobility may under certain circumstances incline individuals toward intolerance or extremism. But on noneconomic issues not concerned with race the downwardly mobile are more often liberals than are those of stable status. Even on non-economic issues where measures of the intensity of the attitude are available the downwardly mobile are no more likely to have strong feelings than are other groups. Thus there is no evidence in the data to support a connection between downward mobility and political extremism, other than their attitudes toward racial issues.

Any assertion that the upwardly mobile are likely to be political extremists is even less supported. On virtually every dimension of political attitudes and behavior the upwardly mobile occupy a position between those of stable high and stable low status. These data would suggest that the upwardly mobile tend to be political moderates--not political extremists.

But to say that the data do not reveal that the mobile are extremists is not exactly the same thing as saying that they are not potential recruits to extremism under certain circumstances. After all, these data cover only an eight year span that, with the possible exception of McCarthyism, includes no extremist political movement of any size. Is there any indication here that the mobile might be more susceptible to extremist political movements under conditions of stress?

Reinhard Bendix describes the kind of person who was most susceptible to one type of extremist political movement--the German Nazi movement:

the impetus to radicalization among the German masses arose in the first instance among those who were just entering political life. It is probably characteristic of many non-voters to regard political participation as 'useless,' to believe that politics will only benefit the crooks anyway, and to profess a lack of concern with public affairs. Such people are likely to vote only under extreme provocation, and they are likely to support a party which proposes to clean the Augean stables and to establish an entirely new order.¹

How does this portrait compare with that of the socially mobile? When compared with the status stable of equivalent status, the downwardly mobile are more interested and active in politics, care more who wins, feel more capable of influencing politics, and vote more often. On these same measures the upwardly mobile, though less interested and involved than those of stable high status, are more so than those of

¹Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and Political Power," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Class, Status and Power (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 606-607.

stable low status. Neither the downwardly nor the upwardly mobile come at all close to fitting the particular pattern of susceptibility to extremism painted by Bendix.

There are certain characteristics of the downwardly mobile, however, that could be interpreted as making them at least potentially vulnerable to the appeals of political extremism. They are, for example, quite a bit more conservative on economic issues than are others of low status, and even in some cases more conservative than are those of high status. Attitude differences between the downwardly mobile and the status stable in some cases increase with age, indicating a failure to become socialized into new group norms. In several cases attitude differences increase with education, with the best educated among the downwardly mobile being the least tolerant, a difference opposite to that which would normally be expected. The downwardly mobile tend to have lower membership rates in formal organizations, and are perhaps less likely to react to formal groups at all, less often expressing either trust or distrust of them. These items may indicate some degree of frustration and isolation on the part of the downwardly mobile, but as noted, it is not reflected in any of the indices of satisfaction with various aspects of life or in feelings of political understanding or efficacy.

One issue was examined that might be considered an index to extremism in that it involves attitudes toward what would be a clear violation of individual rights. When asked to react to the preposterous proposal that any government worker accused of being a

communist should be fired without proof, the downwardly mobile more often disagreed than did those of stable low status. Thus on the one issue available for examination the downwardly mobile somewhat less often adopt an extreme position than do others of equivalent status. This seems to me particularly significant in view of the frequency with which interpreters of the American radical right have asserted a connection between it and downward mobility. I find no convincing evidence in any of the data that the mobile are any more often political extremists or any more susceptible to extremist appeals than are other individuals of low status. Although the evidence is neither unequivocal nor of large magnitude, there is some indication that the opposite is true: the downwardly mobile appear to be somewhat more often political moderates than are their status stable peers.

Partisan Change

One of the most striking findings of research on voting behavior is the persistence of partisan identification, in many cases long after the original reasons for the identification have become irrelevant.² Even the political behavior of the mobile reported in this study may be considered a special case of the same pattern. The mobile tend to

²See, for example: V. O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana, in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (eds.), American Voting Behavior (Glen-coe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 281-299; V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (4th ed., New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1958), p. 233; Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 552-558.

retain the party preference that is predominant in the stratum of their birth in spite of their move to a new status. How is the persistence of party preference to be reconciled with the fact that in a democratic system political parties alternate in power? That is, if party preferences are so stable, why doesn't one party win all of the time?³

The classic model of democratic politics affords an inadequate explanation. In this model of politics the flexibility of the system is the result of rational calculation on the part of informed, interested citizens who choose between parties on the basis of their performance and proposals. Yet in reality it is not the best informed, most interested citizen who is likely to change his vote from one party to another. The authors of Voting state the matter thusly:

Curiously, the voters least admirable when measured against individual requirements contribute most when measured against the aggregate requirement for flexibility. For those who change political preferences most readily are those who are least interested, who are subject to conflicting social pressures, who have inconsistent beliefs and erratic voting histories. Without them--if the decision were left only to the deeply concerned, well-integrated, consistently-principled ideal citizens--the political system might easily prove too rigid to adapt to changing domestic and international conditions.⁴

³This is a fairly crucial question. A political system in which one party did win all of the time would not fit many definitions of democratic politics.

⁴Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 316.

It is the view of the authors of Voting that it is cross-pressured individuals who provide the main element of flexibility in the political system.⁵

Although contrary to hypothesis the evidence does not indicate that the mobile are any more often cross-pressured than are other people, it seems to me that social mobility contributes to the flexibility of the political system in two ways. First, the mobile are themselves more likely to change votes from election to election. Second, the phenomenon of social mobility increases the number of cross-pressured individuals, and thus the proportion of voters susceptible to shifting.⁶

On the first point, both the upwardly and downwardly mobile report having changed parties somewhat more often than do the non-mobile, and on average they report somewhat weaker party preferences. Perhaps more significant, the evidence on votes for President indicates that both upwardly and downwardly mobile are more likely to shift their vote from one party to another. Between 1956 and 1960, for example, more of the mobile switched their votes from Eisenhower to Kennedy than did the non-mobile.

⁵Talcott Parsons concurs in this view. See Talcott Parsons, "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," in Burdick and Brodbeck (eds.), op. cit., pp. 80-120.

⁶The term cross-pressured is used here because this is the way the matter to be described has usually been referred to in the literature. It is not at all necessary to the argument that the cross-pressure hypothesis be correct. It is sufficient that contact with people of varying political views makes political shifting more likely--a point hardly to be disputed.

The reasoning behind the second point, that the phenomenon of mobility increases the number of cross-pressured individuals, is more roundabout. The examination of various indicators of cross-pressure in Chapter VIII revealed no evidence that the mobile are any more often cross-pressured than are the non-mobile.⁷ But this finding is susceptible to two interpretations. It may be that social mobility is not associated with cross-pressure, or it may be that the phenomenon of social mobility creates cross-pressure on both the mobile and non-mobile in relatively equal measure. Lipset, for example, has argued that the hope of improving one's class position can lead to cross-pressure and lower voting rates.⁸ Although none of my data bear upon the effect of the hope of mobility upon the likelihood of individuals being swing voters, another approach to the effect of mobility upon swing voting is possible.

A substantial portion of any status group consists of persons who have been socially mobile. Thus the mobile constitute a portion of the social environment to which the non-mobile are exposed. Sorokin failed to understand this when he stated that because portions of the population are not mobile "a part of the population during one or two or more generations, still remains in a regime like a caste system."⁹

⁷This finding is probably limited to political systems of relatively low status polarization. Where polarization is higher cross-pressure effects seem more likely. c.f. Robert R. Alford, Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963), p. 305.

⁸S. M. Lipset et al., "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, II (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), 1134.

⁹Pitirim Sorokin, Social Mobility (New York: Harper, 1927), p. 438.

But to belong to a caste group where all of your peers have inherited the same social status is a very different matter from belonging to a group where substantial numbers have been socialized at other status levels. The potent influence of friends and co-workers on political behavior may be seen in Table 112. The presence of even one friend or co-worker with a different political preference is sufficient to noticeably alter the probability that an individual will vote in a certain way. Because the mobile are themselves more likely to have political preferences incongruent with their status, their presence as part of the social environment of others makes it more likely that the non-mobile will themselves be exposed to conflicting political attitudes.¹⁰ As a result more of the non-mobile are likely to shift parties between elections than would be true if they were not exposed to socially mobile individuals.

Status Polarization

Closely related to the effect of social mobility on the flexibility of the political system is its effect upon the degree of status polarization that exists in the system. There is an inherently divisive element in the operation of a democratic political system. The electorate must choose among alternative policies or leaders, and the resultant choosing up of sides necessarily results in a certain degree of division of the society into competing camps.

¹⁰ As Wilensky and Edwards have noted, the militancy of miners, seamen, and longshoremen has often been explained in terms of their exposure only to those of identical occupation and social class. Social mobility serves to minimize this kind of social isolation. (cf. H. L. Wilensky and Hugh Edwards, "The Skidder: Ideological Adjustments of Downward Mobile Workers," American Sociological Review, XXIV, No. 2 (April, 1959), 215-231).

TABLE 112.--Respondent's vote intention by intentions of friends and co-workers^a

| Respondent Intends to Vote | Friends' Votes ^b | | | | Co-workers' Votes | | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|------|------|------|-------------------|------|------|------|
| | RRR | RRD | RDD | DDD | RRR | RRD | RDD | DDD |
| Republican | 88% | 74% | 48% | 15% | 86% | 75% | 53% | 19% |
| Democratic | 12 | 26 | 52 | 85 | 14 | 25 | 47 | 81 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 245 | 58 | 29 | 79 | 98 | 36 | 19 | 32 |

^aAdapted from Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 98, Chart XLIII.

^bRRR means all three Republican, RRD means two Republican and one Democrat, and so on.

Data Source: Elmira, New York, 1948.

Yet if a democratic political system is to work properly the division cannot become too deep. This is because it is fundamental to the functioning of democracy that the political game be played according to certain rules. The losers of an election must acquiesce in the ascension of the victors to power, and the victors must not misuse their power so as to make their defeat at subsequent elections impossible. These rules are likely to be obeyed only when the lines of political division are not too deep.¹¹ As Gabriel Almond has noted, "A game is a good game when the outcome is in doubt and when the stakes are not too high. When the stakes are too high, the tone changes from excitement to anxiety."¹²

If the rules are to be obeyed the stakes must not become so high that large numbers of individuals or groups feel that in the interests of self-preservation they must break the rules. Thus politics in successful democracies is often characterized as a "politics of compromise." Where parties must appeal to a broad spectrum of voters

¹¹ Although status polarization and political intensity are not the same thing, they are closely related. Where all of the supporters of a party are drawn from one portion of society (i.e. high polarization) it loses any reason for compromising its program in an attempt to win support from other sectors of society. Thus in highly polarized political systems parties are more likely to pursue radical programs that discriminate against those groups from which they draw no support, for they stand to lose no votes by antagonizing those who won't vote for them anyway. As a result, the stakes of politics go up, and with more to win and more to lose intensity is likely to be higher than in political systems with low status polarization, where parties draw support from all sectors of society and thus try to avoid antagonizing any substantial group.

¹² Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," The Journal of Politics, XVIII (August, 1956), 391-409.

the resulting policies are compromises that are not likely to be so threatening to any substantial segment of the society that they feel impelled to break the democratic rules. It is on this basis that Seymour Lipset argues:

A stable democracy requires a situation in which all the major political parties include supporters from many segments of the population. A system in which the support of different parties corresponds too closely to basic social divisions cannot continue on a democratic basis, for it reflects a state of conflict so intense and clear-cut as to rule out compromise.¹³

One of the most basic social divisions along which the party system is liable to divide is that of social class, and social mobility is of political importance as a mechanism to prevent the full identification of class and party.

Pitirim Sorokin, writing in 1927, stated three propositions describing the effect of social mobility upon status polarization:

- A. Within present Western societies, children of fathers of the same occupation, and often children of the same family, are dispersed among the most different occupational groups.
- B. Each of the occupational groups at the present moment is recruited from the offspring of the most different groups.
- C. The preceding two propositions mean that in present Western societies different occupational groups are strongly interwoven, and the cleavages between them are considerably obliterated, or, more accurately, are somewhat indefinite and not clearly cut.¹⁴

¹³Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 13.

¹⁴Sorokin, op. cit., pp. 435, 437-438.

Although Sorokin describes the effect of social mobility upon status polarization, he lacks the data necessary to specify the mechanisms by which it acts. The findings on mobility reported here suggest three ways in which social mobility operates to reduce status polarization.

First, the mobile themselves are less status polarized than are the non-mobile. The mobile are more often class misidentifiers, more often prefer the "wrong" political party for their status position, and show less status polarization on political issues than do the non-mobile. Because the mobile are a numerically important portion of both high and low status groups, their presence dilutes political polarization at both ends of the social spectrum.

Second, as described in the previous section, the presence of the mobile at different status levels reduces the polarization of the non-mobile by reducing the homogeneity of the social milieu in which the non-mobile live their lives.

The third way in which mobility serves to reduce polarization is not directly tested by the data. Most commentators agree that a belief in the possibility of social mobility serves to reduce status polarization in a political system. V. O. Key exemplifies this view when he states:

A rigid class system, with the associated harshness of political conflict, probably can more readily develop when expectations are general that children are frozen in the status of their parents.¹⁵

¹⁵V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 48.

Because, other things being equal, a belief in the possibility of mobility is more likely when substantial numbers of people are in fact mobile, this too should serve to reduce status polarization--though it should be repeated that this effect is not tested by the available data.

Limitations of the Analysis

Although any study is subject to limitations which need no apology, it is well to point out those which seem most important. In the present case the analysis was entirely in aggregate terms, and though a number of controls were introduced, it is entirely possible that the behavior of significantly deviant groups was masked by the aggregate.

Another limitation, which I find more serious, is that no satisfactory instrument for the measurement of extreme or rapid mobility was available. It seems to me quite possible that those who have been subject to a more abrupt or extensive social transition than is common are subject to pressures and anxieties leading to political behavior quite different from that reported here for the general run of mobile individuals. In certain of the preliminary analyses movement from the highest to the lowest status groups or from the lowest to the highest was treated as extreme mobility, but no important differences between the moderately and extremely mobile were uncovered by the technique, and the results have not been reported here.¹⁶ I do not find the lack of difference convincing, however,

¹⁶ On this point see note 24, p. 64.

and attribute it primarily to the inadequacy of the index of extreme mobility used. Something approaching a status biography would be necessary to adequately pinpoint those who had been subject to extreme or rapid mobility, and these data are not normally obtained in survey research.¹⁷

Although one of the conclusions is that in the United States social mobility serves to reduce political polarization and the severity of class conflict, this is a conclusion that is difficult to generalize to other cultures. It is probable that where mobility results in serious anxieties, or where the process of mobility is by means to which substantial numbers of people deny legitimacy, social mobility can be dysfunctional to the political system. Only comparative study between cultures where the process of mobility differs can provide satisfactory evidence on this point.

Conclusion

The effect of social mobility upon the political system has been the subject of much folklore and speculation, but of few tested propositions. The evidence examined here indicates that, contrary to frequent assertion, the mobile are no more likely to be political

¹⁷ It seems to me that whether or not mobility results in unusual pressures and anxieties for the individual depends on the relationship of at least three variables: (1) the magnitude of social ascent or descent; (2) the rapidity of ascent or descent; (3) the effectiveness of the agencies of socialization to which the individual is exposed. Pressures and anxieties are most likely to be present where the magnitude of the social move is large, where it takes place within a short period of time, and where effective agencies of socialization are absent.

extremists than are the non-mobile--at least under the conditions prevailing in the election years included. The influence of mobility on the political system would rather seem to be as a moderating factor: lending flexibility to the electoral process, reducing the stakes involved in elections, and diluting the class content of politics.

The political system of the United States is characterized by relatively low status polarization. Although those of high status are more likely to be Republicans and those of low status are more often Democrats, adherents of both parties are found at all status levels. The socially mobile are even less polarized than the rest of the population. The result of this low status polarization is that in a statistical sense social status accounts for only a small portion of the variance in political preference. Because the mobile are even less polarized, mobility accounts for an even smaller proportion of political variance. It would be a serious mistake to conclude from this that social mobility is unimportant as a political phenomenon, for it is precisely because social mobility successfully reduces polarization that it is not a good predictor. That only small political differences exist between groups of different status and mobility classifications is testimony to the efficacy of mobility in reducing status polarization.

APPENDIX A

1952 OCCUPATION CODE (SRC STUDY 400)

"What is your occupation? I mean, what kind of work do you do? (If Respondent is not head of the household) What kind of work does the head of your household do?"

Code only full-time jobs--not interested in part-time jobs.
If housewife or student works part-time, code as housewife or student.

1. Professional and semi-professional
2. Self-employed business men and artisans; managers and officials
3. Clerical and sales; buyers, agents, brokers
4. Skilled and semi-skilled
5. Unskilled, service workers, farm laborers
6. Protective service
7. Unemployed
8. Farm operators
9. Retired
- &. Housewife
0. Student
- .. NA

The more elaborate codes used in the 1956 and 1960 election surveys were recoded to conform with the 1952 code.

Cases coded 1 or 2 were placed in the professional and business category. Cases coded 3 were assigned to the white-collar category. Cases coded 4, 5, or 6 were assigned to the blue-collar category. Cases carrying any other code were not used.

APPENDIX B

STATUS DISCREPANCY BETWEEN OCCUPATION CATEGORY OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD AND
RESPONDENT'S FATHER

| Year and Head of Household's Occupation ^a | Prof. and Business | Father's Occupation ^b | | | Total |
|--|-----------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|-------|
| | | White- Collar | Blue- Collar | Farm Operator | |
| <u>1952</u> | | | | | |
| Prof. and Bus. | 122 | 34 | 106 | 94 | 356 |
| White-Collar | 45 | 17 | 60 | 36 | 158 |
| Blue-Collar | 68 | 31 | 344 | 245 | 688 |
| Total | 235 | 82 | 510 | 375 | 1202 |
| <u>1956</u> | | | | | |
| Prof. and Bus. | 151 | 24 | 139 | 87 | 401 |
| White-Collar | 34 | 15 | 77 | 40 | 166 |
| Blue-Collar | 81 | 16 | 381 | 292 | 770 |
| Total | 266 | 55 | 597 | 419 | 1337 |
| <u>1960 (when used alone)</u> | | | | | |
| Prof. and Bus. | 104 | 19 | 88 | 52 | 263 |
| White-Collar | 23 | 10 | 54 | 32 | 119 |
| Blue-Collar | 35 | 14 | 205 | 162 | 416 |
| Total | 162 | 43 | 347 | 246 | 798 |
| <u>1960 (when aggregated)</u> | | | | | |
| Prof. and Bus. | 36 | 4 | 31 | 9 | 80 |
| White-Collar | 8 | 3 | 15 | 10 | 36 |
| Blue-Collar | 14 | 6 | 60 | 42 | 122 |
| Total | 58 | 13 | 106 | 61 | 238 |
| <u>Aggregate: 1952, 1956, 1960</u> | | | | | |
| Prof. and Bus. | 309 | 62 | 276 | 190 | 837 |
| White-Collar | 87 | 35 | 152 | 86 | 360 |
| Blue-Collar | 163 | 53 | 785 | 579 | 1580 |
| Total | 559 | 150 | 1213 | 855 | 2777 |

^aOccupation as coded for the 1956 and 1960 elections has been recoded to conform to the 1952 code. The 1952 code is reproduced in Appendix A.

^b"What kind of work did your father do for a living while you were growing up?" Father's occupation has been recoded in the same manner as head of household's occupation.

APPENDIX C

RESPONDENT'S PERCEPTION OF HIS OWN SOCIAL CLASS AND THAT OF HIS FAMILY
WHILE HE WAS GROWING UP

| Year and Respondent's Subjective Class ^a | Respondent's Classification of His Family While He Was Growing Up ^b | | | Total |
|---|---|---------------|--|-------------|
| | Middle Class | Working Class | | |
| <u>1956</u> | | | | |
| Middle Class | 436 | 185 | | 621 |
| Working Class | 81 | 968 | | 1049 |
| Total | <u>517</u> | <u>1153</u> | | <u>1670</u> |
| <u>1960 (when used alone)</u> | | | | |
| Middle Class | 233 | 143 | | 376 |
| Working Class | 46 | 692 | | 738 |
| Total | <u>279</u> | <u>835</u> | | <u>1114</u> |
| <u>1960 (when aggregated)</u> | | | | |
| Middle Class | 72 | 37 | | 109 |
| Working Class | 17 | 187 | | 204 |
| Total | <u>89</u> | <u>224</u> | | <u>313</u> |
| <u>Aggregate: 1956, 1960</u> | | | | |
| Middle Class | 508 | 222 | | 730 |
| Working Class | 98 | 1155 | | 1253 |
| Total | <u>606</u> | <u>1377</u> | | <u>1983</u> |

^a"There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or to the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as being in one of these classes? Which one?" Includes those who do not normally consider themselves as belonging to a class, but who when pressed were willing to assign themselves to one.

^b"What would you say your family was when you were growing up, middle class or working class?"

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